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Abstract
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM), is a tamper-resistant hardware device that serves as a trust anchor for
the host platform that it is embedded in. To do this, the TPM chip creates attestations about the state of
the host system. These attestations convince a remote verifier that the platform it is communicating with
is running on trusted hardware and using the correct software. Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)
is an anonymous digital signature scheme that allows the TPM attestation service to hold the privacy-
preserving property. That is, the verifier can check that attestations originate from a certified TPM, but
it does not learn the identity of the particular TPM. Another important feature of DAA is that it supports
user-controlled linkability which is obtained by using a basename (bsn). If a platform uses a fresh or
empty basename, the resulting attestations cannot be linked whereas using the same basename makes
the corresponding transactions linkable. Currently standardised Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)
schemes have their security based on the factoring and the discrete logarithm problems and are therefore
insecure against quantum attackers as a result of Shor’s quantum algorithm. Thus, it is important to find
alternatives for the currently used DAA signature schemes. Lattice-based cryptography is considered as
a powerful candidate receiving lots of attention not only due to its conjectured quantum-attack resistance,
but also due to its security guarantee to provide worst-case hardness of average-case instances. This thesis
contributes to a smooth transition of the current Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) and Enhanced
Privacy ID (EPID) schemes, which can be seen as DAA with different linkability requirements, into
the world of lattice-based cryptographic schemes. We also provide a novel solution for an outstanding
authentication problem in the DAA join protocol. Our contributions are classified into three main parts.
The first contribution of this work is constructing two quantum-safe lattice-based Direct Anonymous
Attestation protocols from lattice assumptions. Compared to the only other lattice-based DAA scheme
with conjectured post-quantum security available in the related art, the first proposed lattice-based DAA
(LDAA) protocol ensures that the storage requirements of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) are re-
duced twofold and the signature sizes five times. Moreover, experimental results show that the signing
and verification operations are accelerated 1.1 and 2.0 times, respectively. To achieve more efficiency,
we constructed a compact quantum-safe lattice-based Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol whose sig-
nature size is around 2MB, which is (at least) two orders of magnitude smaller compared to existing
ii
post-quantum DAA schemes. The security of both proposed lattice-based DAA schemes is proved in
the Universal Composability (UC) model under the assumed hardness of the Ring-Short Integer Solution
(Ring-SIS) and the Ring-Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problems. This work is a contribution to the
European H2020 FutureTPM project and the final result of this work may lead to a post-quantum DAA
scheme that is suitable for inclusion in a future quantum-resistant TPM.
The second contribution of this work is a new Lattice-based EPID (LEPID) protocol. Inspired by our
work on lattice-based DAA schemes, we present the first Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) scheme, supported
on lattice primitives, that may benefit from future research developments in post-quantum cryptography.
We also give a new security model for the EPID in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. The
proposed LEPID scheme is proved secure under the new model.
The third contribution deals with the DAA join protocol when the TPM uses two different keys for the
purpose of user privacy. An Endorsement Key (EK) which is used to identify the TPM and an Attestation
Key (AK) used for TPM attestation services. Using two different keys results with a problem of how to
bind these two keys together. This is a crucial property in scenarios in which an issuer needs reliable
information about AK-EK pairs before certifying the AK in the join interface of a DAA protocol. Thus
we introduced a new security property of “key binding” in the process of issuing TPM Attestation Key
(AK) certificates. Our analysis also showed that the DAA schemes that are supported by the TPM chips
(either the TPM 1.2 version or TPM 2.0 version) can suffer from man-in-the-middle attacks from a
malicious TPM and/or a malicious host, or cannot be implemented by following the TPM specifications.
Finally, we present a novel solution for such authentication problem with a rigorous security proof and
implement this solution by using the existing TPM 2.0 commands with a real TPM 2.0 chip.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The existing DAA schemes used in the TPMs are based on either the factorisation problem in the RSA
setting or the discrete logarithm problem in the Elliptic-Curve (EC) setting. Since the factorisation prob-
lem and discrete logarithm problem are known to be vulnerable to quantum computer attacks [Sho99],
then all the existing standardised DAA protocols are not post-quantum secure, i.e., an adversary with a
quantum computer could subvert the existing DAA protocols and might break the TPM’s security. Thus,
there is a need to update the cryptographic primitives of current privacy-preserving schemes, which rely
on classical cryptography, to be quantum resistant. Among the candidates for “post-quantum cryptogra-
phy”, lattices are considered as the most promising one. In this thesis, we developed two quantum safe
Lattice-based DAA (LDAA) schemes, and a novel lattice-based Enhanced Privacy ID (LEPID), since
to the best of our knowledge there is no lattice-based EPID scheme in the literature yet. This research
may lead to quantum-safe DAA and EPID protocols suitable for the inclusion of the quantum resistant
TPM and the Intel’s Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) in the future. This work also provided a detailed
analysis of the DAA join protocol. Our analysis revealed some issues in the communication channel
between a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and a Privacy-CA who serves as a DAA membership Issuer.
To resolve this issue, we proposed a new solution for communication channel and proved its security. We
also demonstrated how to implement this solution by using the existing TPM 2.0 commands with a real
TPM 2.0 chip.
1.1.1 Lattice-based Cryptography
Lattices have been studied since the 18th century by great mathematicians such as Lagrange, Gauss,
Minkowski, and Hermite. The computational aspect of lattices has been a centre of attraction over the
last two decades along with the rapid development of public-key cryptography. The most popular com-
putational problems on lattices are the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and the Closest Vector Problem
(CVP). While Shor’s algorithm proved that the most commonly used problems in public-key cryptog-
raphy, such as the integer factorisation problem and the discrete logarithm problem, can be solved ef-
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ficiently by quantum computers, it is not known whether there exists a quantum algorithm for solving
lattice problems. Therefore, it is reasonable to recall the following conjecture from [MR09]: “There is
no polynomial-time (even quantum) algorithm that approximates lattice problems to within polynomial
factors”. Relying on this conjecture, lattice problems are extremely useful for building cryptographic
constructions, that are resistant against quantum computers.
Among the candidates for “post-quantum cryptography”, lattices are considered promising. Other attrac-
tive properties of lattice cryptography are due to the fact that it ensures security under worst-case assump-
tions: This is a strong theoretical evidence that the random instances used in lattice-based cryptography
are indeed hard to solve. This feature has not been seen in any other cryptographic construction. In 1996,
Ajtai [Ajt96] explained the construction of a cryptographic function such that breaking any instance of
the function is at least as hard as approximating a particular lattice problem on any lattice to within a
small polynomial factor. Hence, the provable security of a cryptographic construction can be based on
the worst-case hardness assumption. This important result was behind the foundation of lattice-based
cryptography. Micciancio and Regev [MR07] introduced the Small Integer Solution (SIS) problem, and
the inhomogeneous variant ISIS was subsequently defined by Gentry et a[GPV08a]. Inspired by Ajtai’s
one-way function, a lot of constructions based on the hardness of the SIS and ISIS problems have been
proposed such as:
• Collision-resistant hash functions[PR06, BDL+16, LM06a]
• Commitment schemes [KTX08, BDL+16]
• Identification schemes [Lyu08a]
• Signature schemes [BDL+16, CHKP12, Boy10, Ru¨c10, Lyu12] and [MP12a]
The underlying average-case problems (I)SIS and LWE involve only simple operations such as choosing
uniformly random integer matrices and vectors and performing basic multiplications and additions with
them. In contrast, for cryptography based on number-theoretic problems, the corresponding operations
are much more expensive, such as generating huge prime numbers and exponentiating modulo these
primes. In 2005, Regev [Reg09] made a significant contribution in the development of lattice-based
cryptography by introducing the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, which enjoys a worst-case to
average-case quantum reduction, i.e., if there is an efficient algorithm that solves any LWE instance, then
there should be an efficient quantum algorithm approximating lattice problems on any lattice. The LWE
problem spread rapidly in the world of research, and since then it has been used as the basis for a large
variety of cryptographic constructions, mostly used in encryption schemes that are secure under chosen-
plaintext attacks [Reg09, GPV08a]. Having these nice features, lattice-based cryptography has become
one of the most trendy topics in the field, especially in the last several years. This yields interesting
challenges of improving the existing schemes and constructing the new ones.
1.1.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a cryptographic protocol that allows a Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) to serve as a trust anchor for a host platform it is embedded in. To do so, the TPM chip creates
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attestations about the state of the host system, e.g., certifying the boot sequence the host is running on.
A DAA can be seen as a special variant of group signatures with a central issuer controlling membership
to the group of certified TPMs, and TPMs being able to sign anonymously on behalf of the group.
Instead of the opening capabilities provided in group signatures, DAA controls privacy through the use
of basenames and user-controlled linkability.
DAA has been developed for the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), which is the industry group that de-
signs the TPM. The first RSA-based DAA protocol got standardised in the TPM 1.2 specification [Tru04]
in 2004 [BCC04], whereas the newer TPM 2.0 standard [Tru14] published in 2014 supports a suite of
elliptic-curve based DAA protocols [BCL08, BCL09, CPS10b] that are specified in the complementing
ISO standard ISO/IEC 20008-2 [Int13, Int15]. As reported by TCG, more than a billion devices include
TPM technology; in particular almost all enterprise PCs, many servers and embedded systems rely on
such trusted hardware anchors. Since the first proposal of DAA, many extensions and works to improve
security and efficiency have been proposed [BFG+13, CU15, XYZF14] and[CDL16, CDL17, CCD+17].
Recently, the practical interest in DAA has revived, as providing authenticity of attestations while pre-
serving the privacy of senders is enjoying increased attention and awareness. Anonymity of attestations
is particularly important in automotive applications such vehicle-to-vehicle communication, wherein
tracking of drivers should be prevented but authenticity of the communication must be guaranteed
too [WCG+17]. A DAA protocol has also been integrated into the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) au-
thentication framework [FID19]. In this application, the TPM creates a new authentication key, and
outputs a DAA signature in order to certify that the key is properly stored in the TPM. Another DAA-
based application is a privacy-enhancing cloud service architecture to protect user’s data, using DAA to
let users control the extent of data sharing among their service accounts [GJL11].
The existing DAA schemes that are currently supported by the TPMs are based on either the factori-
sation problem in the RSA setting or the discrete logarithm problem in the Elliptic Curve (EC) set-
ting. Since the factorisation problem and discrete logarithm problem are known to be vulnerable to
quantum computer attacks [Sho99], then the security of all the standardized DAA schemes may be bro-
ken in the post-quantum age. Thus, there is a need to update the cryptographic primitives of current
privacy-preserving schemes, which rely on classical cryptography, to be quantum-resistant. Many pro-
posed post-quantum cryptographic primitives are built on the top of code [CM10], hash [BHH+15],
lattice [DKL+18] and multivariate-based problems [YN18], which could possibly be used as the basis
for the development of post-quantum DAA protocols. Among these, lattice-based cryptography seems
to be the most flexible, supporting many anonymous digital signatures, such as lattice based group sig-
natures [LLM+16, LNW15, dPLS18], and ring signatures [GCH+19, BS13]. Lattice-based cryptography
also supports more complex cryptographic constructs like homomorphic encryption [MSM17], attribute-
based encryption [ZYW+14], etc.
In this work, we take advantage of this flexibility, namely regarding the additive homomorphism of
a lattice-based commitment scheme, to bring forth optimisations to a recently proposed lattice-based
DAA [BK17]. Thus, we propose a LDAA [KCB+19] scheme. Experimental results showed that our
proposed lattice based DAA scheme is much more efficient than the scheme in [BK17], yet both proposed
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Figure 1.1: TPM-based attestation of an IoT system. As software is loaded, the TPM builds a representation of the platform
state. When access is requested to an Edge network, a DAA signature of the PCRs is sent to the Edge device
latticed based DAA schemes require massive storage and computation resources, which makes them not
suitable for inclusion in the future quantum-resistant TPM.
1.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
The TPM standard defines a hardware chip that serves as the root of trust of a platform [AC15]. It can
securely store cryptographic key material and platform measurements that help ensure IoT platforms
remain trustworthy. Figure 1.1 illustrates how TPM builds a representation of the platform state. As soft-
ware is loaded, hashes of the binaries are extended into the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). The
extension corresponds to the hashing of the concatenation of the previous content of the PCR with the
inputted hash, and the storing of the result in the PCR. The nature of hardware-based cryptography en-
sures that the information stored in the TPM is better protected than software-preserved data. Use-cases
benefiting from the TPM technology are manifold. One may, for instance, seal a hard drive decryption
key to a specific platform state. If the platform is later infected with a rootkit, the TPM representation
of the platform state will change and access to the key will not be made available. While this function-
ality may benefit Cloud-Edges (CE) computing, herein we focus on the attestation functionalities made
possible with the TPM. The Trusted Network Connect (TNC) defines an architecture for network access
control where these functionalities may be exploited [LS]. An edge device, in charge of an edge network,
may require IoT devices to prove that they possess a genuine TPM platform and that they are in a trust-
worthy state before access to the network is granted [str18]. This is achieved with the DAA protocol, as
represented on the right-hand side of Figure 1.1.
Each TPM has a private endorsement key esk embedded in it. Moreover, each issuer can access the
corresponding public endorsement key epk. The encryption/ decryption scheme (ENC/DEC) has been
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selected with the endorsement keys, and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm with a key
space MK has been selected to ensure authentication. DAA was designed for the trusted computing tech-
nology developed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), in which the principal signer is the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), the assistant signer is the TPM’s host computing platform (referring to as a
Host), and the group membership issuer is a Privacy-Certificate Authority (Privacy-CA), that is referred
to as an Issuer in a DAA scheme. The TPM has only an input and output (I/O) interface with its Host, so
the communication between the TPM and Issuer is via the Host. As stated by the developer of the TPM
specifications, the trusted computing group [Rot11], more than a billion devices include the TPM tech-
nology; virtually all enterprise PCs, many servers and embedded systems include the TPM. Every TPM
supports DAA. The existing DAA schemes used in the TPMs are based on either the factorisation prob-
lem in the RSA setting or the discrete logarithm problem in the Elliptic-Curve (EC) setting. The concept
and first DAA scheme was proposed in 2004 by Brickell, Camenisch, and Chen [BCC04]. This scheme is
called RSA-DAA and supported by the TPM version 1.2. Later, Brickell, Chen, and Li proposed the first
EC-DAA scheme based on symmetric pairings [BCL08, BCL09]. There are many EC-DAA schemes,
which improve the performance of this scheme. Two EC-DAA schemes, based on asymmetric (Type
3) pairings, are supported by the TPM version 2.0 [BL10, CL13, CPS10b]. These DAA schemes are
specified in ISO/IEC 20008-2 [Int13]. As a part of the TPM 1.2 specification, RSA-DAA is specified in
[Tru04] and as a part of the TPM 2.0 specification, EC-DAA is specified in [Tru14] that has been adopted
by ISO/IEC and specified in [Int15].
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this Ph.D. work can be summarised into the following points:
• We developed a lattice-based DAA (LDAA) protocol [KCB+19], which is a special anonymous
signature required for a quantum-resistant trusted platform module (TPM) since the existing DAA
schemes used in the TPMs are based on either the factorisation problem in the RSA setting or the
discrete logarithm problem in the Elliptic-Curve (EC) setting. Compared to the only other DAA
scheme with conjectured post-quantum security available in the related art [BK17], our proposed
Lattice-based DAA (LDAA) protocol [KCB+19] ensures that the storage requirements of the TPM
are reduced twofold and the signature sizes 5 times. Moreover, the LDAA scheme was imple-
mented by collegues from INESC-ID, Instituto Superior Te´cnico, University of Lisbon, Portugal.
The implementation results showed that the signing and verification operations are accelerated 1.1
and 2.0 times, respectively. However, both latticed based DAA schemes require massive storage
and computation resources, which makes them not suitable for inclusion in the future quantum-
resistant TPM. We then proposed a compact quantum-safe lattice-based Direct Anonymous At-
testation protocol [CEKLL19] and whose signature size is around 2MB, which is (at least) two
orders of magnitude smaller compared to existing post-quantum DAA schemes. The proposed
compact DAA scheme is also faster in terms of the TPM’s computation costs in the join and sign
interfaces, and have smaller TPM keys and signature sizes. The security of the proposed quantum-
safe lattice DAA scheme is proved in the UC model, however we should point out that signature
size is around 5 - 6 orders of magnitude longer than discrete logarithm based DAA schemes (e.g.
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[CDL16, CCD+17]).
• We constructed a novel lattice-based Enhanced Privacy ID (LEPID) [EKFM+20], since to the best
of our knowledge there is no lattice-based EPID scheme in the literature yet. The proposed LEPID
protocol may benefit not only from future research developments in post-quantum cryptography
but also from instructions that may extend Intel’s Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) in the future.
We also gave a new security model for EPID in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. The
proposed Lattice-based EPID (LEPID) scheme is proved secure under the new model. The LEPID
scheme was implemented by collegues from INESC-ID, Instituto Superior Te´cnico, University of
Lisbon, Portugal. Experimentally compared with a closely related LDAA scheme from the related
art, it is shown that the private-key size is reduced 1.5 times, and that signature and verification
times are sped up to 1.4 and 1.1 times, respectively, for the considered parameters, when LEPID is
compared with LDAA. Moreover, the signature size compares favourably to LDAA for small and
medium-sized communities.
• Our analysis of the DAA join protocol reveals some issues in the communication channel between
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and a Privacy-CA who serves as a DAA membership Issuer.
Chapter 7 addresses this issue in the following three aspects:
1. We introduced a new security property of “key binding” in the process of issuing TPM Attes-
tation Key (AK) certificates (or called credentials in the literature for the same meaning). By
key binding, we mean that if the credential issuing process succeeds, the credential provider
must have a true record of pairing an honest TPM’s endorsement key EK with AK. We for-
malize the requirements and definitions of the security properties for the process of issuing
TPM AK credentials. Under our definitions, key binding can be achieved in the environment
that there are malicious and undetected TPMs or malicious hosts. As discussed before, key
binding is an important security notion that was absent in all the previous DAA security mod-
els. Chen et al. [CLW12] modeled the key binding property as a part of the unforgeability,
however the proposed enhanced Privacy-CA solution (ePCAS) [CLW12] didn’t achieve key
binding (more details are discussed in Section 7.3). In this work, we highlight the key binding
security requirement and present various attacks on previous authentication channels due to
the lack of this requirement.
2. We analysed all the existing schemes of issuing TPM AK certificates (or credentials), in
which the certified AKs are used either in conventional signature schemes (e.g., RSA,
ECDSA, ECSchnorr or SM2), or in anonymous signature schemes (i.e., Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA)). Our analysis demonstrates that neither of these existing schemes holds
the key binding property and can be implemented by using a real TPM chip. All the schemes
that are supported by the TPM chips (either the TPM 1.2 version or TPM 2.0 version) suf-
fer from man-in-the-middle attacks from a malicious TPM and/or a malicious host. A few
scheme that is secure again such attacks but cannot be implemented by following the TPM
specifications [Tru04, Tru14] so cannot be supported by any TPM chips.
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3. We proposed a new solution for issuing the AK certificate/credential that holds the property
of key binding. We also demonstrate how to implement this solution by using the existing
TPM 2.0 commands with a real TPM 2.0 chip. This is the first key binding solution that can
be implemented using a real TPM chip. We will present a new security model for a protocol
establishing such a channel, a novel solution, and rigorous security proof. The contributions
of this work will not only benefit DAA implementation and applications but also any other
applications of the TPM privacy-CA solution.
1.4 Thesis Structure
• Chapter 2 gives a better understanding of Lattice’s theory and lattice-based cryptography. It
presents the main hard problems over lattices and some useful lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs
on which we relied in our constructions. It also gives a brief overview of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) lattice-based digital signatures candidates, and lattice based
anonymous signatures such as group and ring signatures.
• Chapter 3 gives an overview of the concept of direct anonymous attestation and its applica-
tions. It also presents the existing security models and discusses their limitations. We also
describe the security models and the DAA schemes given by Camenish et al. in [CDL16],
[CDL17] and [CCD+17] and provide some comparisons. Chapter 3 also presents an overview
of the DAA scheme from [BK17] that will used as a biulding block for Chapter 4.
• Chapter 4 develops a post-quantum LDAA protocol scheme. The security of this scheme is proved
in the Universally Composable (UC) security model under the hardness assumptions of the Ring
Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solution (Ring-ISIS) and Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE)
problems. Compared to the only other DAA scheme with conjectured post-quantum security avail-
able in related art [BK17], the storage requirements of the TPM are reduced twofold and the
signature sizes 5 times. Moreover, experimental results show that the signing and verification
operations are accelerated 1.1 and 2.0 times, respectively.
• Chapter 5 presents a quantum-safe compact lattice-based Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol.
This research may lead to a post quantum DAA scheme suitable for inclusion in a future quantum-
resistant TPM. The security of our proposed scheme is proved in the Universal Composability
(UC) model under the assumed hardness of the Ring-SIS, Ring-LWE problems. The signature size
of our proposed DAA scheme is around 2MB, which is (at least) two orders of magnitude smaller
compared to existing post-quantum DAA schemes.
• Chapter 6 presents a new EPID scheme is proposed, supported on lattice primitives. This chapter
also gives a new security model for EPID in the UC framework. The proposed LEPID scheme is
proved secure under the new model. This chapter provides some details about the performance of
the LEPID scheme and a detailed comparison between the LEPID and the LDAA schemes.
• Chapter 7 discusses the communication channel between a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and
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a Privacy-CA who serves as a DAA membership Issuer. This channel is an important part of
a Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) scheme but has been ignored by many DAA papers as
well as international standards in this field. After reviewing the existing solutions, issues, security
requirements and definitions along with the TPM specifications. In fact, our review will show that
neither of these solutions can achieve key binding by using real TPM chips and that neither of these
security models has given a precise definition of the key binding property.
We realise that solving the key binding problem with a potentially malicious host is not trivial.
Many things can go wrong and many things have gone wrong (see Section 7.3 for the details),
and correcting them is essential for securing the TPM attestation services, no matter whether the
services using a conventional signature scheme or DAA scheme. Chapter 7 defines the problem,
finds and implements a solution, and proves its security.
• Chapter 8 summarizes and discusses our future work.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries of Lattice-based Cryptography
2.1 Theory of Lattices
Let b1,b2, . . . ,bn be independent vectors over Rm, the lattice spanned by these vectors is given by
L =
{ n∑
i=1
zibi : zi ∈ Z
}
The vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bn are called a basis of the lattice. Let B = [b1|b2| . . . |bn] ∈ Rm×n having the basis
vectors as columns. The lattice generated by B is denoted by L(B), and the rank n of the lattice is defined
to be the number of vectors in B. If n = m then the lattice L is said to be a full-rank lattice.
In general, a lattice may be spanned by more than one basis, for instance, the vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bn and
−b1,b2, . . . ,bn both span the same lattice. We say that two bases B and B′ are equivalent (i.e. they span
the same lattice) if and only if there exists some unimodular matrix V (i.e., one having determinant ±1),
such that B′ = BV . For any two equivalent bases B and B′ , we have
|det (B′)| = |det (BV )| = |det (B)|
Therefore, the value |det (B)| is independent of the chosen basis and denoted by det (L) which represents
the fundamental domain of the lattice.
Definition 1. (The fundamental domain): For a lattice L(B), a fundamental domain is the set P(B) =
{t1b1 + t2b2 + . . .+ tnbn : 0 ≤ ti < 1}. The basis vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bn describe the sides of a parallelepiped
P whose volume is equal to |det(L)|.
Indeed, it is important to check the pairwise orthogonality of the vectors of a given basis, or how much
these vectors tend to be pairwise orthogonal. For this purpose, we will define the following inequality
called the Hadamard’s inequality [HPS14].
Definition 2. (Hadamard’s inequality): Let L be a lattice generated by the basis vectors b1,b2 . . . ,bn,
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and let P be the fundamental domain of L, then
det(L) = Vol(P) ≤ ‖b1‖‖b2‖ . . .‖bn‖. (2.1)
The closer that the basis is to being orthogonal, the closer that Hadamard’s inequality tends to be an
equality. We define the Hadamard ratio of the basis B = b1,b2, . . . ,bn to be the value
H(B) =
(
det(L)
‖b1‖‖b2‖ . . .‖bn‖
)1/n
Thus, 0 < H(B) ≤ 1, and the closer that value is to 1, the more orthogonal the vectors are in the basis.
As our lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rm, then there must exist a lattice vector that has a non-zero
minimal length which is the shortest nonzero lattice vector. The length of the shortest non-zero lattice
vector is denoted by λ1(L(B)) = min{‖x‖, x ∈ L(B)\0} where ‖.‖ is the norm defined in table 1. Note that
the shortest vector is not unique, since if x is a shortest lattice vector, then −x is also a shortest lattice
vector. Finding a shortest vector in a given lattice is a hard problem, another hard lattice problem is the
closest vector problem. Such problems are very important in cryptography as they ensure better security.
We will explain these problems in the next section.
2.1.1 Hard Problems Over Lattices
We now define some of the computational problems on lattices that have been useful in cryptography and
mention some results about their complexity. The most well-studied computational problems on lattices
are the shortest and the closest vector problems [P+16].
Definition 3. Shortest Vector Problem (SVP): Given a Lattice L, find a shortest vector x in L, such that
‖x‖ = λ1(L)
As approximation is very useful in lattice cryptography, we define an approximation factor γ ≥ 1 that is
taken to be a function of the lattice dimension n, which is γ = γ(n).
Definition 4. Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (appr SVPγ): Given a basis B of an n-dimensional
lattice L(B) and an approximation factor γ(n), find a nonzero vector x ∈ L such that ‖x‖ ≤ γ(n)λ1(L).
Note that if γ(n) = 1 then the SVP problem is completely recovered.
Definition 5. Decisional Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (Gap SVPγ): Given a basis B of an
n-dimensional lattice L(B). Decide whether λ1(L) ≤ 1 or λ1(L) > γ(n).
The main theoretical results about the (SVP) are Minkowski’s and Hermite’s theorems [HPS14], which
give us an upper bound for the shortest vector in a given lattice.
Theorem 1. (Minkowski’s Theorem). Given a lattice L of rank m, if λ1 is the norm of the shortest vector
then:
λ1 ≤ 2√
pi
(m
2
)
!
1
m det (L)
1
m (2.2)
Proof. If we place an m-dimensional ball of radius λ12 on each element of L, one can see that the balls
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are pairwise disjoint. Therefore we can deduce that the volume of the ball is less than or equal to the
determinant of the lattice and the theorem follows:
The volume of an m-dimensional ball of radius λ12 is equal to
( λ1
2
)m
pi
m
2
m
2 !
, which is less than or equal to the
det (L).
Therefore,
( λ1
2
)m
pi
m
2
m
2 !
≤ det(L), simplifying we get λ1 ≤ 2√pi m2 !
1
m det(L)
1
m 
Theorem 2. (Hermite’s Theorem): Every lattice of dimension n contains a nonzero vector v ∈ L satisfy-
ing:
‖v‖ ≤ √ndet(L)1/n
Moreover, for any lattice of dimension n we define δn called Hermite’s constant, which is the smallest
value such that the lattice L contains a nozero vector v ∈ L satisfying
‖v‖2 ≤ δn det(L)2/n
Remark The exact value of δn is known for 1 ≤ n ≤ 8 and for n = 24. For instance, δ22 = 43 , δ44 = 4, δ55 =
8, δ88 = 256 and δ24 = 4. For cryptographic purposes, we are mainly interested in the value of δn when
n is large enough. However, although δn is not known for large n, there are well-known bounds for it.
Hermite’s constant always satisfies
n
2pie
≤ δn ≤ n
pie
(2.3)
Also remark that there are versions of Hermite’s theorem that deal with more than one vector. For an
n-dimensional lattice L, with a basis b1,b2, . . . ,bn, we always have the following inequality:
‖b1‖‖b2‖ . . .‖bn‖ ≤ nn/2(det(L)).
Definition 6. (Approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (appr SIVPγ)): Given a basis B of
a full-rank n-dimensional lattice L(B). Let λn(L) be the nth successive minimum which represents the
smallest r such that L has n linearly independent vectors of norm at most r, the problem asks to output
a set W = {wi} ⊂ L of n linearly independent lattice vectors where ‖wi‖ ≤ γ(n)λn(L) for all i and some
function γ(n).
Definition 7. (The Closest Vector Problem (CVP)): Given a vector k ∈ Rm that is not in L, find a vector
v ∈L that is closest to k. In other words, the problem asks to find a vector v ∈L that minimizes the norm
‖k − v‖.
Note that both SVP and CVP are considered to be extremely hard problems. Moreover, CVP is known to
be N P-hard. In practice, CVP is considered to be a bit harder than SVP since CVP can often be reduced
to SVP in a slightly higher dimension. Practically, cryptosystems based on N P-hard or N P-complete
problems tend to rely on particular subclasses of problems, which make them easier to solve than the
general case. Next, we define another problem similar to the CVP but with some approximation, called
the (Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (BDDPγ)).
Definition 8. (Bounded Distance Decoding Problem( BDDPγ)): Given a basis B of an n-dimensional
lattice L(B), a target point t ∈ Rn and a function γ(n) such that dist(t,L) < d = λ1(L)/2γ(n), the problem
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asks to find the unique lattice vector v ∈ L such that ‖t − v‖ < d.
There exist some techniques that can solve completely or approximately some lattice problems by chang-
ing the basis vectors of a lattice into shorter and nearly pairwise orthogonal ones called “Good basis”
which still spans the same lattice, this is called basis reduction. We will explain some techniques for the
basis reduction in the next section.
2.1.2 Basis Reduction
The idea of basis reduction is to change a basis B of a lattice L into a shorter basis B′ that is equivalent
to B. However, the volume of a fundamental domain is a fixed quantity that doesn’t depend on the choice
of the basis, then short and orthogonal must be related. When basis vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bn of B are fully
orthogonal, then det(B) will be equal to the product
∏n
i=1 ‖bi‖. From this, we can conclude that the more
orthogonal the basis vectors are, the shorter they must be. To orthogonalise bases for vector spaces, there
is a process called the Gram-Schmidt process, which takes a basis of a vector space as an input, and
produces an orthogonal basis equivalent to the input basis. The Gram-Schmidt works as follows:
b∗1 = b1
b∗i = bi−
i−1∑
j=1
µi jb∗j ,
where µi j =
〈bi,b∗j〉
‖b∗j‖2
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n
Theorem 3. Given a latticeL generated by the basis b1,b2, . . . ,bn and the orthogonal basis b∗1,b
∗
2, . . . ,b
∗
n
obtained by using the Gram-Schmidt method, then:
det(L) =
n∏
i=1
‖b∗i ‖
We are dealing with lattices, where only integer multiples of our basis vectors are permitted. However,
the quantities µi j are in general not integers and therefore the Gram-Schmidt vectors b∗i are, in general,
not lattice vectors. Thus instead of using the Gram-Schmidt vectors b∗i , we will output the vectors
b′i = bi −
∑i−1
j=1bµi jeb∗j , where b.e rounds to the nearest integer. Note that our new basis b′1,b′2, . . . ,b′n
is close to the Gram-Schmidt basis, and still spanning our same lattice. Applying the Gram-Scmidt
process to our new basis vectors b′1,b
′
2, . . . ,b
′
n results in the same vectors b
∗
i as our original basis but
the Gram-Schmidt coefficients µi j all satisfy µi j ≤ 12 such a basis is called size-reduced. To reduce the
norm of the output basis, there exists an efficient algorithm called the Lenstra–Lenstra–Lova´sz (LLL)
algorithm which was invented in 1982, that change the order of the original basis b1,b2, . . . ,bn in a nice
way to improve the norm of the output basis. This can be done by adding a condition
δ‖b∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖b∗i+1 +µi+1,ib∗i ‖2,
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where δ ∈ (1/4,1) (normally δ = 3/4). The LLL algorithm repeats the procedure to reduce the basis us-
ing Gram-Schmidt vectors while swapping vectors bi,bi+1 whose corresponding Gram-Schmidt vectors
b∗i ,b
∗
i+1 violate the above condtion until all vector pairs satisfy the condition. When LLL terminates, it
results in a basis b1,b2, . . . ,bn such that, approximately
‖b1‖ ≤
(
4
3
) n−1
2
λ1(L)
.
2.1.3 Babai’s algorithm using “Good” bases to solve the CVP
Let L ⊂ Rn has a basis vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bn that are pairwise orthogonal, i.e. bi · b j = 0 ∀i , j, then we
can solve both SVP and CVP. For instance, the length of any vector v in L is given by the formula
‖c1b1 + c2b2 + . . .+ cnbn‖2 = c21‖b1‖2 + c22‖b2‖2 + . . .+ c2n‖bn‖2
Since c1,c2, . . . ,cn ∈ Z, then the shortest nonzero vector(s) in L are simply the shortest vectors in the set
±b1,±b2, . . . ,±bn.
Now, suppose that we want to find a vector in L that is closest to a given vector w ∈ Rn. Then we can
express w as
w = t1b1 + t2b2 + . . .+ tnbn where t1, t2, . . . , tn ∈ R
Let v = c1b1 + c2b2 + . . .+ cnbn ∈ L. The distance between v and w is
‖v−w‖2 = (c1− t1)2‖b1‖2 + (c2− t2)2‖b2‖2 + . . .+ (cn− tn)2‖bn‖2 (2.4)
As the ci’s are integers, (2.4) is minimized if we take each ci to be the closest to the corresponding ti.
Note that, if we start with basis vectors that are highly non-orthogonal, then the algorithm doesn’t work
well.
Theorem 4. (Babai’s Closest Vertex Algorithm [HPS14]) LetL⊂Rn be a lattice with basis b1,b2, . . . ,bn,
and let w ∈ Rn be an arbitrary vector. If the vectors in the basis are sufficiently orthogonal to one
another, then the following algorithm solves the CVP.
Write w = t1b1 + t2b2 + . . .+ tnbn where t1, t2, . . . , tn ∈ R
Set ai = btie f or i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Return the vector v = a1b1 + a2b2 + . . .+ anbn
Example 1. Let L ⊂ R2 be the lattice defined by the following basis
b1 = (137,312) and b2 = (215,−187). Given a vector u = (53172,81743) ∈ R2 we can apply Babai’s
algorithm that outputs a vector in L, which is closest to u. This can be done using the following steps:
1. Check the Hadamard ratio=
(
det(L)
‖b1‖‖b2‖
)1/2 ≈ 0.977, which is reasonably close to 1, thus our basis
vectors are nearly pairwise orthogonal and we can apply Babai’s algorithm.
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2. The algorithm then expresses u as a linear combination of b1 and b2 using real coordinates
t1 and t2 ∈ R.
u = t1b1 + t2b2
3. This gives two linear equations 53172 = 137t1 + 215t2 and 81743 = 312t1−187t2.
4. Solving the equations, we get t1 ≈ 296.85 and t2 ≈ 58.15.
5. Finally, let v = bt1eb1 + bt2eb2 = 297(137,312)+58(215,−187) = (53159,81818) ∈L and closest to
u.
We can find the distance ‖(u− v)‖ ≈ 76.12 which is relatively small. This is expected, as our basis vectors
are nearly pairwise orthogonal.
2.1.4 The Gaussian Error Distribution and Learning with Errors Problem
Let A be a matrix in Zn×mp , we define the m-dimensional lattice as follows:
L(AT ) = {y ∈ Zm| y ≡ AT s mod p for some s ∈ Znp}
In other words, L(AT ) consists of all linear combinations of the columns of AT , shifted by integer multi-
ples of the modulus p. We define the orthogonal lattice L⊥(A) as follows:
L⊥(A) = {w ∈ Zm| Aw = 0 mod p}
Let z ∈ Zmp , we define the distance from the vector z to the lattice L(AT ) as follows:
dist(L(AT ),z) = mins∈Znp‖AT s− z mod p‖
Definition 9. (Gaussian Error Distributions) The m-dimensional continuous Gaussian distribution over
Rm, parameterized by s ∈ R+ and centered at c ∈ Rm, is defined by the following density function
∀x ∈ Rm, Ds,c = 1/smexp(−pi(‖x− c‖/s)2)
Let Ds,c be defined on ‖x − c‖ < sω(
√
logn), with ω is a function of n. If c = 0, then Ds,0 is denoted by
Ds.
Let L ⊂ Zm be a lattice, the discrete Gaussian distribution centered at c ∈ Rm is defined by the following
density function:
∀x ∈ L, DL,s,c = Ds,c(x)∑
y∈LDs,c(y)
Definition 10. Let m and n be positive integers, with m ≥ n and let p ≥ 2, choose a vector s ∈ Znp and a
propability distribution χ on Rm. Define the following distributions over Zn×mp × [0, p)m:
• LWEm,p,χ(s) is the distribution obtained by choosing uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mp , sampling e ← χ,
and outputting (A, AT s + e mod p).
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• Um,p is the distribution obtained by choosing a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mp and a uniform vector
y ∈ [0, p)m, and outputting (A,y).
The decisional LWE problem is the problem of distinguishing between LWEm,p,χ(s) (for a uniform un-
kown s) and Um,p. In other words, for a given m, p,and χ, we say that the LWEm,p,χ(s) problem is hard
if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm PPT:
|Probability[s← Znp; (A,y)← LWEm,p,χ(s) : PPT(A,y) = 1]−Probability[(A,y)← Um,p : PPT(A,y) = 1]|
is negligible. The LWEm,p,Ds (s) problem usually considers the Gaussian distribution Ds with s = αp,
we denote LWEm,p,α(s) as an abbreviation of LWEm,p,Dαp (s). Regev showed in [Reg09] that solving the
LWEm,p,α(s) problem for any m, p = poly(n), and α = 1poly(n) with the condition that αp > 2
√
n is at least
as hard as quantumly solving Gap SVPα and SIVPα on arbitrary n-dimensional lattices.
2.1.5 The Polynomial Ring R and Ideal Lattices
Let Z[X] and R[X] be the polynomial rings with integer and real coefficients respectively. A polynomial
is monic if the coefficient of the highest power of x is one. A polynomial in Z[X] is irreducible if it cannot
be represented as the product of lower degree polynomials in Z[X]. Let g be a polynomial in Z[X], the
lp norm ‖g‖p is defined to be the norm of the corresponding vector of g, i.e. vector whose entries are the
coefficients of the polynomial g. We define the product of two n-dimensional vectors v and w, vw as the
(2n−1)-dimensional vector associated to the product of the corresponding polynomials.
Let R be a ring, an ideal I of R is an additive subgroup of R closed under multiplication by arbitrary ring
elements. The smallest ideal of R containing a subset S ⊂ R is denoted by 〈S 〉.
For any ring element f ∈ R, 〈 f 〉 denotes the set of all multiples of f . Any two ring elements g and h are
said to be equivalent modulo an ideal I ⊂ R if g − h ∈ I. The quotient R/I is the set of all equivalence
classes (g + I) of R modulo I. Much of our work deals with the ring R = Zp[X]/〈 f 〉 where p is some
small odd prime (p = poly(n)) and f is a monic irreducible of degree n over Z. When multiplying two
polynomials in Zp[X]/〈 f 〉 we always assume that the product gets reduced modulo f .
If we have an ideal I = 〈g1,g2, . . . ,gm〉 in R = Z[X]/〈 f 〉, then we can also represent I as the set of all
linear combinations of the polynomials
g1, xg1, x
2g1, . . . , x
n−1g1, . . . ,gm, xgm, x2gm, xn−1gm,
and we can find a set of at most n linearly independent elements of I that form a basis of the ideal lattice.
The R -module Rm: Let aˆ = (a1, . . . ,am) ∈ Rm be a vector of polynomials where m is some positive
integer and a1, . . . ,am are polynomials in R. Let z be a polynomial in R and bˆ ∈ Rm, we define the
following operations on Rm as in [Lyu08b]
1. aˆz = (a1z,a2z, . . . ,amz)
2. aˆ + bˆ = (a1 + b1,a2 + b2 + . . . ,am + bm)
3. aˆ bˆ (or simply aˆbˆ) = a1b1 + a2b2 + . . .+ ambm.
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Note that Rm is an R- module, that is for all aˆ, bˆ ∈ Rm and r, s ∈ R, we have:
1. (aˆ + bˆ)r = aˆr + bˆr
2. (aˆr)s = aˆ(r s)
3. aˆ(r + s) = aˆr + aˆs
The norm on R
For an element a = a0 +a1x+a2x2 + . . .+an−1xn−1 ∈R, where the range of the coefficients is [− p−12 , p−12 ],
we define ‖a‖∞ = maxi(|ai|). Similarly, for aˆ = (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ Rm, we define ‖aˆ‖∞ = maxi(‖ai‖∞). Notice
that ‖.‖∞ is not exactly a norm since ‖αa‖∞ , α‖a‖∞ for all integers α due to the reduction modulo p, but
still holds true that ‖a+b‖∞ ≤ ‖a‖∞+‖b‖∞ and ‖αa‖∞ ≤α‖a∞‖. The product ab will have a degree at most
(2n− 1) and the absolute value of the maximum coefficient of ab will be at most n‖a‖∞‖b‖∞, reducing
this value modulo p will not increase the absolute value of the maximum coefficient, but reducing modulo
the polynomial f usually increases the absolute value of the maximum coefficient of the product ab.
Indeed, the product ‖ab mod f ‖∞ could actually be exponentially larger than ‖a‖∞ and ‖b‖∞. For
example, if f = xn−2xn−1, then if a = b = xn−1, we get ‖ab mod f ‖∞ = 2n−1xn−1. Thus we are interested
in bounding the maximum coefficient of the product of any two polynomials in R .
Definition 11. [Lyu08b] Let θ( f ) = min
{
j,∀a ∈ R[X] of degree < n and 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, ‖axi mod f ‖∞ ≤
j‖a‖∞}
Lemma 1. [Lyu08b] Let a and b be two polynomials in R[X]/〈 f 〉 then ‖ab mod f ‖∞ ≤ nθ( f )‖a‖∞‖b‖∞
Proof. ‖ab mod f ‖∞ = ‖a0b +a1bx+ . . .+an−1bxn−1 mod f ‖∞ ≤ n‖a‖∞max0≤i≤n−1 ‖bxi mod f ‖∞. By
definition of θ( f ), we know that max0≤i≤n−1 ‖bxi mod f ‖∞ ≤ θ( f )‖b‖∞, and so we have
|ab mod f ‖∞ ≤ nθ( f )‖a‖∞‖b‖∞

Lemma 2. [Lyu08b] For all lattices L corresponding to some ideal of R = Zp[X]/〈 f 〉, where f is a
monic, irreducible polynomial of degree n, we have λ∞n (L) ≤ θ( f )λ∞1
Proof. Let u be a polynomial such that ‖u‖∞ = λ∞1 . Then the polynomials u, xu, x2u, . . . , xn−1u are linearly
independent. From the definition of θ( f ) we have
λ∞n ≤max‖xiu‖∞ ≤ θ( f )‖u‖∞ ≤ θ( f )λ∞1

16
Hard Problems over Polynomial Rings
We will now define the shortest vector problem for ideal lattices arising from the ring Z[X]/〈 f 〉 for some
monic polynomial of degree n and define some conjectured hard problems over rings of polynomials.
Definition 12. ( f -SPVγ(L) [Lyu08b]): For any γ ≥ 1, monic polynomial f , and a lattice L correspond-
ing to an ideal in the ring Z[X]/〈 f 〉, the f -SPVγ(L) problem asks to find an element g ∈ L such that
‖g‖∞ ≤ γλ∞1 (L)
Definition 13. (Ring-LWE): Let f = xn + 1 where n is a power of 2, making f irreducible over the
rationals. Let p = 1 mod 2n, be a sufficiently large public prime modulus and let R = Zp[X]/〈 f 〉 be the
ring of integer polynomials modulo f . Choose a uniformly random ring element s ∈ R called the secret,
the Ring-LWE distribution As,χ over R×R is sampled by choosing a ∈R uniformly at random, choosing
the noise e ← χ where χ is an error distribution over R, and outputting (a,b = sa + e mod p). Note
that finding s is a hard problem, also distinguishing arbitrarily many independent ‘random noisy ring
equations’ from truly uniform pairs is a hard problem.
Definition 14. (Ring-SIS): Given a Ring R, which is often (but not always) taken to be Z[X]/〈 f 〉 where
f = x2
k
+ 1 or f = xn − 1 for some integer k. Starting with aˆ = (a1,a2, . . . ,am) where ai are uniformly
random elements in R, the problem asks to find a nonzero vector of polynomials zˆ = (z1,z2, . . . ,zm) ∈ Rm
of norm ‖zˆ‖∞ ≤ β and such that:
haˆ(zˆ) =
∑
i
aizi = 0 ∈ R
2.2 Cryptographic Primitivies Based on Lattices
2.2.1 Hash Function and the Collision Problem
In this section, we will present a hash function which was proven to be a collision resistant hash function
in [Lyu08b].
Definition 15. For any integer m andD⊆R, letH(R,D,m) = {haˆ : aˆ ∈Rm} be the family of functions such
that for any zˆ ∈Dm, haˆ(zˆ) = aˆzˆ = ∑i∈[m] aizi = r, where r is a vector corresponding to some polynomial in
R, aˆ = (a1, . . . ,am) and zˆ = (z1, . . . ,zm) and all the operations aizi are performed in the ring R. If D = R
we simply denote the functions as H(R,m)
Note that for any yˆ, zˆ ∈ Dm and k ∈ R, the hash functions in H(R,m) are module homorphisms, that is
they have the following two properties:
haˆ(yˆ + zˆ) = haˆ(yˆ) + haˆ(zˆ)
haˆ(yˆk) = haˆ(yˆ)k
An interesting observation about the function haˆ is that the kernel of haˆ contains many elements that have
small norm.
Lemma 3. Let Ker(haˆ) = {yˆ ∈Dm|haˆ(yˆ) = 0} be the kernel of a hash function haˆ, then for every positive
integer c and for every haˆ ∈H(R,D,m), there exist at least cmn elements yˆ ∈Dm such that ‖yˆ‖∞ ≤ cp1/m
and haˆ(yˆ) = 0.
Proof. Let S be the set containing all elements in Rm with coefficients between 0 and cp1/m. The number
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of elements in S denoted by |S | = (bcp1/mc+ 1)mn > cmn pn and as R = Zp[X]/〈 f 〉 then |R| = pn. By the
pigeonhole principle, there exists a t ∈R and S ′ ⊂ S such that |S ′|> cmn and for all sˆ′i ∈ S ′ , haˆ(sˆ′i ) = t (i.e.
haˆ is highly surjective). Let S ′ = {sˆ′1, sˆ′2, . . . , sˆ′k} and consider the set Y = {sˆ′1− sˆ′1, sˆ′2− sˆ′1, . . . , sˆ′k− sˆ′1}.
Now for each element in yˆ ∈ Y we have ‖yˆ‖∞ ≤ cp1/m and haˆ(yˆ) = 0. 
Although haˆ is surjective over Rm, it is still difficult to find two elements zˆ and zˆ′ ∈ Rm such that haˆ(zˆ) =
haˆ(zˆ′), this property leads to the following definition.
Definition 16. Given an element h ∈H(R,m), the collision problem Col(h,D) where D ⊂R, asks to find
two distinct elements zˆ, zˆ′ ∈Dm such that haˆ(zˆ) = haˆ(zˆ′).
Theorem 5. [Lyu08b] Let R = Zp[X]/〈 f 〉 be a ring where f is a monic, irreducible polynomial of degree
n, define the set D = {y ∈ R : ‖y‖∞ ≤ d} for some integer d. Let H(R,D,m) be a hash function family as
defined before, such that m > log plog2d and p ≥ 4θ(f)2dmn1.5 logn. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that solves Col(h,D) for a random h ∈H(R,D,m) with some non-negligible probability, then there is a
polynomial time algorithm that can solve f −SPVγ(L) for every lattice L corresponding to an ideal in
Zp[X]/〈 f 〉, where γ = 16θ( f )2dmn log2 n.
2.2.2 Lattice based Encryption Schemes
During the mid-1990s, several cryptosystems were introduced, most of them depend on the conjectured
hard lattice problems such as the SVP and/or CVP. The most important of these were the Ajtai-Dwork
cryptosystem [NS98], the GGH cryptosystem of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [GGH97] and the
NTRU cryptosystem proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman [HPS98]. Next, we will give a brief
description of the GGH and the NTRU cryptosystems.
The GGH Public Key Cryptosystem The basic GGH system consists of Alice’s private key which is
a good basis Bgood (i.e. has short basis vectors that are nearly pairwise orthogonal) for a lattice L, and
her puplic key is a bad basis Bbad for L. Bob’s message is a binary vector m, and Bob’s ciphertext is
e = mBbad + p where p is a short vector. Notice that e is not a lattice point, but it is close to the lattice
point v = mBbad, since p is small. For decryption, Alice uses Babai’s algorithm with her private key,
good basis Bgood to find a vector v = m.Bbad. She then multiplies by B−1bad to recover m.
Example 2. We illustrate the GGH cryptosystem with the example from [HPS14] in 3-dimensions. Let
b1 = (−97,19,19), b2 = (−36,30,86), b3 = (−184,−64,78). The lattice L spanned by b1,b2,b3 has a
determinant det (L) = 859516, and the Hadamard ratio of the basis is H(B) =
(
det(L)
‖b1‖‖b2‖‖b3‖
)1/3 ≈ 0.74620.
Alice multiplies her private basis by the unimodular matrix
U =

4327 −15447 23454
3297 −11770 17871
5464 −19506 29617

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Now, Alice’s public key is
Bbad = Bgood.U =

−4179163 −1882253 583183
−3184353 −1434201 444361
−5277320 −2376852 736426

We can check that the Hadamard ratio of the public basis is very small, which approximately equals to
0.0000208.
Bob sends a plaintext m = (86,−35,−32) to Alice. Using a small random vector p = (−4,−3,2), Bob
outputs the ciphertext
e = (86,−35,−32)

−4179163 −1882253 583183
−3184353 −1434201 444361
−5277320 −2376852 736426
+ (−4,−3,2)
=(-79081427, -35617462, 11035473). Alice uses Babai’s algorithm to decrypt. She first writes e as a
linear combinations of her private basis with real coefficients,
e ≈ 81878.97b1−292300.00b2 + 443815.04b3
She then rounds the coefficients to the nearest integer and computes the lattice vector
v = (−79081423,−35617459,11035471)
that is close to e. Finally, Alice recovers m by multiplying v by B−1bad.
The NTRU Cryptosystem The NTRU cryptosystem was the first cryptographic construction using
polynomial rings, which is most usefully interpreted in terms of algebraically structured lattices. The
NTRU cryptosystem is practically efficient and has quite compact keys. The NTRU cryptosystem is
parametrised by a certain polynomial ring R = Z/ f , where f = xn−1 for a prime n or f = xn +1 if n is a
power of two. Let q be a sufficiently large odd number that defines the quotient ring Rq =R/qR. Briefly,
let g and s be two short (i.e. having small integer coefficients) polynomials in R, the public key is h =
2gs−1 ∈Rq where s is the secret key that is chosen to be invertible modulo q and two. Encryption is done
by multiplying h by a short factor r, then adding a message m ∈ R to get the ciphertext e = h.r + m ∈ Rq.
To decypt, we multiply the ciphertext by the secret key to output es = 2gr + ms ∈ Rq, which is a short
element of R. Finally, we can recover ms modulo two, and thus m modulo two to recover the message
bits.
2.2.3 Lattice-based Zero Knowledge Proofs
Zero knowledge proofs and proofs of knowledge are fundamental notions and powerful tools in cryp-
tography. In a zero-knowledge proof system, a prover convinces a verifier that some statement is true
while leaking nothing but the validity of the assertion. While the prover also convinces the verifier that
he indeed knows a satisfying witness for the given statement. The rapid development of lattice-based
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cryptography yields an interesting challenge of designing and improving proof systems for lattice-based-
problems.
Next, we explain a ZKP for the Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solution ISIS problem [LNSW13], we start
with some useful definitions.
Definition 17. The ISISpn,m,β problem in the lp norm with parameters (n,m, p,β) asks to find a vector
x ∈ Zm with ‖x‖p ≤ β, for some positive integer β, such that x satifies Ax = y mod p, for a uniformly
chosen A ∈ Zn×mp and vector y ∈ Znp.
Setup: Let n be a security parameter, p and β be positive integers, and k = logβ+ 1. The input is a pair
(A,y) ∈ Zn×m ×Zn, the prover’s auxiliary input is the secret short vector x ∈ {−β, . . . ,0, . . . ,β}m such that
A.x = y. Let B3m denote the set of all vectors u ∈ {−1,0,1}3m having exactly m coordinates equal to -1,
m coordinates equal to 0, and m coordinates equal to 1. Before the interaction between the prover P and
the verifier V, both P and V form the extended matrix A′ ∈ Zn×3m by appending 2m zero columns to the
matrix A, so that A′ has the same number of columns as the number of rows in the vector u j that we will
construct later. Then P performs the following steps:
1. Decomposition: The prover P aims to represent x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) by k vectors in {−1,0,1}m. This
can be done as follows:
• For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, consider the binary representation of each coordinate of vector x as
follows: xi = bi,020 + bi,121 + . . .bi,m2k−1, where bi, j ∈ {−1,0,1} for all j = 0,1 . . .k−1.
• For each index j, let u˜ j = (b1, j,b2, j, . . .bm, j) ∈ {−1,0,1}m. It is easy to check that x = ∑k−1j=0 2 j .˜u j
2. Extension: For each index j = 0, . . .k− 1, extend u˜ j to u j ∈ B3m, this can be done as follows: If
the number of coordinates −1,0,1 in the vector u˜ j are P j(−1),P j(0) and P j(1) respectively, then
choose a random vector t j ∈ {−1,0,1}2m that has exacly (m− P j(−1)) coordinates -1, (m− P j(0))
coordinates 0, and (m−P j(1)) coordinates 1. Append t j to u˜ j, and let u j = (˜u j||t j). Now, since the
last columns of A′ are zero- columns, we get:
A′
k−1∑
j=0
2 j.u j
 = y mod p ⇐⇒ Ax = y mod p
In the protocol, the prover’s goal is to convince the verifier in ZK that he knows u0,u1, . . . ,uk−1 ∈
B3m such that A′(
∑k−1
j=0 2
j.u j) = y mod p.
The Interactive SternExt Proof System [LNSW13]: Stern’s ZKP proof system is a 3-move interactive
protocol, the prover P computes three commitments and sends them to the verifier. The verifier chooses
a uniform random challenge and sends it to P, then P reveals two of the three commitments according to
the value of the challenge. The prover P and the verifier V interact as follows:
1. The Prover P samples the following:
• k vectors r0,r1, . . . ,rk−1← Z3mp
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• k permutations pi0,pi1, . . . ,pik−1← S 3m, where S 3m denoted the symmetric group on 3m.
P sends the commitment CMT = (c1,c2,c3) to the verifier V, where
c1 = COM(pi0,pi1, . . . ,pik−1, A′(
∑k−1
j=0 2
j.r j) mod p
c2 = COM(pi0(r0),pi1(r1), . . . ,pik−1(rk−1)).
c3 = COM(pi0(r0 + u0),pi1(r1 + u1), . . . ,pik−1(rk−1 + uk−1).
2. Challenge: Upon recieving CMT, the verifier V sends a challenge Ch ∈ {1,2,3} to P.
3. Response. The prover replies as follows:
• If Ch = 1, then P reveals c2 and c3, and send a response
RSP:=(v0,v1, . . . ,vk−1,w0,w1, . . . ,wk−1) where v j = pi j(u j) and w j = pi j(r j)
• If Ch = 2, then P reveals c1 and c3. Let φ j = pi j and z j = u j + r j. The prover P, sends a
response RSP:=(φ0, . . . ,φk−1,z0,z1, . . . ,zk−1).
• If Ch = 3, the prover reveals c1 and c2. Let ψ j = pi j, and s j = r j. Then the prover P sends the
response RSP:=(ψ0,ψ1, . . . ,ψk−1, s0, s1, . . . , sk−1).
Remark: The reason we introduced the permutations φ and ψ to refer to pi, is that in every run we
have different values of pi.
Verification: When receiving a response RSP from the prover P, the verifier performs the following
checks:
• If Ch = 1, the verifier V checks that v j ∈ B3m for all j = 0,1, . . . ,k−1, andc2 = COM(w0,w1, . . . ,wk−1)c3 = COM(v0 + w0,v1 + w1, . . . ,vk−1 + wk−1)
• If Ch = 2, the verifer checks that:c1 = COM(φ0,φ1, . . . ,φk−1, A
′(
∑k−1
j=0 2
j.z j)− y mod p)
c3 = COM((φ0(z0),φ1(z1), . . . ,φk−1(zk−1)).
• If Ch = 3, the verifer checks that:c1 = COM(ψ0,ψ1, . . . ,ψk−1, A
′(
∑k−1
j=0 2
j.s j) mod p)
c2 = COM(ψ0(s0),ψ1(s1), . . . ,ψk−1(sk−1))
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In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold, otherwise, V outputs 0.
Definition 18. A statistically hiding, computationally binding string commitment scheme is a PPT algo-
rithm COM(s,ρ) satisfying:
• For all s0, s1 ∈ {0,1}∗, we have
COM(s0, .) ≈s COM(s1, .)
where ≈s means that the two distributions are statistically close.
• For all PPT algorithm returning (s0,ρ0), (s1,ρ1) where s0 , s1 we have,
Probability[COM(s0,ρ0) = COM(s1,ρ1)] = negl(n)
Roughly speaking, COM is statistically hiding if the verifier learns “nothing” about the committed values,
and COM is computationally binding, if the prover cannot change what it committed.
Theorem 6. [LNSW13] If COM is a statistically hiding string commitment scheme, then the proof system
SternExt is statistically zero knowledege.
2.2.4 Lattice Based Signatures
Electronic signatures are essential for cybersecurity. For example, they provide authenticity proofs for
billions of software downloads daily on the Internet. In recent years, lattice-based signatures have be-
come an interesting alternative to the schemes that are currently being used in practice, like RSA and
ECDSA, as they are resistant to quantum attacks. The lattice-based signature schemes have two impor-
tant properties. They have good performance, i.e., they can compete with RSA and ECDSA. Also, they
are provably secure as they allow for security reductions from lattice problems that are expected to be
hard even in the presence of quantum computers. In this section, we will introduce the lattice based
signatures schemes from NIST second round PQC process with some comparisons. We also introduce
some lattice-based anonymous signature schemes such as group and ring signatures and describe their
schemes.
2.2.4.1 Lattice based Signatures (From NIST PQC Process)
CRYSTALS-Dilithium [DKL+18]
The design of the scheme is based on the Fiat-Shamir transform with Aborts approach and the scheme
works as follows:
Key Generation: The key generation algorithm generates a k× ` matrix A, whose entries are elements of
the ring R = Zq/(xn + 1) with q = 223 − 213 + 1 and n = 256. The secret consists of two random vectors
s1 ∈ R` and s2 ∈ Rk, and with small coefficients of size at most η. Finally, the public key is computed as
t = As1 + s2.
Sign: The signing algorithm generates a masking vector of polynomials y with coefficients less than γ1,
where γ1 is large enough so that the final signature doesn’t reveal the secret key (the signing algorithm is
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zero-knowledge), yet γ1 is small enough so that the signature is not easily forged. Let w = Ay, then every
coefficient w of w can be written in a canonical way as w = w12γ2 + w0, where |w0| ≤ γ2. Let w1 denote
the vector comprising all w1’s. The signature is then computed as z = y + cs1, where c is a polynomial
created as a hash of the message and w1, i.e. c = H(M|w1), that belongs to R with exactly 60±1 and the
rest are 0’s. Let β be the parameter corresponding to the maximum possible coefficient of |csi|, clearly
β ≤ 60η. The scheme uses rejection sampling to avoid the dependency of z on the secret key, if any of
the coefficents of z is larger than γ1 − β, then z is rejected and the signing procedure is restarted. For
correctness of the scheme, the signing is also restarted if any coefficient of the low-order bits of Az − ct
is greater than γ2−β. The signature is σ = (z,c).
Lemma 4. [DKL+18] : If ‖s‖∞ ≤ β and ‖LowBitsq(r,α)‖∞ < α/2−β, then:
HighBitsq(r,α) = HighBitsq(r + s,α)
Verification: The verifier first computes w′1 to be the high order bits of Az − ct, accepts if all the coeffi-
cients of z are less than γ1−β and c is that hash of the message and w′1. In particular we have
HighBits (Az− ct,2γ2) = HighBits(Ay,2γ2)
This is true since Az − ct = Ay − cs2, and we have ‖LowBits(Ay − cs2,2γ2)‖∞ < γ2 − β, and ‖cs2‖∞ < β,
therefore it follows from Lemma 8 the equality:
HighBits(Ay,2γ2) = HighBits(Ay− cs2,2γ2)
qTESLA [ABB19]
Definition 1. Let w be an integer polynomial, we define the following:
• [.]L is the value represented by the d least significant bit of w.
• [.]m is the value represented by the d most significant bit of w.
• w is well-rounded if ‖w‖∞ ≤ bq/2c−LE and ‖ [w]L ‖∞ ≤ 2d −LE
• We define the hash oracle H: {0,1}∗ → H, where H denotes the set of polynomials c ∈ R with
coefficients in {−1,0,1} with excatly h nonzero entries.
Key Generation: Let R = Zq/(xn + 1), and (n,q,γ,LE ,LS ,B,d) and h be the system parameters.
• The algorithm samples a uniformly random invertible ring element a from the ring R.
• Choose two short polynomials e and s from some distribution χγ.
• If the h largest entries of e sum to LE , then sample new polynomial e.
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• If the h largest entries of s sum to LS , then sample new polynomial s.
• Let t = as + e ∈ R.
• The secret key is the pair(s,e), and the public key is (a, t).
Sign: Given a message M and a secret key (s,e,a), the algorithm outputs a signature σ as follows:
• Choose a uniformly random polynomial y in R, ‖y‖∞ < B.
• Let c = H([ay]m,M).
• z = y + sc.
• If ‖z‖∞ > B−LS , then resample y.
• If ay− ec is not well rounded, then resample y.
• Return the siganture σ = (z,c).
Verify: Starting with a message M, public key (a, t) and a signature σ, the algorithm out put ’Accepted’
if the signature is valid, otherwise ’Rejected’.
• If ‖z‖∞ > B−LS , then return reject.
• Let w = az− tc mod q, if H([w]m,M) , c, return reject.
• Return accept.
FALCON [FHK+18]
FALCON is a lattice-based signature scheme from NTRU assumptions. It stands for Fast Fourier lattice-
based compact signatures over NTRU. A FALCON signature may be described as follows:
FALCON=Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (GPV) framework+Fast Fourier sampling.
Key Generation: Let Φ is a cyclotomic polynomial which is monic and irreducible, and q be a modulus
that can be either:
• Binary case: Φ = xn + 1 with n is a power of 2, q = 12289.
• Ternary case: xn− xn/2 + 1, with n is 3 times a power of 2, and q = 18433.
Let β > 0 be a real bound. The FALCON private key consists of four short polynomials f , g, F , G ∈
Z/(Φ), verifying the NTRU equation:
f G −gF = q mod Φ
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The FFT representation of f , g, F and G, ordered in the form of the following matrix:
Bˆ =
FFT(g) −FFT( f )FFT(G) −FFT(F )

The FALCON public key is a polynomial h ∈ Z/(Φ) such that:
h = g f −1 mod (Φ,q)
Sign: It takes a secret key and a message M, the signer uses his secret key to sign M as follows:
• Generate a random salt r uniformly in {0,1}320.
• Compute a hash value c ∈ Z/(Φ) from a message M and a salt r.
• Using the knowledge of the secret key ( f , g, F , G), the signer computes two short vectors s1 and
s2 in Z/(Φ) such that s1 + s2h = c mod q.
• s2 is compressed to a bitstring s as specified in [FHK+18].
• The signature σ consists of the pair (r, s).
Verify: The signature verification procedure is much simpler than the key pair generation and the signa-
ture generation. Starting with a public key h, a message M, a signature σ(r, s) and an accepatance bound
β, the verifier checks that the signature σ is a valid signature for the message M using the following steps:
• Compute a hash value c ∈ Z/(Φ) from a message M and a salt r.
• s is decompressed to a polynomial s2 ∈ Z/(Φ).
• The value s1 = c− s2h mod q is computed.
• If ‖(s1, s2)‖ ≤ β, the the signature is accepted. Otherwise, rejected.
pqNTRUSign; A modular lattice signature scheme [ZCHW18]
Key Generation: Let R = Zq/(xN ± 1), where N and q are public parameters. Let f ,g and h be 3
polynomials in R, where f and g are invertible polynomials with small coefficients (less than some
real number Bk); h = p−1g f −1 for some integer p. The secret key is ( f ,g), and the public key is the
polynomial h.
Sign: Takes a message M, public key h, secret key ( f ,g) and a distribution χt, and outputs a
signature as follows:
• Calculate hash(M|h) = (up,vp) ∈ R2.
• Sample a polynomial r from the distribution χt, and a random bit b.
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• Let u1 = pr + up; v1 = u1h mod q
• Let a = (vp− v1)/g mod p
• Check that the norms of a f and ag are bounded by some small parameters Bs and Bt respectively,
if not then resample r and b.
• Let v = v1 + (−1)bag. If ‖v‖∞ > q/2−Bt, then resample r and b.
• Return the signature σ = (r + (−1)ba f ).
Verify: Takes the public parameters, a message M, the public key h and a signature σ as inputs. It accepts
or rejects the signature using the following steps:
• Check that hash(M|h) = (up,vp)
• Set u = pσ+ up
• if ‖u‖2 > p2t2N, reject.
• v = uh mod q.
• If v . vp mod p or ‖v‖∞ > q/2−Bt, reject, otherwise accept.
BLISS: A Lattice Signature Scheme using Bimodal Gaussians [DDLL13]
This scheme was not involved in the NIST submission process. However, we give a brief overview of the
scheme due to its efficiency, more details can be found in [DDLL13].
Key Generation: The secret key is a short matrix S ∈ Zm×n2q and the public key is given by the ma-
trix A ∈ Zn×m2q such that AS = qIn( mod 2q), where In denotes the n× n identity matrix. An impor-
tant feature of the rejection sampling algorithm that is used in BLISS, satisfied by the key pair, is that
AS = A(−S ) = qIn( mod 2q).
Sign: To sign a message µ, the signer samples a vector y from the m-dimensional discrete Gaussian
distribution Dmσ and then computes c ← H(Ay mod 2q,µ). The signer then samples a bit b ← {0,1}
and computes z = y + (−1)bS c. Notice that z is distributed according to the bimodal discrete Gaus-
sian distribution 12 D
m
S c,σ +
1
2 D
m
−S c,σ. The rejection sampling outputs the signature (z,c) with probability
1(
M exp(− ‖S c‖
2
2
2σ2
) cosh( 〈z, S c〉
σ2
)
) , where M is some fixed positive real number.
Verify: The verification algorithm will accept (z,c) if the following conditions are satisfied:
• ‖z‖2 ≤ B2, where B2 is a function of m and σ
• ‖z‖∞ < q4
• c = H(Az + qc mod 2q,µ)
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scheme n k q NIST Assumption Φ pk
size(bytes)
signature
size (bytes)
Dilithium 768 3 8380417 1 MLWE xn/k + 1 1184 2044
Dilithium 1024 4 8380417 2 MLWE xn/k + 1 1472 2701
Dilithium 1280 5 8380417 3 MLWE xn/k + 1 1760 3366
qTESLA 1024 - 8058881 1 RLWE xn + 1 2720 2976
qTESLA 2048 - 12681217 3 RLWE xn + 1 5664 6176
qTESLA 2048 - 27627521 5 RLWE xn + 1 5920 6432
Table 2.1: Parameter sets for LWE-based signature schemes with dimension n, modulo q, (rank k in case of MLWE) over the
ring Zq/(Φ(x)). The NIST column indicates the NIST security category aimed at. The table also compares the public key and
signatures sizes in both schemes.
scheme n q ‖ f ‖ ‖g‖ NIST Φ pk
size(bytes)
signature
size
(bytes)
FALCON 512 12289 91.71 91.71 1 xn + 1 897 618
FALCON 768 18433 112.32 112.32 2,3 xn− xn/2 + 1 - -
FALCON 1024 12289 91.71 91.71 4,5 xn + 1 1793 1233
pqNTRUsign 1024 65537 22.38 22.38 1, 2, 3, 4,
5
xn−1 2048 1408
Table 2.2: Parameter sets for NTRU-based signature schemes with dimension n, modulo q, small polynomials f and g, and ring
Zq/(Φ(x)). The table also compares the public key and signatures sizes in both schemes.
Implementation Results
We now give some implementation results of the above signature schemes that were submitted to NIST.
This table is from [ACD+18].
2.2.4.2 Lattice-based Group Signatures
Group signatures aim to provide a way to guarantee that a message was sent by a group member
(authentication and data integrity) without leaking any information about which group member signed
the message (privacy) unless an opening authority decides to open the signature. More precisely, group
signatures allow members of a group, which is administered by a group manager, to anonymously sign
messages on behalf of that group. The signature verifier will be convinced that the signature comes
from some group member, but without knowing the signer. At the same time, an authority is able to
determine the signer’s identity (traceability) using some trapdoor information known as the signature
opening operation. There are many other possible applications to group signatures, such as trusted
computing platforms for protecting the privacy of users in public transportation, and intelligent cars that
communicate with each other for transmitting traffic information [GBW07].
Security properties of Group Signatures: The basic requirements of a group signature scheme is
that any honest signature generated by a group member should be accepted as correct, also the signature
should be traceable to the group member who issued it. Group signatures are also required to be
anonymous, meaning that without the tracing key, it should be infeasible for an adversary (even given
all the signing keys) to determine the identity of the group member who issued a specific signature.
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Formally, an anonymous group signature scheme can be defined as follows [GKV10]:
Syntax Of Group Signature Schemes
A group signature scheme GS=(G.Key Gen, G.Sign, G.Verify, G.Open) consists of four polynomial-time
algorithms:
1. The randomized group key generation algorithm G.KeyGen(1n,1N) takes inputs 1n,1N , where n ∈
N is the security parameter and N ∈ N is the group size. This algorithm returns (PK,T K,gsk),
where PK is the group public key, T K is the group manager’s tracing key, and gsk is a vector of N
signing keys such that gsk[i] corresponds to the ith user signing key.
2. The group signature algorithm G.sign(gsk[i],M) is a randomised algorithm that takes the ith user
secret key gsk[i] and a message M, outputs a signature σ on M.
3. The group signature verification algorithm G.Veri f y(PK,M,σ) is a deterministic algorithm that
takes the group public key PK, a message M and a signature σ on M, returns 0 or 1.
4. The opening algorithm G.Open(M,T K,σ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes a message M, the
tracing key T K and a signature σ as inputs, and returns an identity i ∈ [N].
Definition 19. A group signature scheme GS=(G.Key Gen, G.Sign, G.Verify, G.Open) is anonymous if
for all polynomials P(.) and all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A in the
following experiment is negligible in n:
• Compute (PK,T K,gsk)← G.Key Gen(1n,1N) and give (PK,gsk) to the adversary.
• A outputs two distinct identities i0, i1 ∈ N with a message M. A random bit is chosen, and the
adversary A is given G.Sign(gsk[ib],M). A outputs a bit b′.
A succeeds (denoted by succ) if b′ = b, and the advantage of A is |probability[succ]− 12 |.
A second important requirement for a group signature scheme is that it should be difficult for an adversary
who can corrupt some set of group members C to output a valid signature that can’t be traced to some
member in C, this means traceability. We will give a formal definition of traceability in the following
definition.
Definition 20. We say that a group scheme GS=(G.Key Gen, G.Sign, G.Verify, G.Open) is traceable, if
for all polynomials P(.) and all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A in the
following experiment is negligible in n:
• Compute (PK,T K,gsk)← G.Key Gen(1n,1N) and give (PK,T K) to the adversary.
• The adversary query the following oracles
1. A Corrupt oracle that inputs i ∈ [N] and returns gsk[i].
2. A Sign oracle that inputs i ∈ [N] and a message M, returns a signature from
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G.Sign(gsk[i],M).
• The adversary A outputs a message M with a signature σ on M. Let C denote the set of all
identities to be corrupted. A succeeds if G.Verify(PK,M,σ) = 1 and G.Sign(gsk[i],M) was never
queried for i <C yet G.Open(M,T K,σ) <C.
We also mention some general security notions for group signatures such as:
• Unforgeability: It is computationally infeasible to produce message signature pairs (M,σ) that are
accepted by verification algorithm without knowledge of the secret key(s).
• Exculpability: is the property that no member of the group and not even the group manager can
produce signatures on behalf of other group members.
• Coalition resistance: The possibility of a group of signers colluding together to generate signa-
tures that cannot be traced to any of them.
• Framing: Framing is a version of coalition resistance where a set of group members combine their
keys to produce a valid signature in such a way that the opening algorithm will ouput an identity i
that is not a member of that group.
• Unlinkability: After seeing a list of signatures, one can not relate two signatures together as being
produced by the same user.
Lattice Based Group Signature Scheme from [GKV10]
Let N be the size of the group, p = poly(n), m ≥ 8n log p, s = ω√n log p logn and γ = Ω √m/ logm be
the system parameters. Before we start describing the scheme, we mention the following useful PPT
algorithms [GKV10]:
• TrapSamp: takes 1n,1m, p with p ≥ 2 and m ≥ 8n log p as inputs, and returns matrices A ∈ Zn×mp
and T ∈ Zm×m such that the distribution on A is statistically close to uniform over Zn×mp , the
columns of T form a basis of the lattice L⊥(A), implying AT = 0 mod p and ‖T‖ = O(n log p) and
‖T˜‖ = O( √n log p), where T˜ is the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization.
• SuperSamp: takes 1n,1m, p, and a matrix B ∈ Zn×mp , where p ≥ 2, m ≥ n+8n log p, and the columns
of B span Znp, outputs A ∈ Zn×mp and T ∈ Zm×mp such that ABT = 0 mod p and the distribution on A
is statistically close to uniform over Zn×mp .
Moreover,
1. The columns of T , form a basis of the lattice L⊥(A), implying AT = 0 mod p.
2. ‖T˜‖ = O(logn √nm log p).
• RandBasis: takes a basis S ′ and ouputs a random basis S that spans the same space.
• GPVInvert: is the trapdoor inversion algorithm that takes input A, T, s and a vector u, computes
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the vectors t ∈ Zm such that At = u. Then samples a short vector e← DL⊥(A)+t,s.
Now the group signature is defined as follows:
1. G.Key Gen(1n,1m): For 1 ≤ i ≤ N, computes the couple of matrices (Bi,S ′i )← TrapS amp(1n,1N)
and (Ai,Ti)← S uperS amp(1n,1N , p,Bi) and S ← RandBasis(S’). Then outputs PK = ((Ai,Bi)Ni=1)
as the public key, T K = (S i)Ni=1as the tracing key, and gsk = (Ti)
N
i=1 as the users’ signing keys.
2. G.Sign(T j,M): To sign a message M by a group member j, the signer j chooses random r←{0,1}n,
and computes ui = H(M|r|i) f or 1 ≤ i ≤ N, where H : {0,1}∗→ Znp is a hash function modelled as
a random oracle. Then the signer samples a short vector e j ← GPVInvert(A j,T j, s,u j), note that
finding such e j without the trapdoor T j is hard. For all i , j the signer chooses ei ∈ Zmp uniformly
subject to the condition Aiei = ui mod p.
For all i, the signer samples the vectors si ← Zpn . The encryption part is done by the matrix Bi.
The signer encrypts ei using a random vector si and outputs the ciphertext zi = BTi si + ei mod p.
Effectively, ei is being used as the noise in an instance of learning with error (LWE) problem.
Finally, the signer outputs the signature σ = (r,z1,z2, . . . ,zN ,Π), where Π is a proof to be discussed
later in this chapter.
3. G.Verify(PK,M,σ): Outputs 1 if Π is correct, and Aiei = H(M|r|i) mod p ∀i.
4. G.Open(T K,M,σ): Using the tracing key {S i}, outputs the smallest index i for which
dist(L(BT ),zi) ≤ s√m.
Anonymity and Traceability of the Scheme
Theorem 7. [GKV10] Let m, p, s be as described above, if the LWEm,p,Dαp problem is hard for α =
s/(p
√
2), then the above group signature is anonymous. Moreover, if the Gap SVPγ problem is hard for
γ = O(n log4(n)), then the above group signature scheme is traceable.
Anonymity Let A be the adversary attacking the system. Let G0 denote the experiment of definition 19,
with b=0, and G1 be the same experiment with b=1. We will do the experiment with b=0. Consider the
following experiments G0,G′0 (Same experiment can be done on G1,G
′
1, to prove anonymity), it’s enough
to show that the experiments G0,G′0 and G1,G
′
1 are indistinguishable.
1. The adversary runs the key-generation algorithm to get the group public key
(
(Ai,Bi)Ni=1
)
,
and the secret vector signing key gsk = (Ti)Ni=1 from SuperSamp algorithm, (Ai,Ti) ←
SuperSamp(1n,1N ,Bi, p).
2. A outputs i0, i1,M and a signature of the user i0 computed as follows:
• A compute ei0 ← GPVInvert(Ai0 ,Ti0 , s,ui0 ) where ui = H(M|r|i) for a random r← {0,1}n.
• For all i , i0, ei is chosen uniformly such that Aiei = ui mod p.
• For all i ∈ [N], A chooses a random si← Znp.
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• Finally, A outputs zi = BTi si + ei, then A generates a proof Π and a signature
(r,z1,z2, . . . ,zN , s,Π).
3. In G′0 we introduce the following modification with respect to G0. When generating the signature
σ, ei0 ←GPVInvert(Ai0 ,Ti0 , s,ui0 ) as in G0 and ei1 ←GPVInvert(Ai1 ,Ti1 , s,ui1 ). For all j , {i0, i1},
the value e j is choosen uniformly to satisfy Aie j = u j mod p.
Remark: It was claimed in [GKV10] that if the LWEm,p,α problem is hard, then G0,G′0, and G1,G
′
1 are
indistinguishable.
So far, we have discussed the lattice based signature for static groups only. This means that, after
the initial setup in which all group members have their own secret keys, no new group member can join
the group. Therefore, to add a new group member we have to re-start the setup phase, which is not really
practical. This was behind the construction of dynamic group signatures, which is not just a simple
extension of static group signature since it includes two distinct authorities
1. The opening authority (opener): which can identify the author of any signature.
2. The group manager (issuer): which delivers group membership certificates to users.
An important requirement of dynamic group signatures is that, even if the two authorities collude together
with dishonest group members, they cannot create signatures that will be opened to some honest group
member who didn’t issue it. We now discuss dynamic group signatures.
Lattice Based Dynamic Group Signature Scheme from [LLM+16]
Setup(1λ,1N): Given the following:
• Security parameter λ > 0
• N = 2l = poly(λ) be the maximum number of the group members.
• n = O(λ) represents the lattice parameter.
• p is a prime modulus.
• m = 2ndlog pe is the lattice dimension.
• α = φ( √n log p logn) is the Gaussian parameter.
• β = αω(logm) is the infinity norm bound.
• b = √nω(logn) and χ be a b-bounded distribution.
• H : {0,1}∗← {1,2,3}t for some t = ω(logn), is a hash function modelled as a random oracle.
Next, we will describe the dynamic group signature scheme as in [LLM+16]:
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KeyGen: This is an algorithm for dynamic group key generation, it works as follows:
1. Runs TrapSamp(1n,1N , p) to get A ∈ Zn×mp and a short basis TA of L⊥(A).
2. Chooses uniformly the matrices A0,A1, . . . ,Al,D← Zn×mp , D0,D1 ← Z2n×2mp , F ← Z4n×4mp , F will
be used against framing attacks, and vector u← Znp.
3. Chooses uniform matrix B ∈ Zn×mp with a short basis TB ∈ Zm×m of L⊥(B).
4. Chooses a one-time signature scheme ΣOTS = (G,S ,V) and a hash function H0 : {0,1}∗ ← Zn×2mp ,
modeled as random oracles.
The algorithm outputs (PK,S OA,S GM), where PK is the group public key defined as
PK :=
(
A, {A j}lj=0, B, D, D0, D1, F, u, ΣOTS , H, H0
)
S OA := TB is the opening authority’s private key, and S GM := TA is the group manager’s private key.
Join: The group manager GM and a user Ui run the following interactive protocol
[Juser(λ,PK), JGM(λ,S t,PK,S GM)] as follows:
1. Ui samples a membership secret that consists of a short vector zi ← DZ4m,α, and computes a syn-
drome vi = Fzi ∈ Z4np . Then Ui sends vi, whose binary representation is bin(vi) ∈ {0,1}4ndlog pe,
together with an ordinary digital signature sigi, using his long-term secret key usk[i] correspond-
ing to the user’s long term public key upk[i], to the GM.
2. JGM verifies that vi wasn’t used before by some registered users and that sigi is a valid signature
with respect to upk[i]. It aborts if at least one of the conditions is not satisfied. Otherwise, GM
chooses l-bits fresh identifier idi ∈ {0,1}l, and uses his secret key TA to certify that Ui is a new
group member, this can be done as follows:
• GM defines the following matrix
Aid = [A|A0 +
l∑
j=1
idi[ j]A j] ∈ Zn×2mp
• GM runs T ′idi ← ExtBasis(Aid,TA), T ′idi is a short basis of L⊥p (Aidi ) ∈ Z2m×2m
• GM samples a short vector si ← DZ2m,α, and using T ′idi , GM computes a short vector d i =[
di,1
di,2
]
∈ Z2m such that
Aidi d i = [A|A0 +
l∑
j=1
idi[ j]A j]d i = u + D.bin(D0.bin(vi) + D1si) mod p (2.5)
• GM sends the certificate (idi,d i, si) to Ui
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3. Juser verifies that the triple (idi,d i, si) satifies (2.5) and that ‖d i‖∞ ≤ β, ‖si‖∞ ≤ β, otherwise aborts.
The membership secret seci = zi ∈ Z4m.
4. JGM stores the transcripti = (vi,certi, i,upk[i], sigi) in the database S ttrans of joing transcripts.
Sign(PK,certi, seci,M): To sign a message M ∈ {0,1}∗ using certi = (idi,d i, si), the group member gen-
erates a one-time signature key pair (VK,S K) and does the following:
1. Computes G0 = H0(VK) ∈ Zn×2mp and uses it to encrypt bin(vi) ∈ {0,1}2m and outputs
cvi = (c1,c2) = (B
T e0 + x1,GT0 e0 + x2 + bin(vi).bp/2c) (2.6)
for a randomly chosen e0← χn, x1← χm, x2← χ2m.
2. Run SternExt Proof System protocol, to be discussed in the next section, to prove the knowledge
of the following:
• idi ∈ {0,1}∗
• vectors si ∈ Z2m, d i1 ,d i2 ∈ Z2m and zi ∈ Z4m with infinity norm bound β.
• e0 ∈ Zn, x1 ∈ Zm, x2 ∈ Z2m with infinity norm bound b.
• bin(vi) ∈ {0,1}2m and wi ∈ {0,1}m, they all satisfy (2.6) and the the following equations:
A.d i,1 + A0d i,2 +
l∑
j=1
(idi[ j].d i,2)A j−Dwi = u ∈ Znp (2.7)
and
H2n×mwi = D0.bin(vi) + D1si ∈ Z2np
Fzi = H4n×2m.bin(vi) ∈ Z4np
(2.8)
The protocol is repeated t = ω(logn) times in parallel to acheive negligible soundness error, and
then outputs Π = ({COM j}tj=1,Ch, {Resp j}tj=1) where
Ch = H(M,VK,cvi , {COM j}tj=1) ∈ {1,2,3}t
3. Computes a one time signature sig = S (S K, (cvi ,Π)), and outputs the signature σ= (VK,cvi ,Π, sig).
Verify(PK,M,σ): returns 1 iff V(VK,cvi ,Π, sig) = 1 and the proof Π is valid.
Open(PK,S OA,M,σ): using TB the opening authority
• computes a small norm matrix E ∈ Zn×2m, such that B.E = G0 mod p.
• Decrypts cvi by computing b(c2−ET c1)/(p/2)e, to obtain a string bin(v) ∈ {0,1}2m.
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• Checks that v = H4n×2m.bin(v) mod p, appears in transcripti then outputs i.
Security Claims
1. The scheme is secure against misidentification attacks under the SISn,2m,p,β′ assumption, where
β′ = O(lα2m3/2).
2. The scheme is secure against framing attacks under the SIS4n,4m,p,β′′ , where β′′ = 4α
√
m.
3. The scheme provides CCA- anonymity if the LWEn,p,χ assumption holds and if ΣOTS is a strongly
unforgeable one-time signature scheme.
For full proof, see [LLM+16].
Zero Knowledge Proofs for the dynamic Group Signature Scheme
The system upon which group signature scheme is built [LLM+16] can be summarised as follows:
Common Inputs:
• A, {A j}lj=0, B ∈ Zn×mp , D0, D1 ∈ Z2n×2mp , F ∈ Z4n×4mp and G0 ∈ Zn×2mp .
• u ∈ Znp, c1 ∈ Zmp and c2 ∈ Z2mp .
Prover’s inputs:
• y = binary(v) ∈ {0,1}2m, w ∈ {0,1}m and id ∈ {0,1}l.
• z ∈ [−β,β]4m and s ∈ [−β,β]2m.
• e0 ∈ [−b,b]n, x1 ∈ [−b,b]m and x2 ∈ [−b,b]2m.
Prover’s Goal: Convince the verifier in ZK that:
Ad1 + A0d2 +
∑l
j=1 (id[ j].d2)A j−Dw = u mod p
H2n×m.w = D0y + D1s mod p
F.z = H4n×2my mod p
(c1,c2) = (BT .e0 + x1,GT0 .e0 + x2 + y.bp/2c) mod p
When the equations are combined, we get a new equation of the form:
M.

d1
s
z
+ M0d2 +
l∑
j=1
M j(id[ j]d2) + M′.
wy
+ M′′

e0
x1
x2
 = k mod p
where the matrices M, M0, . . . , Ml, M′, M′′ and the vector k are built from the common inputs. The idea
of the proof is to combine all the above equations into one single equation of the form Ax = k mod p,
where x is a short secret vector that contains the prover’s auxiliary inputs, then run SternExt protocol
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t = ω(logn) times in parallel to achieve negligible soundness error.
2.2.4.3 Lattice-Based Ring Signatures
The concept of ring signature was first introduced in 2001 Rivest, Shamir and Tauman [RST01]. Ring
signatures are a type of anonymous digital signature, where the signer takes a number of public keys,
called the ring, and a secret key which corresponds to one of the public keys. When the signer outputs a
signature, a verifier can be convinced that a secret key correponding to one of the public keys has been
used for the signature, yet the verifier cannot tell which secret key is used. While group signature requires
an opening authority, ring signature enables a signer to generate a message anonymously in the name of
others without a manager. The verifier checks only the validity of the signature, but can not know the
identity of the real signer. Ring signature has many applications, such as e-voting, e-money, and whistle
blowing. Several efficient lattice-based ring signatures have been naturally constructed from lattice basis
delegation, but all of them have large verification key sizes. In general, ring signatures have two main
properties:
• Unforgeability: It is not possible to sign on behalf of a ring without knowing one of the associated
secret keys.
• Anonymity: It is not possible to know the identity of the user that output a signature.
Before we start describing the lattice-based ring signature scheme [MBB+13], we recall the definition of
the following family of collision resistant hash functions since it is used in the construction of the ring
signature scheme [MBB+13] described below.
Definition 21. For any integer m and D ⊆ R = Zp/〈xn + 1〉, let H(R,D,m) = {haˆ : aˆ ∈ Rm} be the family
of functions such that for any zˆ ∈Dm, haˆ(zˆ) = aˆzˆ = ∑i∈[m] aizi = r, where r is a vector corresponding to
some polynomial in R, aˆ = (a1, . . . ,am) and zˆ = (z1, . . . ,zm) and all the operations aizi are performed in
the ring R. If D = R we simply denote the functions as H(R,m).
Syntax of Ring Signatures
Let Ds,Dy,Dz be subsets of the polynomial ring R, where the size of the coefficients in the polynomials
of each subset has a particular upper bound. Let H : {0,1}∗ → Ds denote a random oracle, the ring
signature scheme can be described by the following quadruple of algorithms:
1. R.ParGen(1n): A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes a security parameter n, outputs
a set of public parameters pp.
2. R.KeyGen (pp): A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes a set of public parameters
pp, and outputs a public key PK with the corresponding secret key S K.
3. R.sign(pp,S K,m,R): A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes a set of public parame-
ters pp, a signing key S K, a message m, and a set of public keys R, then returns a signature σ on
m under S K.
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4. R.verify(pp,σ,m,R): A deterministic algorithm that takes a set of parameters pp, a set of public
keys R, a message m and a signature σ on m, outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
A Lattice based Ring Signature Scheme from [MBB+13]
We will describe a lattice based ring signature scheme which is based on the collision resistant family of
hash functions defined above. The scheme works as follows:
R.ParGen(1n): takes a security parameter n, and outputs the set pp=(m, p,S ), where m = 3logn, p is a
prime larger than n4, and S ← R, where R is the polynomail ring Z/〈xn + 1〉.
R.KeyGen(pp): Generate a keypair as follows:
1. Set sˆ = (s1, s2, . . . , sm)←Dms .
2. If none of the polynomials si is invertible over Ds, then go to step (1) and choose another sˆ.
3. Let i0 ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}, such that si0 is invertible.
4. Choose unformly a vector of polynomials aˆ = (a1,a2, . . . ,ai0−1,ai0+1am)← Rm−1
5. Set ai0 = s
−1
i0
(S −∑i,i0 aisi).
6. Output (PK,S K) = (haˆ, sˆ).
R.sign(pp,S K,m,R): Given a message m, a ring of N members with public keys R = {haˆi }Ni=1, and a secret
key S K = sˆ j associated to one of the public keys haˆ j ∈ R, the ring signature is generated as follows:
1. For all i ∈ [N], with i , j, choose yˆi←Dmz
2. For i = j; yˆ j←Dmy
3. Set e← H( ∑i∈[N] haˆi (yˆi),R,m)
4. For i = j let zˆ j = sˆ je + yˆ j
5. If zˆ j <Dmz , then go to step (2).
6. For i , j, let zˆi = yˆi.
7. Output the signature σ = ({zˆi}i∈[N],e).
R.Verify(pp,m,R,σ) : Given a message m, a ring R = {haˆi }Ni=1 and a ring signature σ = ({zˆi}i∈[N],e), the
verifier accepts the signature if the following conditions are satisfied:
• zˆi ∈Dmz for all i ∈ [N].
• e = H( ∑i∈[N] haˆi (zˆi)−S .e,R,m).
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Otherwise, the verifier rejects.
Correctness of the Algorithms: To prove the correctness of the signing algorithm, let σ =
({zˆi}i∈[N],haˆi ,e)← R.sign(P, sˆ j, m, {haˆi }i∈[N]) be a signature signed by the user j using keypair(haˆ j , sˆ j).
The first condition in R.verify is always satisfied by a valid signature due to the conditions (2) and (5) in
R.sign algorithm, this ensures that signatures only contain elements inDmz . As to the second condition in
R.verify, we have ∑
i∈[N]
haˆi (zˆi)−S e =
∑
i∈[N]\{ j}
haˆi (zˆi)−S e + haˆ j (zˆ j)
=
∑
i∈[N]\{ j}
haˆi (zˆi)−S e + haˆ j (sˆ je + yˆ j)
=
∑
i∈[N]\{ j}
haˆi (zˆi)−S e + haˆ j (sˆ j)e + haˆ j (yˆ j)
=
∑
i∈[N]\{ j}
haˆi (yˆi)−S e + S e + haˆ j (yˆ j) =
∑
i∈[N]
haˆi (yˆi)
As e = H(
∑
i∈[N] haˆi (yˆi)− S e,R,m), the second condition of R.verify is therefore satisfied. Thus, a cor-
rectly issued signature is always verified.
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Chapter 3
Existing Works on Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)
3.1 Introduction
In general, a DAA scheme consists of an issuer, a set of signers and a set of verifiers. The issuer creates
a DAA membership credential for each signer. In practice, a DAA credential corresponds to a signature
of the signer’s identifier produced by the issuer. A DAA signer consists of the (Host, TPM) pair. Their
membership to the DAA community and trustworthy state is proved by providing the verifier with a DAA
signature of the TPM representation of the Host state. The DAA signature includes a zero-knowledge
proof-of-knowledge, which is a cryptographic construct used to convince the verifier that the signer
possesses a valid membership credential, but without the verifier learning anything else about the identity
of the signer. In contrast to other privacy-preserving constructs, like group signatures [dPLS18, LLM+16,
LNW15], DAA does not support the property of traceability, wherein a group manager can identify the
signer from a given group signature. Furthermore, when the DAA issuer also plays the role of a verifier,
the issuer does not obtain more information from a given signature than any arbitrary verifier. However,
to prevent a malicious signer from abusing anonymity, DAA provides two alternative properties as the
replacement of traceability. One is the rogue signer detection, i.e. with a signer’s private key, anyone can
check whether a given DAA signature was created under this key or not. The other is the user-controlled
linkability: two DAA signatures created by the same signer may or may not be linked from a verifier’s
point of view. The linkability of DAA signatures is controlled by an input parameter called the basename.
If a signer uses the same basename in two signatures, they are linked; otherwise, they are not.
The existing DAA schemes used in the TPMs are based on either the factorisation problem in the RSA
setting or the discrete logarithm problem in the Elliptic-Curve (EC) setting. The concept of a DAA
scheme was first proposed in 2004 by Brickell, Camenisch, and Chen [BCC04]. This scheme is called
RSA-DAA and supported by the TPM version 1.2. Later, Brickell, Chen, and Li proposed the first
EC-DAA scheme based on symmetric pairings [BCL08, BCL09]. Two EC-DAA schemes, based on
asymmetric (Type 3) pairings, are supported by the TPM version 2.0 [BL10, CL13, CPS10b].
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3.2 DAA Applications
IoT devices are becoming increasingly common in our everyday lives and on industrial applications.
Networks of sensors and actuators are being implemented in the general infrastructure to achieve better
energy efficiency; in production to obtain customised mass production; and in the automotive industry
to improve safety, among others. Due to the always larger amounts of data produced by such sensors,
the Cloud-assisted IoT (CoT) paradigm, wherein the sensors are connected to a central Cloud server, is
suffering from scalability issues. In contrast, with the emerging CE technology, distributed edge devices,
such as smart gateways and local PCs, offer cloud-like services to only a limited group of devices. These
edge devices should ensure that IoT platforms connecting to the network are in a trustworthy state and
do not constitute an hazard to the remaining nodes.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is an industrial consortium that aims at the design of standards for
trusted systems [Rot11], including the TPM [AC15] and the Trusted Network Connect TNC [LS]. The
TPM is a piece of security hardware that may be included on the motherboards of IoT devices [IoT17].
When loading code, including bootloaders, BIOSs, etc., the binaries are measured and extended into the
TPM Platform Configuration Register PCR. As a result, the PCRs contain a value that is representative
of the current state of the system. When combined with the TNC, which is an architecture for network
access control, the functionality offered by the TPM may be exploited to ensure that all devices connected
to an edge IoT network are in a secure state [str18].
In particular, the DAA is a protocol enabling a TPM and a Host IoT device not only to authenticate
themselves to a verifying edge device and to prove that the Host is in a trustworthy state, but also to do
so in a privacy-preserving manner. More concretely, the DAA provides the TPM with the ability to sign
its register values in an anonymous way, whilst still convincing the verifier that it possesses valid DAA
credentials. Anonymity is particularly important in applications such as the automotive industry, wherein
tracking of drivers should be prevented. For instance, Whitefield et al. [WCG+17] proposed the use of
DAA algorithms to enhance existing V2X security architectures.
A privacy-enhancing cloud service architecture to protect user’s data based on DAA scheme was intro-
duced by Greveler[GJL11]. The architecture provides cloud users with the abilities of controlling the
extent of data sharing among their service accounts. The application enables a user to link Cloud Service
applications in such a way, that the user’s data are shared only among designated applications.
DAA protocol has been integrated into the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) authentication framework
[FID19]. In this application, the TPM creates a new authentication key, and outputs a DAA signature,
with the help of the host, in order to certify that the key is properly stored in the TPM. The FIDO alliance
is in the process of standardizing a specification called FIDO-ECDAA.
DAA protocol also serves some rewarding applications that allow participants to earn incentives in an
anonymous way that cannot be linked to their actions or identities. In some rewarding applications, the
TPM is asked to provide a DAA signature with the same link token issued in the join protocol. This
token depends on some issuer’s fixed public input parameter called the basename bsni ∈ {0,1}∗, every
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TPM creates a link token using its secret DAA key in the join protocol. The issuer will then record
the binding list between the TPM endorsement key and the link token. Chapter 7 emphasizes on the
importance of the key binding security notion in such rewarding applications. For instance, suppose that
a rogue TPM, say TPMb with endorsement key epkb (that is unknown by the issuer, i.e. doesn’t belong
to the existing Revocation List RL) cheats the issuer with the help of some dishonest host, by sending
the tuple (epkb,certb, pka) to the issuer, where pka is a DAA public key of some honest TPM, say TPMa.
Due to the absence of the key binding security requirement, the issuer will not be able to make sure that
the pair (epkb, pka) stems from the same TPM. The issuer will then proceed with the join protocol, TPMa
creates a link token and eventually gets a valid credential on pka, however this token links to epkb since
the issuer has a wrong bind record between the rogue TPMb endorsement key and TPMa DAA public
key pka, due to the rogue TPMb is unknown. As a result, the rogue TPMb will benefit from the honest
TPMa contributions.
3.3 Security Models for DAA
In this section we give brief overview of the security models proposed for the DAA schemes, namely
simulation-based models, game-based models and UC models. We will mainly focus on the limitations
of these models. A major limitation of all these models is that they all failed to present a clear model for
the communication channel between the TPM and the issuer in the DAA join protocol. This issue will
be discussed in Chapter 7.
3.3.1 Simulation Models
DAA was originally introduced by Brickell, Camenisch, and Chen [BCC04] based on the simulation-
based security definition. The functionality has a single interface encompassing both signature genera-
tion and verification, this means that the signature is generated for a specific verifier and is verified by
that verifier. As signatures generated are not interactively verified, an attack against the linkability was
presented by Bernhard et al. in [BFG+13], the attack shows that a signature for a non-empty basename
will still verify if submitted for verification with an empty basename. This means that one can produce a
valid signature on a message/basename pair without a user’s secret key even if the user never signed this
pair.
Later attempt by Chen et al. [CMS08a] to solve this problem has failed for the following reason that was
described in Camenish et al. [CDL16]: it is trivial to distinguish between the ideal and the real world
according to the definition of the ideal functionality presented in [CMS08a]. In particular, the security
definitions aim to provide linkability as an explicit feature in the functionality by adding a link interface
that takes as input two signatures and determines whether they link or not. However, the sign and verify
interfaces are interactive and thus signatures are never sent as output to parties, rather be provided as
input to be verified.
A new security definition presented by Chen et al. [CMS08b] solved this problem by separating the
signatures generation from their verification, this was done by outputting the signatures. However, this
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security definition has two limitations that are discussed by Camenisch et al. in [CDL16]:
1. Signatures are simply random values even when the TPM is corrupt.
2. The verify interface rejects all requests when the issuer is corrupt.
3.3.2 Game-based Models
The first game based security model was presented by Brickell et al. [BCL09]. In this model, the authors
defined security games for anonymity and user-controlled traceability. The model has several major
shortcomings discussed in Camenish et al. [CDL16] and Bernhard et al. [BFG+13]:
1. There is only one game on traceability, the adversary wins that game if it can output a signature for
an honest user which has not been the output of any signature query, or if the adversary can come
up with two signatures which should be linked but are not.
2. The definitions of unforgeability-1 and unforgeability-2 in [BCL09] have major problems that are
discussed in details in [CDL16].
(a) In the unforgeability-1 game, the adversary wins if he can come up with a valid signature
that is not a previous oracle response, this requirement allows insecure schemes to win the
security game. If we consider a DAA scheme that outputs a signature that is independent
of the message, for example, the signature is simply the hash of the TPM’s secret key, then
clearly after seeing one signature, an adversary can provide a signature on any message of his
choice.
(b) Another problem with the unforgeability-2 game that was discussed in [CDL16] is that the
adversary’s goal is to provide a signature on a message m and basename bsn ,⊥ and signer’s
identity ID. The adversary wins the game if another signature associated with the same ID
exists, but signatures don’t link. Firstly the meaning of “associated with the same ID” is not
clearly defined. Secondly, there is no check on the validity of the supplied signatures, which
makes winning trivial for the adversary.
A similar problem occurs in the game-based model that was presented by Chen et al. in [Che09], the
game doesn’t capture attacks in which the adversary produces two signatures which are linked, but they
should not, this was explained in [BFG+13].
Bernard et al. [BFG+13] provided an extensive set of game-based security definitions covering all ex-
pected security requirements. However, the security games make a simple assumption by assuming that
the platform consisting of a host and TPM is considered as one party by defining a pre-DAA protocol.
Bernard et al. presented a full DAA security model achieved by randomizing the credential. However,
it was explained in [CDL16] that there is no guarantee whether the security properties are provably pre-
served in the full DAA settings.
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Figure 3.1: Universal composability security model: the real and the ideal world executions are indistinguishable to the environ-
ment ε.
3.3.3 Universal Composability Security Models
In Universal Composability UC, an environment E passes inputs and outputs to the protocol parties. The
network is controlled by an adversary A that may communicate freely with E. In the ideal world, the
parties forward their inputs to the ideal functionality F, which then (internally) performs the defined task
and creates outputs that the parties forward to E.
Roughly, a real-world protocol Π is said to securely realize a functionality F, if the real world is indistin-
guishable from the ideal world, meaning for every adversary performing an attack in the real world, there
is an ideal world adversary (often called simulator) S that performs the same attack in the ideal world.
More precisely, a protocol Π is secure if for every adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that no
environment E can distinguish executing the real world with Π andA, and executing the ideal world with
F and S. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the UC framework.
In this section, describe the security models for DAA given by Camenish et al. in [CDL16] [CDL17] and
[CCD+17] and provide some comparisons. The security definition is given in the Universal Composabil-
ity (UC) model with respect to the ideal functionalities Fldaa,Fpdaa and Fpdaa+ as defined in [CDL16],
[CDL17] and [CCD+17] respectively. UC model also defines abstract subfunctionalities that will be pre-
sented in this section, however these definitions are very abstract, not clearly explained and cannot be
implemented in a real TPM chip as the TPM is not able to handle the sessions sid, jsid and ssid that are
required in the UC model.
Security Properties of DAA From [CDL16]
Security in the UC framework follows the simulation-based paradigm, where a protocol is secure when
it is as secure as an ideal functionality which performs the desired tasks in a way that is secure by design.
The security definition is given in the Universal Composability (UC) model with respect to an ideal
functionality Fldaa, which covers the following high-level security properties:
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Unforgeability: When the issuer and all TPMs are honest, no adversary can create a signature on a
message µ w.r.t. basename bsn when no TPM signed µ w.r.t. bsn.
One-More-Unforgeability: When the issuer is honest, an adversary can only sign in the name of corrupt
TPMs. More precisely, if n TPMs are corrupt, the adversary can create at most n unlinkable
signatures for the same basename.
Anonymity: An adversary that is given two signatures, w.r.t. two different basenames, cannot distinguish
whether both signatures were created by one honest platform, or whether two different honest
platforms created the signatures.
Non-frameability: No adversary can create signatures on a message µ w.r.t. basename bsn that links to
a signature created by an honest platform for the same basename, when this honest platform never
signed µ w.r.t. bsn.
The anonymity and non-frameability properties must hold even when the issuer is corrupt.
Ideal Functionality Fldaa
The ideal functionality Fldaa assumes static corruptions, i.e., the adversary decides upfront which parties
are corrupt and makes this information known to the functionality. The UC framework allows us to focus
the analysis on a single protocol instance with a globally unique session identifier sid. Fldaa uses session
identifiers of the form sid = (I, sid′) for some issuer I and a unique string sid′. The ideal functionality
Fldaa is further parametrised by a leakage function l : {0,1}∗→{0,1}∗, that models the information leakage
that occurs in the communication between a host Hj and TPM Mi.
Finally, the definition uses two “macros” to determine if a TPM secret key tsk is consistent with the
internal functionality records or not. This is checked at several places in the functionality and also
depends on whether the tsk belongs to an honest or corrupt TPM. The first macro CheckTskHonest is
used when the functionality stores a new TPM key tsk that belongs to an honest TPM, and checks that
none of the existing valid signatures are identified as belonging to this TPM key. The second macro
CheckTskCorrupt is used when storing a new tsk that belongs to a corrupt TPM, and checks that the new
tsk does not break the identifiability of signatures, i.e., it checks that there is no other known TPM key
tsk′, unequal to tsk, such that both keys are identified as the owner of a signature. Both functions output
a bit b where b = 1 indicates that the new tsk is consistent with the stored information, whereas b = 0
signals an invalid key. Formally, the two macros are defined as follows.
CheckTskHonest(tsk) =
∀〈σ,µ,bsn,M〉 ∈ Signed : identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk) = 0 ∧
∀〈σ,µ,bsn,∗,1〉 ∈ VerResults : identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk) = 0
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CheckTskCorrupt(tsk) =
¬∃σ,µ,bsn : ((〈σ,µ,bsn,∗〉 ∈ Signed∨〈σ,µ,bsn,∗,1〉 ∈ VerResults) ∧
∃tsk′ : (tsk , tsk′∧ (〈∗,∗, tsk′〉 ∈ Members∨〈∗,∗, tsk′〉 ∈ DomainKeys) ∧
identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk) = identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′) = 1)
)
We define the JOIN and SIGN sub-sessions by jsid and ssid. We also define the algorithms that will be
used inside the functionality as follows:
• Kgen(1λ): A probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter λ and generates keys tsk for
honest TPMs.
• sig(tsk,µ,bsn): A probabilistic algorithm used for honest TPMs. On input of a key tsk, a message
µ and a basename bsn, it out puts a signature σ.
• ver(σ,µ,bsn): A deterministic algorithm that is used in the VERIFY interface. On input of a
signature σ, a message µ and a basename bsn, it out puts f = 1 if the signature is valid, f = 0
otherwise.
• link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn): A deterministic algorithm that will be used in the LINK interface. It out-
puts 1 if both σ1 and σ2 were generated by the same TPM, 0 otherwise.
• identify(tsk,σ,µ,bsn): A deterministic algorithm that will be used to ensure consistency with the
ideal functionality Fldaa’s internal records. It outputs 1 if a key tsk was used to produce a signature
σ, 0 otherwise.
We now explain the interfaces of the ideal functionality Fldaa in the UC framework from [CDL16]:
Setup
1. Issuer Setup. On input (SETUP,sid) from issuer I
• Verify that sid = (I, sid′) and output (SETUP,sid) to S.
2. Set Algorithms. On input (ALG,sid,sig, ver, link, identify, Kgen) from S
• Check that ver, ink and identify are deterministic (i).
• Store (sid,sig, ver, link, identify, Kgen) and output (SETUPDONE,sid) to I.
Join
3. Join Request. On input (JOIN,sid, jsid,Mi) from host Hj
• Create a join session record 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj,status〉 with status← request.
• Output (JOINSTART,sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) to S.
4. Join Request Delivery. On input (JOINSTART,sid, jsid) from S
• Update the session record 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj,status〉 to status← delivered.
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• Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
5. Join Proceed. On input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) from I
• Update the session record 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj,status〉 to status← complete.
• Output (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid) to S.
6. Platform Key Generation. On input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, tsk) from S.
• Look up record 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj,status〉 with status = complete.
• Abort if I or Mi is honest and a record 〈Mi,∗,∗〉 ∈ Members already exists (ii).
• If Mi and Hj are honest, set tsk←⊥.
• Else, verify that the provided tsk is eligible by checking
– CheckTskHonest(tsk) = 1 if Hj is corrupt (iii) and Mi is honest, or
– CheckTskCorrupt(tsk) = 1 if Mi is corrupt (iv).
• Insert 〈Mi,Hj, tsk〉 into Members and output (JOINED,sid, jsid) to Hj.
Sign
7. Sign Request. On input (SIGN,sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from host Hj.
• If I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists in Members, abort.
• Create a sign session record 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn,status〉 with status← request.
• Output (SIGNSTART,sid, ssid, l(µ,bsn),Mi,Hj) to S.
8. Sign Request Delivery. On input (SIGNSTART,sid, ssid) from S.
• Update the session record 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn,status〉 to status← delivered.
• Output (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
9. Sign Proceed. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi.
• Look up record 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn,status〉 with status = delivered.
• Output (SIGNCOMPLETE,sid, ssid) to S.
10. Signature Generation. On input (SIGNCOMPLETE,sid, ssid,σ) from S.
• If Mi and Hj are honest, ignore the adversary’s signature and internally generate the signature for a
fresh or established tsk:
– If bsn , ⊥, retrieve tsk from 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys for (Mi,bsn). If no such tsk exists
or bsn = ⊥, set tsk← Kgen(). Check CheckTskHonest(tsk) = 1 (v) and store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in
DomainKeys.
– Compute signature as σ← sig(tsk,µ,bsn) and check ver(σ,µ,bsn) = 1 (vi).
– Check identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk) = 1 (vii) and check that there is no M′i ,Mi with key tsk
′ registered
in Members or DomainKeys with identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′) = 1 (viii).
• If Mi is honest, store 〈σ,µ,bsn,Mi〉 in Signed.
• Output (SIGNATURE,sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
Verify
11. Verify. On input (VERIFY,sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from some party V.
• Retrieve all pairs (tski,Mi) from 〈Mi,∗, tski〉 ∈ Members and 〈Mi,∗, tski〉 ∈ DomainKeys where
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identify(σ,µ,bsn, tski) = 1. Set f ← 0 if at least one of the following conditions hold:
– More than one key tski was found (ix).
– I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found (x).
– There is an honest Mi but no entry 〈∗,µ,bsn,Mi〉 ∈ Signed exists (xi).
– There is a tsk′ ∈ KRL where identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′) = 1 and no pair (tski,Mi) for an honest Mi was
found (xii).
• If f , 0, set f ← ver(σ,µ,bsn) (xiii).
• Add 〈σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f 〉 to VerResults, output (VERIFIED,sid, f ) to V.
Link
12. Link. On input (LINK,sid,σ,µ,σ′,µ′,bsn) from some party V with bsn , ⊥.
• Output ⊥ to V if at least one signature tuple (σ,µ,bsn) or (σ′,µ′,bsn) is not valid (verified via the
verify interface with KRL = ∅) (xiv).
• For each tski in Members and DomainKeys compute bi ← identify(σ,µ,bsn, tski) and b′i ←
identify(σ′,µ′,bsn, tski) and do the following:
– Set f ← 0 if bi , b′i for some i (xv).
– Set f ← 1 if bi = b′i = 1 for some i (xvi).
• If f is not defined yet, set f ← link(σ,µ,σ′,µ′,bsn).
• Output (LINK,sid, f ) to V.
Ideal Functionalities From [CDL16]
Semi-Authenticated Channels via F∗auth
This functionality must capture the fact that a sender S sends a message containing both authenticated
and unauthenticated parts to a receiver R, while giving the host F the power to block the message, replace
it and block the communication. F∗auth capture these requirements.
1. On input (SEND,sid, ssid,µ1,µ2,F) from S , check that sid = (S ,R,sid′) for some R and output
(REPLACE1, sid, ssid,µ1,µ2,F) to S ;
2. On input (REPLACE1, sid, ssid,µ′2,F) from S , output (APPEND, sid, ssid,µ1,µ
′
2) to F.
3. On input (APPEND, sid, ssid,µ′′2 ) from F, output (REPLACE2, sid, ssid,µ1,µ
′′
2 ) to S .
4. On input (REPLACE2, sid, ssid,µ′′′2 ) from S , output (SENT, sid, ssid,µ1,µ
′′′
2 ) to R
Figure 3.2: The special authenticated communicatioin functionality F∗auth
Certification Authority
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1. Upon receiving the first message (Register, sid,v) from a party P, send (Rigester, sid,v) to the
adversary;
2. Upon receiving ok from the adversary, if sid = P and this is the first request from P, then record
the pair (P,v).
3. Upon receiving a message (Retrieve, sid) from a party P′, send (Retrieve, sid,P′) to the
adversary, and wait for an ok response from the adversary.
4. If there is a recorded pair (sid,v), output (Retrieve, sid,v) to P′.
5. Else, output (Retrieve, sid,⊥) to P′.
Figure 3.3: Ideal certification authority functionality FCA
Secure Message Transmission
This functionality is parametrized by a leakage function l : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗. For the security proof, it is
required that the leakage function l satisfies the following property:
l(b) = l(b′) =⇒ l(a,b) = l(a,b′)
This is a natural requirement, as most secure channels will at most leak the lenght of the plaintext, for
which this property holds.
1. Upon receiving input (Send, S ,R,sid,µ) from S , send (Sent, S ,R, sid, l(µ)) to the adversary;
2. Generate a private delayed output (Sent, S ,sid,µ) to R and halt.
3. Upon receiving (Corrupt, sid,P) from the adversay, where P ∈ {S ,R}, disclose µ to the
adversary.
4. If the adversary provides a value µ′, and P = S , and no output has been given to R, then output
(Sent, S ,sid,µ′) to R and halt.
Figure 3.4: Ideal secure message transmission functionality FlSMT
Common Reference String
This functionality is parametrized by a distribution D, from which crs is sampled.
1. Upon receiving input (CRS,sid) from a party P,verify that sid = (J,sid′) where J is the set of
identities, and P ∈ J, else ignore the input.
2. If there is no r recorded, then choose and record r←D.
3. Finally, send a public delayed output (CRS, sid,r) to P.
Figure 3.5: Ideal crs functionality FDCRS
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General Overview of the DAA Scheme [CDL16]
Setup: I generates his key pairs x,y← Zq, sets X = gx2 and Y = gy2. I proves that his key is well formed
and register his key (X,Y,piipk) at FCA.
Join: I upon recieving a join request session from Hj, chooses a fresh nonce n and sends it to Hj
who forwards it to the TPM Mi. The TPM then chooses his secret key tsk ← Zq, sets Q = gtsk1 , and
computes pi1, a proof of construction of Q. Mi sends (Q,pi1) to the issuer via Hj. The issuer then
verifies pi1 and that the platform is eligible to join, then generates the credentail as follows: The issuer
chooses r← Zq, sets a = gr1, b = ay, c = axQrxy and d = Qry, I also generates a proof pi2 on his credential
constructions. I sends (a,b,c,d,pi2) to Hj. The host verifies pi2, checks that a , 1, e(a,Y) = e(b,g2),
e(c,g2) = e(ad,X), then forwards (b,d,pi2) to Mi. The TPM verifies pi2 and stores (tsk,b,d) in its records.
Sign: To sign a message µ with respect to a basename bsn, the host re-randomizes his credential by
choosing a random s← Zq, and sets (a′,b′,c′,d′)← (as,bs,cs,ds). Hj then sends (µ,bsn, s) to the TPM
Mi who checks that b′ = bs and d′ = ds, sets nym = H1(bsn)tsk, and calculates a SPK on (µ,bsn) as
SPK{tsk : nym = H1(bsn)tsk,d′ = b′tsk}(bsn,µ)
The TPM sends (nym,pi) to the host who ouputs the signature σ← (a′,b′,c′,d′,nym,pi).
Verify: The verifier upon recieving a signature σ = (a′,b′,c′,d′,nym,pi) on a message µ w.r.t. a bsename
bsn, it verifies pi w.r.t. (µ,bsn) and nym. Checks that a′ , 1, e(a′,Y) = e(b′,g2), e(c′,g2) = e(a′d′,X). For
all tski ∈ KRL, the verifier checks that b′tski , d′, it sets f = 1 if all the checks passed and f = 0 otherwise.
Link: Upon recieving σ1 = (a′1,b
′
1,c
′
1,d
′
1,nym1,pi1) and σ2 = (a
′
2,b
′
2,c
′
2,d
′
2,nym2,pi2) on a message µ w.r.t.
a bsename bsn, if both signatures are valid and nym1 = nym2 output 1, otherwise 0.
Security Model for DAA with Optimal Privacy and the Scheme in [CDL17] In this section, we
describe the security model given by Camenish et al. in [CDL17]. The security definition is given in the
Universal Composability (UC) model with respect to an ideal functionality Fpdaa. In general, the security
properties of a DAA scheme as defined in this security model are the following:
• Unforgeability If the issuer is honest, the adversary can only sign in the name of corrupt platforms(i.e.
both host and TPM are corrupt). If all the platforms are honest (i.e. at least one of the TPM or host
is honest), then no adversary can output a signature on a message µ with respect to a basename bsn.
On the other hand, if not all the platforms are honest, say n platforms are corrupt, the adversary can at
most output n unlinkable signatures with respect to the same basename.
• Anonymity: Starting from two valid signatures with respect to two different basenames, the adversary
can’t tell whether these signatures were produced by one or two different platforms, this property must
hold even if the TPM is corrupt.
• Non-frameability: It ensures that no adversary can produce a signature on a message µ with respect to
a basename bsn that links to a signature generated by a platform with an honest host who never signed
µ with respect to bsn.
The Ideal Functionality Fpdaa We now explain the interfaces of Fpdaa as follows:
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SETUP: On the input(SETUP, sid) from the issuer I, Fpdaa does the following:
• Verify that (I,sid′) = sid and output (SETUP,sid) to S.
• SET Algorithms. Upon receiving the algorithms (Kgen, sig, ver, link, identify) from the simulator S, it
checks that (ver, link, identify) are deterministic, stores (sid, Kgen, sig, ver, link, identify) and outputs
(SETUPDONE,sid) to I.
JOIN:
1. JOIN REQUEST: On input (JOIN,sid, jsid,Mi) from the host Hj to join the TPM Mi, the ideal func-
tionality Fpdaa proceeds as follows:
• Create a join session 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, request〉. Output (JOIN,sid, jsid,Hj) to Mi.
2. TPM Join Proceed: On input (JOIN,sid, jsid) from Mi
• Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, delivery〉.
• Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) to S, wait for input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) from S
• If I or Mi is honest and 〈Mi,∗,∗〉 is already in Members, output ⊥.
• Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
3. I JOIN PROCEED:
• Upon receiving an approval from I, Fpdaa updates the session record to
〈 jsid,sid,Mi,Hj,JOINCOMPLETE〉. Then output (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid) to S and wait
for input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, τ) from S.
• If H j is honest, set τ = ⊥
• Else, verify that the provided tracing trapdoor τ is eligible by checking CheckTtdCorrupt(τ)=1.
• Insert 〈Mi,Hj, τ〉 into Members, and output (JOINED,sid, jsid) to Hj.
SIGN
1. SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN,sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj requesting a DAA signature
on a message µ with respect to a basename bsn, the ideal functionality does the following:
• Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists in Members, else create a sign session
〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉. Output (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
2. SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi
• Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, complete〉.
• If I is honest, check 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists in Members.
• Generate the signature for a fresh or established key: (Strong privacy)
– Retrieve (gsk, τ) from 〈Mi,Hj,bsn,gsk, τ〉 ∈ DomainKeys. If no (gsk, τ) was found, generate a
fresh key (gsk, τ)← Kgen(1λ).
– Check CheckTtdHonest(τ) = 1, and store 〈Mi,bsn,Hj,gsk, τ〉 in DomainKeys.
– Generate the signature σ← sig(gsk,µ,bsn).
– Check ver(σ,µ,bsn)=1, and check identify(σ,µ,bsn, τ)=1.
– Check that there is no (M′i ,H
′
j ) , (Mi,Hj) with tracing trapdoor τ
′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, τ′)=1.
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• Store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn,Hj〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
VERIFY: On input (VERIFY,sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL), from a party V to check whether a given signature σ
is a valid signature on a message µ with respect to a basename bsn and the key revocation list KRL, the
ideal functionality does the following:
• Extract all tuples (τi,Mi,Hj) from the DomainKeys and Members , for which identify(σ,µ,bsn, τi)=1.
Set b = 0 if any of the following holds:
– More than one key τi was found [Check IX].
– I is honest and no pair (τi,Mi,Hj) was found.
– Mi or Hj is honest, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi,bsn,Hj〉 was found in Signed (Strong Unforgeability).
– There is a key τ′ ∈ KRL, such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, τ′)=1 and no pair (τi,Mi,Hj) for an honest Hj
was found.
• If b , 0, set b←ver(σ,µ,bsn). Add 〈σ,µ,bsn,KRL,b〉 to VerResults, and output (VERIFIED,sid,b) to
V.
LINK: On input (LINK,sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), from a party V to check if the two signatures stem from
the same signer or not. The ideal functionality deals with the request as follows:
• If at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid (verified via the VERIFY
interface with KRL , ∅), output ⊥.
• For each τi in Members and DomainKeys, compute bi ← identify(σ1,µ1,bsn, τi) and b′i=
identify(σ2,µ2,bsn, τi) then set:
– f ← 0 if bi , b′i for some i.
– f ← 1 if bi = b′i = 1 for some i.
• If f is not defined, set f ←link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), then output (LINK,sid, f ) to V.
General Overview of the DAA Scheme [CDL17]
Signature for Encrypted Message A signature for encrypted message consists of the following algo-
rithms as described in [CDL17].
• S igKGen(spar): On input of the system parameters, this algorithm outputs a public verification key
spk and a secret signing ket ssk.
• EncS ign(ssk,epk,C): On input a signing key ssk, a public encryption key epk and a ciphertex C =
Enc(epk,µ), outputs an encrypted signature σˆ of C.
• DecS ign(esk, spk, σˆ): On input an encrypted signature σˆ, secret decryption key esk, and a public
verfication key spk, outputs a standard signature σ.
• V f (spk,σ,µ): On input a public verification key spk, signature σ and a message µ, outputs 1 if the
signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
Algorithms for the Split Signatures A split signature scheme allows two different parties, each holding
a share of the secret key, to jointly create signatures. As defined in [CDL17], a split signature scheme
consists of the following algorithms:
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• PreKeyGen(spar): On input the system parameters, this algorithm outputs a pre-public key ppk and
the first share of the secret signing key ssk1.
• CompleteKeyGen(ppk): On input the pre-public key, this algorithm outputs a public verification key
spk and the second secret signing key ssk2.
• VerKey(ppk, spk, ssk2): On input the pre-public key ppk, the full public key spk, and the secret key
share ssk2, this algorithm outputs 1 iff the pre-public key combined with the secret key part ssk2 leads
to full public key spk.
• PreS ign(ssk1,µ): On input a secret signing key share ssk1, and a message µ, this algorithm outputs a
pre-signature σ′.
• CompleteS ign(ppk, sk2,µ,σ): On input the pre-public key ppk, the second signing key share ssk2, a
message µ, and a pre-signature σ′, this algorithm outputs the completed signature σ.
• V f (spk,σ,µ): On input the public key spk, signature σ, and a message µ, this algorithm outputs 1 if
the signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
Let S S IG = (PreKeyGen,CompleteKeyGen,VerKey,PreS ign,CompleteS ign,V f ) denote a secure split
signature scheme, and let ES IG = (S igKGen,EncS ign,DecS ign,V f ) denote a secure signature scheme
for encrypted messages as defined in [CDL17].
The DAA Scheme in [CDL17]
Setup: I generates his key pair (isk, ipk)← ES IG.KGen(spar), with ipk = gisk1 . I proves that his key is
well formed and register his key (ipk,piipk) at FCA.
Join: I upon recieving a join request session from Hj, chooses a fresh nonce n and sends it to Hj who
forwards it to the TPM Mi. The TPM then generates his key pair (tsk, tpk)← S S IG.PreKeyGen(spar),
sends tpk to the issuer via the host and stores tsk in its record. The host generates its key share for
the split signature (gpk,hsk)← S S IGN.CompleteKeyGen(tpk). The host generates his encryption key
pair (epk,esk)← EncKGen(spar) and encrypts gpk under epk as C ← Enc(epk,gpk). The host gener-
ates a proof piJOIN , to prove that C is an encryption of the public key gpk that is correctly derived from
the TPM’s public key share tpk. The host sends (epk,C,piJOIN) to the issuer. The issuer then verifies
piJOIN w.r.t. the TPM’s public key tpk. I checks that the platform is eligible to join, then generates
the credentail by creating a signature on C as cred′ ← ES IG.EncS ign(isk,epk,C), and prove that he
generates cred′ correctly in a proof piJOIN,I. I sends the (cred′,piJOIN,I) to the host. The host verifies
piJOIN,I w.r.t. ipk, cred′, and C, decrepts the credential as cred← ES IG.DecS ign(esk,cred′), and stores
(hsk,cred, tpk,gpk) in its records.
Sign: The host and the TPM jointly create the signature as follows: tag ← H(0,µ,bsn)tsk.hsk and
nym← H(1,bsn)tsk.hsk without revealing gpk and the credential, instead the host provides a proof piS IGN
to show that tag and nym are valid split signatures under gpk and a valid credential cred. The host then
outputs the siganture σ← (tag,nym,piS IGN).
Verify: The verifier upon recieving a signature σ on a message µ w.r.t. a basename bsn, it verifies piS IGN
w.r.t. µ,bsn, tag and nym. For every gpki ∈ KRL, the verifier checks that S S IG.V f (gpki,nym, (1,bsn)), 1.
Outputs 1 if all the proofs are correct, 0 otherwise.
Link: Upon recieveing σ = (nym, tag,piS IGN) and σ′ = (nym′, tag′,pi′S IGN) on a message µ w.r.t. a base-
name bsn, if both signatures are valid and nym = nym′ output 1, otherwise 0.
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Security Model for DAA with Strong Privacy and the Scheme in [CCD+17]
In this section, we describe the security model given by Camenish et al. in [CCD+17]. The security
definition is given in the Universal Composability (UC) model with respect to an ideal functionality
Fpdaa+ . In general the security properties of a DAA scheme as defined in this security model are the
following:
• Unforgeability When the issuer and all unrevoked TPMs are honest, then no adversary can output a
signature on a message µ with respect to a basename (bsn) and attribute disclosure (D, I) when no
platform that joined with these attributes signed µ with respect to bsn and (D, I).
• Anonymity: Starting from two valid signatures with respect to two different basenames, the adversary
can’t tell whether these signatures were produced by one or two different honest platforms. This prop-
erty must hold even when the issuer is corrupt. Privacy should be achieved even in the presence of
corrupt TPMs.
• Non-frameability: No adversary can produce a signature on a message µ w.r.t a basename bsn that
links to signatures generated by an honest platform, when this platform never signed µ w.r.t bsn. This
property must hold even when the issuer is corrupt.
The Ideal Functionality Fpdaa+ We now explain the interfaces of Fpdaa+ , which defines DAA with
attributes, signature-based revocation, and strong privacy.
SETUP: On the input (SETUP,sid) from the issuer I, Fpdaa+ does the following:
• Verify that (I,sid′) = sid and output (SETUP,sid) to S.
• SET Algorithms. Upon receiving the algorithms (Kgen, sig, ver, link, identify) from the simulator S, it
checks that (ver, link, identify) are deterministic, stores (sid, Kgen, sig, ver, link, identify) and outputs
(SETUPDONE,sid) to I.
JOIN:
1. JOIN REQUEST: On input (JOIN,sid, jsid,Mi) from the host Hj to join the TPM Mi, the ideal func-
tionality Fpdaa+ proceeds as follows:
• Output (JOINSTART,sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) to S and wait for the input (JOINSTART,sid, jsid) from S.
• Create a join session 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj,⊥,delivered〉.
• Abort if I is honest and 〈Mi,∗,∗〉 is already in Members.
• Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
2. I JOIN PROCEED: Upon input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi,attrs) from I
• Output (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid) to S and wait for input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, τ) from S.
• If H j is honest, set τ = ⊥
• Else, verify that the provided tracing trapdoor τ is eligible by checking CheckTtdCorrupt(τ) = 1.
• Insert 〈Mi,Hj, τ,attrs〉 into Members, and output (JOINED,sid, jsid,attrs) to Hj.
SIGN
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1. SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN,sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn,p,SRL) from the host Hj
• Abort if H j is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗,attrs〉 exists in Members with p(attrs) = 1.
• Set σ←⊥ if Hj is corrupt.
• If Hj is honest, generate the signature for a fresh or established key as follows:
– Retrieve (gsk, τ) from 〈Mi,Hj,bsn,gsk, τ〉 ∈ DomainKeys. If no (gsk, τ) was found, generate a
fresh key (gsk, τ)← Kgen(1λ).
– Check CheckTtdHonest(τ) = 1, and store 〈Mi,bsn,Hj,gsk, τ〉 in DomainKeys.
– Generate the signature σ← sig(gsk,µ,bsn,p,SRL).
– Check ver(σ,µ,bsn,p,SRL)=1, and check identify(σ,µ,bsn, τ)=1.
– Check that there is no (M′i ,H
′
j ) , (Mi,Hj) with tracing trapdoor τ
′ registered in Members or
DomainKeys such that identify (σ,µ,bsn, τ′)=1.
• Create a sign session record 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,bsn,µ,p,SRL,σ, request〉.
• Output (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid,µ) to Mi if Mi is honest, and
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid,bsn,µ,SRL,σ) to Mi if the TPM is corrupt.
2. SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi
• Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, p,SRL,σ, complete〉.
• If I is honest, check 〈Mi,Hj,∗,attrs〉 exists in Members, with p(attrs) = 1.
• For all (σ′,µ′,bsn′) ∈ SRL, find all (τi,M′i ,H′j ) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ′,µ′,bsn′,∗, τ′) = 1
3. Check that there doesn’t exist two distinct tracing trapdoors matching to σ′.
4. Check that no pair (τi,Mi,Hj) was found.
5. Store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn,Hj,p,SRL〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
VERIFY: On input (VERIFY,sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL, SRL), from a party V:
• Extract all tuples (τi,Mi,Hj) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which identify(σ,µ,bsn, τi)=1.
Set b = 0 if any of the following holds:
– More than one key τi was found.
– I is honest and no pair (τi,Mi,Hj) was found for which an entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗,attrs〉 ∈ Members exists
with p(attrs) = 1.
– Mi is honest, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi,bsn,Hj〉 was found in Signed.
– Hj is honest, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi,bsn,Hj,p,SRL〉 was found inSigned.
– There is a key τ′ ∈ KRL, such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, τ′)=1 and no pair (τi,Mi,Hj) for an honest Hj
was found.
– For some matching τi and (σ′,µ′,bsn′) = 1 ∈ SRL, identify(σ′,µ′,bsn′, τi) = 1
• If b , 0, set b←ver(σ,µ,bsn,p,SRL).
• Add 〈σ,µ,bsn,KRL,b〉 to VerResults, and output (VERIFIED, sid,b) to V.
LINK: On input (LINK,sid,σ1,µ1,p1,SRL1,σ2,µ2, p2,SRL2,bsn)
• If at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,p1,SRL1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,p2,SRL2,bsn) is not valid (verified via
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the VERIFY interface with KRL , ∅), output ⊥.
• For each τi in DomainKeys and Members, compute bi ← identify(σ1,µ1,bsn, τi) and b′i=
identify(σ2,µ2,bsn, τi) then set:
– f ← 0 if bi , b′i for some i.
– f ← 1 if bi = b′i = 1 for some i.
• If f is not defined, set f ←link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), then output (LINK,sid, f ) to V.
General Overview of the DAA Scheme [CCD+17]
Setup: I generates his secret key x← Z∗q, sets X = gx2 and X′ = gx1. I proves that his key is well formed
and register his key (X,X′,piipk) at FCA.
Join: I upon recieving a join request session from Hj, chooses a fresh nonce n and sends it to Hj who
forwards it to the TPM Mi. The TPM then chooses his secret key tsk← Zq, sets tpk = gtsk. The TPM
also computes tpk′ = g˜tsk and generates a proof pitpk, a proof of construction of tpk and tpk′. The TPM
then sends (tpk, tpk′,pitpk) to the hostj and stores tsk in its record. The host chooses his secret key
hsk← Zq, and calculates gpk = tpk′g˜hsk. The host also computes pigpk, a proof of construction of gpk.
The host sends (tpk, tpk′,gpk,pitpk,pigpk) to the issuer, the issuer then verifies pitpk and pigpk, checks that
the platform is eligible to join, then generates the credentail by creating a signature on gpk and attributes
attrs. I sends the credential and atrributes to the host who verifies the credential w.r.t. gpk,attrs, ipk, and
stores (hsk,cred,attrs) in its records.
Sign: The host first verifies that its attributes fulfill the predicate (D, I), then the host and the TPM
jointly create the pseudonym nym← H(1|bsn)gsk and a proof picred of a memebership credential on gsk =
tsk+hsk and attrs. For each tuple (bsni,nymi) ∈ SRL, the host and the TPM jointly create non-revocation
proofs piSRL. The host then outputs a signature σ = (nym,picred, {piSRL, i}).
Verify: The verifier upon recieving a signature σ on a message µ w.r.t. a basename bsn, it verifies picred
and {piSRL, i}w.r.t. µ,bsn,SRL and (D, I). For every gski ∈ KRL, the verifier checks that nym,H(1|bsn)gski .
Outputs 1 if all the proofs are correct, 0 otherwise.
Link: Upon recieveing σ = (nym,picred, {piSRL, i}) and σ′ = (nym′,pi′cred, {pi′SRL, i}) on a message µ w.r.t. a
basename bsn, if both signatures are valid and nym = nym′ output 1, otherwise 0.
3.3.4 Comparison
Security Comparison
• Privacy: The most significant contribution in [CDL17] and [CCD+17] is that the ideal functionalities
Fpdaa and Fpdaa+ guarantee anonymity as long as the host is honest even when the TPM is corrupt,
whereas Fldaa in [CDL16] guarantees anonymity only when both the TPM and the host are honest.
Another difference between the functionalities is that if both the TPM and the host are honest, Fpdaa and
Fpdaa+ assume that no adversary can alter, read or even notice the communication happening between
the TPM and the host, this is due to the physical proximity of the host and the TPM. Consequently,
Fpdaa and Fpdaa+ are simpler compared to Fldaa, as both functionalities, F
l
daa and Fpdaa+ omit all the
dedicated interfaces and outputs that inform the simulator about the communication between the host
and the TPM. Unfortunately, optimal privacy defined in [CDL17] cannot be achieved using construction
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where the TPM and the host together create a Fiat-Shamir proof of knowledge as most efficient DAA
schemes are designed. In fact, the DAA protocol with optimal privacy proposed in [CDL17] comes
with a new design that shifts the most important computations from the TPM to the host and requires
new operations to be implemented on the TPM. A new privacy notation, strong privacy, was proposed
in [CCD+17], it aims to obtain the best privacy properties with minimal changes to the existing TPM
and DAA specifications. This new privacy notation allows the TPM to see the anonymous signature that
is generated by the functionality, the TPM can also alter the distribution of the signatures. Therefore,
while the actual signature shown to the TPM is still guaranteed to be anonymous, the TPM can influence
the final distribution of the signatures by blocking certain signature values.
• Non-Frameability: The notion of strong non-frameability was first introduced in [CDL17], it guaran-
tees non-frameability as long as the host is honest, unlike Fldaa that guarantees non-frameability only
if the entire platform is honest. This modification is done through JoinProceed interface in [CDL17],
it allows the adversary to provide a tracing trapdoor τ only when the host is corrupt, and sets τ = ⊥
whenever the host is honest. This replaces the condition of discarding the adversarial τ when both the
TPM and the host are honest in [CDL16].
• Unforgeability: As Fldaa guarantees unforgeability if the TPM is honest, and of course the issuer too.
Fldaa provide stronger unforgeability version which guarantees that attestations cannot be forged unless
the entire platform is corrupted, i.e. it ensures unforgeability if at least one of the two entities, TPM
or host, is honest. To achieve strong unforgeability, Fldaa stores the identity of the host as a part of the
signature record when the signatures are created in SignProceed interface. The verify interface then
requires the existence of such a record whenever the signature to be verified belongs to an honest host
or honest TPM.
In Fldaa and Fpdaa models, the TPM approves both the message and the basename for which the host
request as a signature. InFpdaa+ model, the TPM only approves the message being signed, but no longer
receives the basename. Therefore in [CCD+17], the unforgeability with honest TPM and corrupt host
is slightly weaker than the UC definitions in [CDL17] and [CDL16]. When the host is honest and the
TPM is corrupt, Fpdaa+ guarantees the same unforgeability and non-frameability as Fpdaa.
General Comparison
• Isolated TPM Corruption Model: In the UC standard model, the adversary gains full control over a
corrupted party, i.e., it receives all inputs of the corrupted parties and chooses their outputs. This gives
the adversary much more power than in reality. In the isolated corruption model [CDL17], it is assumed
that the adversary cannot directly interact with the isolated party, TPM in our case. When a corrupted
TPM is isolated, the adversary cannot communicate directly with the TPM, but only via honest host.
The adversary thus no longer learns which isolated TPM signed which combination of messages and
basenames, and the signatures created by Fpdaa guaranteed to be unlinkable.
• Dedicated Tracing Key: Fldaa uses the generated key gsk for two purposes: to create signatures
for honest platforms (via sign interface) and to trace signatures (via identify interface) to ensure
non-frameability and unforgeability. The key gsk is provided by the adversary in the join or sign
interfaces. In Fpdaa and Fpdaa+ models, the key is split into two values: gsk which is used in sign
interface to create signatures and τ which is used in the identify interface to trace signatures. The
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Corrupt TPM Fldaa Fpdaa Fpdaa+
Standard − + -
Isolated − + +
Table 3.1: Comparison of privacy guarantees by the 3 functionalities for an honest host in the presence of a corrupt TPM, in both
the standard UC or isolated model
adversary can then only extract τ value in the security proof instead of gsk.
• Attributes and Signature-based Revocation: Unlike Fpdaa and Fldaa functionalities, Fpdaa+ supports
adding attributes to the membership credentials, and selectively disclosing attributes when signing.
Fpdaa+ can be seen as Fpdaa extended with attributes and signature-based revocations. Signature-based
revocation allows one to revoke TPMs without assuming that the TPM’s secret key becomes publicly
available upon corruption. This improves the standard private key-based revocation of DAA.
Remark: As in the standardised DAA schemes supported by the TPM (either the TPM Version 1.2 or
the TPM Version 2.0), in the proposed LDAA scheme, privacy was built on the honesty of the entire
platform, i.e., both the TPM and the host are supposed to be honest. In [CDL17] and [CCD+17] it is
considered that the TPM may be corrupt and privacy must hold whenever the host is honest, regardless
of the corruption state of the TPM. To achieve the best performance, we do not consider this case in this
Phd and leave it for future work.
3.4 El Bansarkhani and El Kaafarani DAA Scheme [BK17]
There has been a growing effort to standardise post-quantum cryptography [oST17]. However, this effort
has been focused on key-exchange and digital signatures schemes, leaving privacy-preserving crypto-
graphic constructs, like ring and group-based signatures, mostly as a research topic [LNW15, LLNW16,
LLM+16, dPLS18]. Recently, El Bansarkhani and El Kaafarani [BK17] proposed the first direct anony-
mous attestation scheme from lattice assumptions. However, the scheme requires massive storage and
computation resources. We give a brief overview of this scheme.
The DAA scheme proposed in [BK17] works as follows. The Issuer’s public key consists of `+2 vectors
in Rmq , namely AˆI, Aˆi for i = 0,1, · · ·`, and 2 polynomials u and b ∈ Rq. During the join step, the TPM
generates a small secret Zˆ1 ∈R2m+1q such that [b|Aˆid] · [Zˆ1] = u˜ mod q, where Aˆid = [AˆI|Aˆ0 +
∑`
i=1 idi · Aˆi] ∈
R2mq . The TPM sends u˜ together with a proof of knowledge pi1 to the issuer, who registers both u˜ and the
corresponding TPM, and samples (using his secret key) a small credential Zˆ2 such that Aˆid · Zˆ2 = u − u˜
mod q. Zˆ2 corresponds to the host secret-key share. The TPM and the host secret-key shares together
satisfy u = [b|Aˆid] · [Zˆ1 + (0|Zˆ2)]. To create a signature, the TPM samples a small random vector Tˆ ∈R2mq ,
such that Tˆ · Aˆid mod q is uniform, and shares it with the host. Tˆ is used to randomise signatures. Then,
the TPM and the host independently compute pi2 and pi3, where pi2 proves that u′ = [b|Aˆid] · [Zˆ1 + (0|Tˆ )]
and pi3 proves that u − u′ = Aˆid · (Zˆ2 − Tˆ ). Notice that, in [BK17], commitments are not hashed before
being stored in pi2 or pi3. Finally, the host outputs the signature σ = (pi2,pi3,u′,µ).
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Chapter 4
A Lattice-based Direct Anonymous Attestation (LDAA)
Scheme
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a new lattice based direct anonymous attestation scheme that reduces the
demands on the TPM in terms of storage costs and computational resources of the scheme in [BK17]
discussed in Section 3.4. Experimental results show that the storage requirements of the TPM are re-
duced twofold and the size of the signatures five times when compared with [BK17]. The signing and
verification operations are also accelerated 1.1 and 2.0 times. The security of our Lattice-based Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) (LDAA) scheme is based on the hardness of the Ring-ISIS and Ring-
LWE problems. As there is no known quantum algorithm that solves either of these problems, this
provides a promising DAA scheme for the post-quantum age. We also prove the security of our LDAA
scheme in the Universal Composability (UC) model.
Chapter organisation: Section 4.2 presents Boyen signature scheme and Baum et. al commitment scheme
with our modifications, which will be used as two building blocks of our LDAA scheme. Section 4.3 pro-
poses novel lattice-based cryptographic primitives. A security proof for our LDAA scheme is presented
in Section 4.4, the proof is based on the security model proposed in [CDL16] and presented in Subsec-
tion 3.3.3. Finally, we evaluate the LDAA experimentally in Section 4.5, and discuss the performance of
the proposed scheme in comparison to related art in Section 4.6.
4.2 Building Blocks for LDAA
4.2.1 Boyen’s Signature Scheme and Our Modification
This scheme operates over a ring Rq, with m = O(logq), and can sign any message id ∈ {0,1}`. This
section describes Boyen’s scheme. The security of the Boyen signature scheme is based on the hardness
of the Ring-SIS problem and is proved to be secure in the standard model. We refer to [Boy10] for the
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security proof. The proof was improved later in [MP12a] by using a new trapdoor and ring analogue.
In this section, a modification to Boyen’s signature scheme is proposed to support the issuing of DAA
credentials, also we provide a proof of security of the modification of Boyen’s scheme.
Boyen’s Signature Scheme
• KeyGen(1λ):
1. Generates a vector of polynomials Aˆ ∈Rmq together with a trapdoor Tˆ . The trapdoor enables sampling
vectors of polynomials following a discrete Gaussian distribution over the lattice L⊥v (Aˆ|Bˆ) for any
v ∈ Rq and Bˆ ∈ Rmq , where | denotes concatenation and L⊥v (Aˆ|Bˆ) =
{
Zˆ ∈ R2mq : [Aˆ|Bˆ] · Zˆ = v mod q
}
.
2. Samples uniform random vectors of polynomials Aˆi ∈ Rmq for i ∈ {0, . . . , `}.
3. Selects a uniform random syndrome u ∈ Rq.
4. Outputs the secret key sk := Tˆ and the public key pk := (Aˆ, Aˆ0, Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆ`,u,q,β).
• Sign(sk, id ∈ {0,1}`):
1. Generates a vector of polynomials Aˆid = [Aˆ|Aˆ0 +∑`i=1 idi · Aˆi] ∈ R2mq .
2. Using the secret key Tˆ , samples Zˆ = (z1, . . . ,z2m) ← DL⊥u (Aˆid),s, such that Aˆid · Zˆ ≡ u mod q and
‖Zˆ‖∞ ≤ β.
3. Outputs the signature Zˆ = (z1, . . . ,z2m).
• Verify(pk, id, Zˆ): If Aˆid · Zˆ ≡ u mod q and ‖Zˆ‖∞ ≤ β are satisfied, output 1, else 0.
Modified Boyen’s Signature Scheme
• KeyGen(1λ): samples one more uniform random vector of polynomials Aˆt ∈Rmq than KeyGen in above
Boyen’s scheme and outputs the secret key sk := Tˆ and the public key pk := (Aˆt, Aˆ, Aˆ0, Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆ`,u,q,β).
• Sign(sk, id ∈ {0,1}`):
1. Samples a vector of polynomials Zˆt = (z1, . . . , zm)←↩DmZn,s such that ‖Zˆt‖∞ ≤ β, and computes Aˆt · Zˆt ≡
ut mod q.
2. Generates a vector of polynomials Aˆid = [Aˆ|Aˆ0 +∑`i=1 idi · Aˆi] ∈ R2mq , as in the Boyen scheme.
3. Using the secret key Tˆ , samples Zˆh = (zm+1 . . . ,z3m)← DL⊥uh (Aˆid),s, with ‖Zˆh‖∞ ≤ β and such that
Aˆid · Zˆh ≡ uh = (u−ut) mod q.
4. Outputs the signature Zˆ = [Zˆt |Zˆh] = (z1, . . . ,z3m).
• Verify(pk, id, Zˆ): If [Aˆt |Aˆid] · Zˆ ≡ u mod q and ‖Zˆ‖∞ ≤ β are satisfied, output 1, else 0.
Security Proof of the Modified Boyen Signature Scheme
Theorem 8. Let q = poly(λ), if there is a probabilistic algorithm A that outputs an existential signa-
ture forgery of the modified Boyen signature scheme, with time τ making Q ≤ q/2 adaptive chosen-
message queries, then there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves the Ring-ISIS(q,n,m,β) where
β = poly(`,m,n), in time τ′ ≈ τ. Moreover, the simulation completes both the Queries and Forgery phases
without aborting with probability of completion
1
q
(
1− Q
q
)
≤ Pr{completion} ≤ 1
q
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.Proof. Suppose that there exists such a forger A. We construct a solver B that simulates an attack
environment and uses the forgery to create its solution. The following operations can be performed by
B:
• Invocation: B is supplied with a vector of polynomials Aˆ ∈ Rmq and a polynomial u from a uniform
distribution, and requested to output a short solution Yˆ ∈ Rmq such that Aˆ · Yˆ = u mod q.
• Setup: B gives the adversary A a simulated verification key constructed as follows:
– Pick a random vector of polynomials Bˆ ∈ Rmq with a short basis (trapdoor) TBˆ ⊂ L⊥u (Bˆ).
– Pick `+ 2 short random polynomials r t,r0,r1, . . . ,r` ∈ Rq from DZn,η.
– Pick ` uniformly random scalars h1,h2, . . . ,h` ∈ Zq and set h0 = 1.
– Output the verification keys
∗ Aˆt = r tAˆ mod q
∗ Aˆ0 = r0Aˆ + h0Bˆ mod q
∗ Aˆ1 = r1Aˆ + h1Bˆ mod q, . . . , Aˆ` = r`Aˆ + h` Bˆ mod q.
• Queries: B answers adaptive signature queries from A on any id ∈ {0,1}`+1 as follows:
– Compute the polynomial r id =
∑`
i=0 idir i.
– Compute the scalar hid =
∑`
i=0 idihi.
– If hid = 0 mod q, abort the simulation.
– Using TBˆ sample a short vector of polynomials Zˆ ∈ R3mq such that
[
Aˆt |Aˆ|∑`i=0 Aˆi]Zˆ = u, this is done
by the following steps:
1. Sample a short element Zˆ1 and Zˆ2 from DmZn,σ.
2. Using the trapdoor TBˆ, sample a pre-image, Zˆ3 from D
m
Zn,σ of the following polynomial v = u −
r tAˆ · Zˆ1 − Aˆ · Zˆ2 such that hidBˆ · Zˆ3 = v mod q. Note that the trapdoor of (hidBˆ) is TBˆ as hid is a
scalar.
3. Output the signature Zˆ =
[
(Zˆ1|Zˆ2− r idZˆ3)|Zˆ3
]
that satisfies
[
Aˆt |Aˆ|∑`i=0 Aˆi]Zˆ = u.
• Forgery: B receives from A a forged signature Zˆ∗ ∈ R3mq on a new unqueried id∗ and does:
1. Compute the polynomial r∗ =
∑`
i=0 id
∗
i r i.
2. Compute the scalar h∗ =
∑`
i=0 id
∗
ihi.
3. If h∗ , 0 mod q, abort the simulation.
4. Separate Zˆ∗ = [Zˆ∗1 |Zˆ∗2 |Zˆ∗3] with Zˆ∗i ∈ Rmq for i = 1,2,3.
5. Return Yˆ = r tZˆ∗1 + Zˆ
∗
2 + r
∗Zˆ∗3 ∈Rmq as a solution of Aˆ · Yˆ = u mod q, where Yˆ is with high probability,
a short non-zero element in Rmq and thus a valid Ring-ISIS solution.
• Outcome: The completion probability for B against an arbitrary strategy for A can be exactly lifted
from Lemma 27 of [Boy10].

In order to create a DAA signature, which is jointly signed by a TPM and its Host, we modify Baum’s
scheme to allow for two parties to commit a set of secret values jointly. This modification is based
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on the additive homomorphism of the scheme. Let Sˆ t ∈ Rltq and Sˆ h ∈ Rlhq , for some integers lt and lh,
respectively be the TPM and the Host’s inputs to be concatenated, and st and sh in Rq be the TPM and
the host’s corresponding inputs to be added. With our modification, the TPM and the Host are able to
jointly commit to the vector
(
st + sh| Sˆ t | Sˆ h
)
without one learning about the input values of the other. The
original Baum et al. scheme was proved to hold the properties of statistically hiding and computationally
binding and the proof is based on an instantiation of the Ring-SIS problem. The security of this modified
commitment scheme is based on the original scheme. We will argue that splitting the prover role into two
entities does not affect these two properties.
4.2.2 Baum et al’s Commitment Scheme and Our Modification
The proposed DAA technique follows a non-interactive sigma protocol construction. Sigma protocols
are a basic building block for zero-knowledge proofs-of-knowledge, wherein the prover commits to a
series of interrelated values, an array of challenges is produced, and the prover opens a subset of the
commitments according to the challenges. Each opening reveals a property of the DAA credential held
by the Internet of Things (IoT) device. Given sufficient challenges/openings, an Edge device will be
convinced of the validity of those credentials. Herein, Baum et al’s commitment scheme [BDOP16] is
exploited to develop a quantum-resistant DAA. The security of this commitment scheme is based on the
hardness of the Ring-ISIS problem. We refer to [BDOP16] for the security proof. In this section, Baum
et al’s commitment scheme is modified to handle the splitting of the prover into two entities (the TPM
and the Host) efficiently, we also provide a security proof of this modification.
Baum et al’s Commitment Scheme
• C.KeyGen(k): Given a security parameter k, generates the system parameters (q, Rq, α, γ, Bˆ), where
q is a prime modulus defining Rq, α and γ are positive numbers, and Bˆ is a uniformly random matrix
of polynomials in R(d+1)×kq , for some positive integer d.
• Commit (Sˆ ): To commit to a message Sˆ ∈ Rdq, choose a uniformly random vector of invertible polyno-
mials Rˆ ∈D ⊆ Rk such that ‖Rˆ‖∞ ≤ α. Compute C = COM(Sˆ , Rˆ) := BˆRˆ + (0, Sˆ ), and output C .
• Open(C , Sˆ , Rˆ, p): A valid opening of a commitment C is a 3-tuple: Sˆ ∈ Rq, Rˆ ∈ Rk and an invertible
polynomial p ∈ R such that ‖p‖∞ ≤ γ. The verifier checks that
BˆRˆ + (0, pSˆ ) = pC with ‖Rˆ‖∞ ≤ α
Note that an honest committer can always open by letting p = 1. However, the purpose for this relaxed
condition is to get soundness and zero-knowledge for the protocol as proposed in [BDOP16].
Modified Baum et al’s Commitment Scheme
To commit to a message Sˆ = [(st + sh)| Sˆ t | Sˆ h] ∈Rlt+lh+1q , the TPM and the host share a uniformly random
vector of polynomials Bˆ in R(lt+lh+2)×kq .
To commit to a message [st | Sˆ t], the TPM:
• Chooses a uniformly random vector of invertible polynomials Rˆt ∈ D such that ‖Rˆt‖∞ ≤ αt for some
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small constant αt.
• Computes C t = COM([st | Sˆ t], Rˆt) := BˆRˆt + (0| st | Sˆ t | 0ˆ ∈ Rlhq ), outputs C t.
To commit to a message [sh| Sˆ h] the host:
• Chooses a uniformly random vector of invertible polynomials Rˆh ∈D such that ‖Rˆh‖∞ ≤ αh for some
small constant αh.
• Computes Ch = COM([sh| Sˆ h], Rˆh) := BˆRˆh + (0| sh| 0ˆ ∈ Rltq | Sˆ h), outputs Ch.
Now we have C = C t +Ch = Bˆ(Rˆt +Rˆh)+(0| st + sh| Sˆ t | Sˆ h) =COM([st + sh| Sˆ t | Sˆ h], Rˆt +Rˆh) =COM(Sˆ , Rˆ),
where Rˆ = Rˆt + Rˆh and ‖Rˆ‖∞ < αt +αh.
Security Proof of the Modified Baum Commitment Scheme
We will now prove the security requirements of our modified commitement scheme based on the hardness
of the Ring-SIS problem. First we prove that breaking the binding property implies solving a Ring-SIS
problem over Rq.
Lemma 5. (Binding Property): Starting from two correct distinct openings (Sˆ , p, Rˆ) and (Sˆ ′, p′, Rˆ′) for
the same commitement C, one can efficiently compute a small solution, with norm bounded by some real
number h = f (α,γ), to the Ring- SIS instance defined by the top row of Bˆ.
Proof. : Let (Sˆ , p, Rˆ) and (Sˆ ′, p′, Rˆ′) be two different openings for the same commitement C , then
pC = BˆRˆ + (0, pSˆ ) (4.1)
and
p′C = BˆRˆ′+ (0, p′Sˆ ′) (4.2)
Multiply equation 4.1 by p′, and equation 4.2 by p, then subtract we get:
Bˆ(p′Rˆ− pRˆ′) = (0, p′p(Sˆ − Sˆ ′))
Since Sˆ − Sˆ ′ , 0 and both p and p′ are invertible, then we have p′p(Sˆ − Sˆ ′) , 0, therefore p′Rˆ− pRˆ′ , 0.
Hence a solution p′Rˆ− pRˆ′ such that ‖p′Rˆ− pRˆ′‖∞ < h, to the Ring SIS instance defined by the first row
of Bˆ. 
Lemma 6. (Hiding Property): Assume that the min-entropy of the vectors Rˆt and Rˆh sampled from D is
at least (lt + lh + 2) log(|Rq|) +λ, where λ is a security parameter, and the function fBˆ(Rˆ) = AˆRˆ for some
Aˆ ∈ Rkq, is universal (as defined in [BDOP16]). Then the scheme is statistically hiding.
Proof. : Although the commitment gives the adversary log(|Rq|) bits of information on Rˆ, precisely the
61
dot product of Rˆ with the first row Bˆ1 in Bˆ, we still have (lt + lh + 1) log(|Rq|) +λ bits of randomness left
in Rˆ. Let Bˆ =
[
Bˆ1 ∈ R1×kq | Bˆr ∈ R(lt+lh+1)×kq
]T , then by the left over hash lemma, it follows that hBˆr (Rˆ) is
statistically close to random, even given hBˆ1 (Rˆ). Thus, the scheme is statistically hiding. 
4.2.3 ISIS Proof for LDAA
DAA signatures will correspond to a zero-knowledge proof of a Boyen’s signature. The techniques
developed herein to achieve that can be seen as a generalisation of the scheme proposed by Ling et
al [LNSW13] to prove the knowledge of a small vector x with ||x||∞ ≤ β such that Ax = y mod q for a
secret x ∈ Znq and public A ∈ Zm×nq , y ∈ Zmq . Instead of arguing directly about x, x is decomposed into
k = dlog2 βe vectors of norm at most 1:
x =
k∑
i=1
2i−1bi
In order to prevent the leakage of the bi, elements from {−1,0,1} are added to the decomposed vectors, so
the number of each of them is the same, producing xi = (bi|ti) ∈ B3n. Finally the matrix A is also extended
with 2n 0 columns A′ = (A|02m×n) such that:
A′
k∑
i=1
2i−1xi = y
The prover now commits to
c1 = COM
(
pi0, . . . ,pik−1,A′
∑k
i=1 2
i−1r i
)
c2 = COM (pi0(r0), . . . ,pik−1(rk−1))
c3 = COM
(
pi0(r0 + x0), . . . ,pik−1(rk−1 + xk−1)
)
for random r0, . . . ,rk−1 ←↩ Z3nq and uniformly random permutations pi0, . . . ,pik−1. Then, the verifier ran-
domly chooses a challenge i←↩ {1,2,3} and the prover reveals c j∀ j , i. If c2,c3 are revealed, the prover
will be convinced that the xi are indeed small. In the other two cases the verifier will be able to validate
either the left or the right-hand side of
A′
k∑
i=1
2i−1r i = A′
k∑
i=1
2i−1(r i + xi)− y,
giving the verifier confidence that the prover knows a preimage of y. Since revealing all commitments
would also reveal the x, the above described process has to be repeated several times.
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4.3 Proposed LDAA Scheme
A DAA scheme supported on the above described lattice-based cryptographic constructs is now pro-
posed. The security of this scheme is based on the Ring-ISIS and Ring-LWE problems, conjectured to
be hard to solve even in a post-quantum setting. As noticed in Subsection 1.1.2, DAA credentials cor-
respond to a signature of the IoT identifier produced by the Issuer. In practice, DAA credentials are not
held by a single party, but part of them are stored in the TPM, and another part in the IoT Host. Boyen’s
signature scheme is herein modified as described in Subsection 4.2.1 to achieve this key splitting. The
Issuer’s public-key now includes one more random vector of polynomials Aˆt ∈ Rq. Each signature is
comprised of two vectors of polynomials Zˆt and Zˆh of small norm such that [Aˆt |Aˆid] · [Zˆt |Zˆh] = u. Zˆt is
held by the TPM and Zˆh by the Host. The security of this modified Boyen signature scheme is based
on the original Boyen signature scheme which is unforgeable under the hardness assumption of the SIS
problem [Boy10]. The unforgeability of the modified Boyen signature can be reduced to the existential
unforgeability of the original Boyen signature scheme. A detailed analysis of the security of the modified
scheme can be found in Section 4.2.1. Before proceeding with the description of the LDAA scheme, we
define some standard functionalities that are used in the TPM technology, as specified in [CDL16]. A
detailed characterisation of these functionalities is presented in Section 3.3.3 of this book.
• FCA is a common certificate authority functionality that is available to all parties.
• FCRS is a common reference string functionality that provides participants with all system parameters.
• F∗auth is a special authenticated communication functionality that provides an authenticated channel
between the issuer and the TPM via the host.
• FSMT is a secure message transmission functionality that provides an authenticated and encrypted com-
munication between the TPM and the host.
The LDAA scheme includes the Setup, Join, Sign, Verify, and Link processes. The Setup step is described
in Procedure 1 and corresponds to the generation of the parameters shared by the Issuer’s community,
along with the Issuer’s secret-key and the initialisation of its internal state.
Procedure 1 (LDAA Setup).
• FCRS creates the system parameters: sp = (λ,q,n,m,Rq,c,β,β′, `,η), where λ, c and η are positive
integer security parameters, β and β′ are positive real numbers such that β,β′ < q, and ` is the length of
a message to be signed with Boyen’s signature scheme.
• Upon input (SETUP, sid), where sid is a unique session identifier, the Issuer first checks that sid =
(I,sid′) for some sid′, then creates its key pair. The Issuer’s public key is pp = (sp, Aˆt, AˆI, Aˆ0, Aˆ1, ..., Aˆ`,
u, H,H0,H1), where Aˆt, AˆI, Aˆi(i = 0,1, ..., `) ∈ Rmq , u ∈ Rq, H : {0,1}∗ → Rq, H0 : {0,1}∗ → {1,2,3}c
and H1 : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}η be a collision resistant hash function. The Issuer’s private key is TˆI, which
is the trapdoor of AˆI and ‖TˆI‖∞ ≤ ω, for some small real number ω. The Issuer initialises the list of
joining members (Members← ∅) and proves that his secret key is well formed by generating a proof
of knowledge piI, and registers the key (TˆI,piI) with FCA. Finally, it outputs (SETUPDONE,sid).
The Join process is a protocol running between the Issuer I and a platform, consisting of a TPM Mi
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and a Host Hj (with an identifier id). More than one Join session be may run in parallel. A unique sub-
session identifier jsid is used and this value is given to all parties. The issuer I checks that the TPM-Host
is qualified to execute the trusted computing attestation service, then issues a credential enabling the
platform to create attestations. Via the unique session identifier jsid, the issuer can differentiate between
various Join sessions that are executed simultaneously. A Join session works in two distinct phases,
Join request and Join proceed. During the Join request, described in Procedure 2, the TPM generates its
private-key Xˆt and the corresponding public-key ut, along with a a linking token nymI associated with the
Issuer, and a proof that the public-key and the token are well formed. The Issuer finalises the Join request
phase by checking the validity of the proof and that the TPM-Host has not been provisioned before. The
linking token enables the Issuer to ensure that no two TPMs hold the same private key in the Join proceed
step. This prevents a signature from a TPM from tracing back to the signature of another TPM. Moreover,
during Join proceed (see Procedure 3), the Issuer samples a small Xˆh such that [Aˆt |Aˆid] · [Xˆt |Xˆh] = u. Xˆh
is then transmitted to the Host.
Procedure 2 (LDAA Join Request).
• On input query (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi), the host Hj forwards (JOIN, sid, jsid) to I, who replies by sending
(sid, jsid,ρ,bsnI) back to Hj, where ρ is a uniform random nonce ρ←↩ {0,1}λ, and bsnI is the Issuer’s
base name. This message is then forwarded to Mi.
• The TPM proceeds as follows:
1. It checks that no such entry exists in its storage.
2. It samples a private key: Xˆt = (x1, . . . , xm)←↩ Rmq with the condition ‖Xˆt‖∞ ≤ β, and stores its key as
(sid,Hj, Xˆt, id).
3. It computes the corresponding public key ut = Aˆt · Xˆt mod q, a link token nymI =H(bsnI) · x1 + eI
mod q for some error eI←↩DZn,s′ such that ‖eI‖∞ < β′, and generates a signature based proof:
piut = SPK
{
public := {sp, Aˆt,ut,bsnI,nymI},
witness := {Xˆt = (x1, . . ., xm),eI} :
ut = Aˆt · Xˆt mod q ∧ ‖Xˆt‖∞ ≤ β ∧ nymI =H(bsnI) · x1 + eI mod q ∧ ‖eI‖∞ ≤ β′
}
(ρ).
4. It sends (nymI, id, ut,piut ) to the issuer I via the host by means of F
∗
auth, i.e., it gives F
∗
auth an input
(SEND, (nymI,piut ), (sid, Mi,I), jsid, Hj).
• The host, upon receiving (APPEND, (nymI, piut ), (sid, Mi,I)) from F∗auth, forwards it to I by sending
(APPEND, (nymI, piut ), (sid, Mi,I)) to F
∗
auth and keeps the state ( jsid, ut, id).
• The Issuer, upon receiving (SENT, (nymI, piut ), (sid, Mi,I), jsid, Hj) from F∗auth, verifies the proof piut
to make sure that Mi < Members. I stores ( jsid, nymI, piut , id, Mi, Hj), and generates the message
(JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid, id,piut ).
Procedure 3 (LDAA Join Proceed).
• If the platform chooses to proceed with the Join session, the message (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid) is
sent to the issuer, who performs as follows:
1. It checks the record ( jsid,nymI, id, Mi, Hj,piut ). For all nym
′
I
from the previous Join records, the
issuer checks whether ‖nymI − nym′I‖∞ ≤ 2β′ holds; if yes, the issuer treats this session as a rerun
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of the Join process; otherwise the issuer adds Mi to Members and goes to Step 2. If this is a rerun,
the issuer will further check if ut = u′t ; if not the issuer will abort; otherwise the issuer will jump to
Step 4 returning Xˆh = Xˆ′h. Note that this double check will make sure that any two DAA keys will
not include the same x1 value.
2. It calculates the vector of polynomials Aˆh = [AˆI|Aˆ0 +∑`i=1 idi · Aˆi] ∈ R2mq .
3. It samples, using the issuer’s private key TˆI , a preimage Xˆh = (xm+1, . . . , x3m) of u − ut such that:
Aˆh · Xˆh = uh = u−ut mod q and ‖Xˆh‖∞ ≤ β.
4. It sends (sid, jsid, Xˆh) to Hj via F∗auth.
• When the host receives the message (sid, jsid, Xˆh), it checks that the equations Aˆh · Xˆh = uh mod q and
u = ut + uh are satisfied with ‖Xˆh‖∞ ≤ β. If the checks are correct, then Hj stores (sid,Mi, Xˆh,ut) and
outputs (JOINED, sid, jsid).
After obtaining the credential from the Join process, Mi and Hj can sign a message µ with respect to a
basename bsn. We use a unique sub-session identifier ssid to allow for multiple Sign sessions. Each
session has two phases, Sign request and Sign proceed. While the first, described in Procedure 4, is
mostly responsible for ensuring the TPM and the Host have compatible secret-key shares; in the second,
described in Procedure 5, a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of small Xˆt and Xˆh such that [Aˆt |Aˆid] ·
[Xˆt |Xˆh] = u is produced. More concretely, the TPM and the Host respectively commit to random strings
each showing that either Xˆt and Xˆh are small or that Aˆt · Xˆt = ut and Aˆh · Xˆh = uh. Through the additive
homomorphism of Scheme in 4.2.2, the addition of these commitments results on commitments to strings
showing that either Xˆt |Xˆh is small or that [Aˆt |Aˆid] · [Xˆt |Xˆh] = u. The opening of all the commitments would
reveal the value of Xˆt |Xˆh. Instead, this procedure is iterated multiple times, and at each iteration a subset
of the commitments is revealed at random. The randomness is derived from the message to be signed.
The prover, by checking that the expected properties are verified for each opening, is convinced that it
is communicating with a genuine TPM/Host pair. This proof is described in a detailed manner in this
section. In addition, a nym tag is produced that is associated with the basename bsn.
Procedure 4 (LDAA Sign Request).
• Upon input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,bsn,µ), Hj looks up the record (sid,Mi, id,ut, Xˆh), and sends the mes-
sage (sid, ssid,bsn,µ) to Mi.
• The TPM then does the following:
1. It asks Hj for a permission to proceed.
2. It makes sure to have a Join record (sid Xˆt,Hj).
3. It generates a sign entry (sid, ssid,bsn,µ) in its record.
4. Finally it outputs (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,bsn,µ).
Procedure 5 (LDAA Sign Proceed).
• When Mi gets permission to proceed for ssid, the TPM proceeds as follows:
1. It retrieves the records (sid, id,Hj,piut ) and (sid, ssid,bsn,µ).
2. Depending on the input bsn, there are two cases: If bsn , ⊥, Mi computes the tag nym =H(bsn) ·
x1 + e mod q, for an error term e ←↩ DZn,s′ such that ‖e‖∞ < β′ and generates a commitment as
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described in Subsection 4.2.2:
θt = COM
{
public := {sp, Aˆt,nym, bsn, H, ut},
witness := {Xˆt = (x1, . . . , xm),e} :
{Aˆt · Xˆt = ut ∧ ‖Xˆt‖∞ ≤ β} ∧ nym =H(bsn) · x1 + e ∧ ‖e‖∞ ≤ β′
}
.
If bsn=⊥, then Mi samples a random value bsn← {0,1}λ, and then follows the previous case.
3. Mi sends (sid, ssid, θt,µ) to Hj.
4. When Hj receives the message (sid, ssid, θt,µ), it checks that θt is valid, and subsequently generates
a commitment again as described in Subsection 4.2.2:
θh = COM
{
public := {sp, Aˆh, uh, µ, θt},
witness := {Xˆh = (xm+1, . . . , x3m), id} :
{Aˆh · Xˆh = uh ∧ ‖Xˆh‖∞ ≤ β}
}
.
The combination of these two commitments θt and θh as described in Subsection 4.2.2 follows the
additive homomorphic property of the commitment scheme.
5. The TPM and Host run the standard Fiat-Shamir transformation, and the result is a signature based
proof (signed on the message µ):
pi = SPK
{
public := {pp, nym, bsn},
witness := {Xˆ = (x1, . . . , x3m), id, e} :
[Aˆt |Aˆh] · Xˆ = u ∧ ‖Xˆ‖∞ ≤ β ∧ nym =H(bsn) · x1 + e mod q ∧ ‖e‖∞ ≤ β′
}
(µ).
The details of the θt, θh and pi computation will be given below.
6. Hj outputs the LDAA signature σ = (nym,bsn,pi).
The verify algorithm, described in Procedure 6, allows anyone to check whether a signature σ on a mes-
sage µ with respect to a basename bsn is valid. Moreover, the link algorithm, depicted in Procedure 7
allows anyone to check whether two signatures (σ,µ) and (σ′,µ′) that were generated for the same base-
name bsn stem from the same TPM. This done by checking whether the difference between the two nym
tags has a small norm.
Procedure 6 (LDAA Verify).
• Let KRL denotes the key revocation list with all the rogue TPM’s secret keys. Upon input (VERIFY,
sid,bsn,σ,µ,KRL), the verifier V proceeds as follows:
1. It parses σ as (nym, bsn, pi), and checks SPK on pi with respect to bsn,nym,µ and u, verifying the
statement:
[Aˆt |Aˆh] · Xˆ = u ∧ ‖Xˆ‖∞ ≤ β ∧ nym = H(bsn) · x1 + e mod q ∧ ‖e‖∞ ≤ β′.
2. It checks that the secret key Xˆt that was used to generate nym, doesn’t belong to the Key Revocation
List KRL. This is done by checking whether the following equation holds:
∀x1 ∈ KRL,‖H(bsn) · x1−nym‖∞ ≤ β′.
3. If all checks passed, the verifier outputs (VERIFIED, ssid,1), and (VERIFIED, ssid,0) otherwise.
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Procedure 7 (LDAA Link).
• Upon input (LINK, sid,σ,µ,σ′,µ′,bsn) the verifier V follows the following steps:
1. Starting from σ = (nym,bsn,pi) and σ′ = (nym′,bsn,pi′), the verifier verifies σ and σ′ individually.
2. If any of the signatures is invalid, the verifier outputs ⊥.
3. Otherwise if ‖nym−nym′‖∞ < 2β′, the verifier outputs 1 (linked); otherwise 0 (not linked).
The proofs θt, θh and pi In this section, the computation of the θt, θh and pi is described in detail. The
techniques employed herein can be seen as generalisations of those described in Subsection 4.2.3. The
matrix A was public, here the matrix [Aˆt |Aˆh] depends on the secret identifier id. We employ the techniques
described in [LNW15] of rewriting [Aˆt |Aˆh] ·[Xˆt |Xˆh] as [Aˆt |AˆI|Aˆ0|Aˆ1| . . . |Aˆ`] ·[Xˆt |Xˆh1 |Xˆh2 |id1Xˆh2 | . . . |id`Xˆh2 ],
where Xˆh = [Xˆh1 ∈Rmq |Xˆh2 ∈Rmq ], for a public [Aˆt |AˆI|Aˆ0|Aˆ1| . . . |Aˆ`], and extending and randomising id such
that [LNSW13] is still applicable.
Our main technical innovation is the proposal of a proof about values that are shared between the TPM
and the Host. Let k = dlog2 βe. Since we are operating in the ring Rq = Zq[x]/〈xn + 1〉, with n = O(λ),
then we can transform products of elements in Rq into matrix-vector products. The matrices A¯i = rot(ai)
are constructed as defined in [LNW15], for i = (1,2, . . . , (`+ 3)m), for all polynomials ai in Aˆt, AˆI , Aˆ0, ...,
Aˆ`, respectively. More concretely, the matrices A¯i = rot(ai) for i = (1,2, . . . ,m) are associated with the m
polynomials in Aˆt, the matrices A¯i = rot(ai) for i = (m,m + 1, . . . ,2m) with the m polynomials in AˆI, etc.
Similarly, the vectors x¯i whose entries are the coefficients of xi, for i = (1,2, . . . ,3m), are produced for all
polynomials xi in Xˆt and Xˆh, respectively. As a result of these operations, the products A¯i x¯i and aixi are
isomorphic. Furthermore, the following extensions are considered:
• id = {id1, ..., id`} ∈ {0,1}` is extended to id∗ ∈ B2` which is the set of vectors in {0,1}2` of hamming
weight `.
• A¯∗i = [A¯i|0 ∈ Zn×3n] for i = 1 to i = (3 + `)m and A¯∗i = 0 for (3 + `)m < i ≤ (3 + 2`)m.
• x¯(2+i)m+ j = id∗i · x¯2m+ j for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2` and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Using techniques similar to those described in Subsection 4.2.3, the vectors x¯i and e are decomposed
and extended into vectors of norm at most 1 such that x¯i =
∑k
d=1 2
d−1 x¯di [1 : n] and e =
∑k
j=1 e
j[1 : n]2 j−1,
where x¯di [1 : n] and e
j[1 : n] correspond to the first n entries of x¯di and e
j, respectively, and
{e j}kj=1, {x¯ j1}kj=1, {x¯ j2}kj=1, . . . , {x¯ j(3+2`)m}kj=1 ∈ B3n,
i.e. they have n entries equal to −1, n entries equal to 0 and n entries equal to 1.
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The extensions of the A¯i and id and the decompositions of the extensions of the xi satisfy:
u = [Aˆt |Aˆh] · Xˆ
= [Aˆt |AˆI|Aˆ0 +
∑`
i=1
idi · Aˆi] · Xˆ
=
3m∑
i=1
A¯i · x¯i +
∑`
j=1
id j ·
m∑
i=1
A¯i+( j+2)m · x¯i+2m
=
3m∑
i=1
A¯∗i ·
 k∑
d=1
2d−1 x¯di
+ 2∑`
j=1
id∗j ·
m∑
i=1
A¯∗i+( j+2)m ·
 k∑
d=1
2d−1 x¯di+2m

=
(3+2`)m∑
i=1
A¯∗i
 k∑
d=1
2d−1 x¯di

The commitment algorithm COM used to compute θt and θh is as explained in Subsection 4.2.2. To
produce θt, the TPM samples the vectors {r je ←↩ Z3nq }kj=1 and {r ji ←↩ Z3nq }kj=1 for i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [k]; and
the permutations {φ j ←↩ S3n}kj=1 associated with Xˆt, and {ϕ j ←↩ S3n}kj=1 for e. The following terms are
also calculated: D = [rot(H(bsn))|0] ∈ Zn×3nq , v ji = x ji + r ji and v je = e j + r je . Now, θt = (C t1,C t2,C t3) is
computed with:
• C t1 = COM(∑mi=1 A¯∗i · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r ji ), D · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r j1) + [I|0] · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r je), {φ j}kj=1, {ϕ j}kj=1).
• C t2 = COM({φ j(r j1), . . . ,φ j(r jm)}kj=1, {ϕ j(r je)}kj=1).
• C t3 = COM({φ j(v j1), . . . ,φ j(v jm)}kj=1, {ϕ j(v je)}kj=1).
In a similar fashion, the Host samples the vectors {r ji ←↩ Z3nq }kj=1 for i−m ∈ [(2 + 2`)m] and j ∈ [k], and
r id∗ ←↩ Z2`q ; and the permutations τ←↩ S2` for id∗, {δ j ←↩ S3n}kj=1 for Xˆh1 and {ψ j ←↩ S3n}kj=1 for Xˆh2 . It
also computes v ji = x
j
i + r
j
i and vid∗ = id
∗+ r id∗ . Then θh = (Ch1,Ch2,Ch3) is computed:
• Ch1 = COM(∑(3+2`)mi=m+1 A¯∗i · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r ji ), τ, {δ j}kj=1, {ψ j}kj=1).
• Ch2 = COM({δ j(r jm+1), . . . , δ j(r j2m), ψ j(r j2m+1), . . . , ψ j(r j3m),ψ j(r j(τ(1)+2)m+1),
. . . , ψ j(r
j
(τ(1)+3)m), . . . ,ψ j(r
j
(τ(2`)+2)m+1), . . . ,ψ j(r
j
(τ(2`)+3)m)}kj=1, τ(r id∗ )).
• Ch3 = COM({δ j(v jm+1), . . . , δ j(v j2m),ψ j(v j2m+1), . . . ,ψ j(v j3m),ψ j(v j(τ(1)+2)m+1),
. . . , ψ j(v
j
(τ(1)+3)m), . . . ,ψ j(v
j
(τ(2`)+2)m+1), . . . ,ψ j(v
j
(τ(2`)+3)m)}kj=1, τ(vid∗ )).
The proof pi is computed using a strategy similar to Subsection 4.2.3, but where the commitments are
produced using the homomorphic properties described in 4.2.2. Since multiple iterations of the process
described in Subsection 4.2.3 are necessary to achieve high soundness, Mi hands out the commitments
of the total c rounds to Hj. Hj then adds its own commitments to those of the TPM, generating CMT =
(C1,C2,C3) such that:
• C1 = COM(∑mi=1 A¯∗i · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r ji ) +∑(3+2`)mi=m+1 A¯∗i · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r ji ),D · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r j1) +[I|0] · (∑kj=1 2 j−1r je),
τ, {φ j}kj=1, {δ j}kj=1, {ψ j}kj=1, {ϕ j}kj=1).
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• C2 = COM({φ j(r j1), . . . ,φ j(r jm), δ j(r jm+1), . . . , δ j(r j2m),ψ j(r j2m+1), . . . ,ψ j(r j3m),
ψ j(r
j
(τ(1)+2)m+1), . . . ,ψ j(r
j
(τ(1)+3)m), . . . , ψ j(r
j
(τ(2`)+2)m+1), . . . , ψ j(r
j
(τ(2`)+3)m)}kj=1,
{ϕ j(r je)}kj=1, τ(r id∗ )).
• C3 = COM({φ j(v j1), . . . ,φ j(v jm), δ j(v jm+1), . . . , δ j(v j2m),ψ j(v j2m+1), . . . ,ψ j(v j3m),
ψ j(v
j
(τ(1)+2)m+1), . . . ,ψ j(v
j
(τ(1)+3)m), . . . ,ψ j(v
j
(τ(2`)+2)m+1), . . . ,ψ j(v
j
(τ(2`)+3)m)}kj=1,
{ϕ j(v je)}kj=1, τ(vid∗ )).
Inspired by [PS00], instead of directly storing the C1, C2 and C3 values in pi we opt to store an hash of
them instead. A significant reduction in the proof size is achieved. Challenges are generated following
a Fiat-Shamir approach, namely by using a hash function that consumes H1(C1)|H1(C2)|H1(C3) and
outputs a random looking distribution of {1,2,3}c:
{CH j}cj=1 =H0(µ,H1(C j1)|H1(C j2)|H1(C j3)}cj=1,pp) ∈ {1,2,3}c.
For each challenge, the Mi and the Hj combine the required values to produce the following responses:
• if CH = 1, C2 and C3 are revealed, corresponding to all the permuted τ(id∗), τ(r id∗ ), {φ j(x ji )}kj=1,
{δ j(x ji )}kj=1, {ψ j(x ji )}kj=1, {ϕ j(e j)}kj=1, {ϕ j(r je)}kj=1, {φ j(r ji )}kj=1, {δ j(r ji )}kj=1 and {ψ j(r ji )}kj=1.
• if CH = 2, C1 and C3 are revealed, corresponding to the permutations τ, {φ j}kj=1, {δ j}kj=1, {ψ j}kj=1,
{ϕ j}kj=1 and all the v values.
• if CH = 3, C1 and C2 are revealed, corresponding to all the permutations τ, {φ j}kj=1, {δ j}kj=1, {ψ j}kj=1,
{ϕ j}kj=1 and all the r values.
Finally Hj sends the proof to the verifier V.
Depending on the prover’s inputs, the verifier can always check 2 out of 3 commitments. When CH = 1,
the verifier will be convinced that the e ji and the x¯
j
i were small. When CH = 2 or CH = 3, the verifier
will be able to validate either the left or the right-hand side of the following expressions:
(3+2`)m∑
i=1
Aˆ∗i
k∑
d=1
2d−1rdi =
(3+2`)m∑
i=1
Aˆ∗i
k∑
d=1
2d−1
(
x¯di + r
d
i
)
−u
D ·
k∑
d=1
2d−1rd1 + [I|0] ·
k∑
d=1
2d−1rde = D ·
k∑
d=1
2d−1
(
x¯d1 + r
d
1
)
+ [I|0] ·
k∑
d=1
2d−1
(
rde + e
d
)
− nym
4.4 Security Proof for LDAA Scheme
We first provide a sketch of the security proof of the proposed protocol. A sequence of games based
on the model of Camenish et al. in [CDL16] is presented. The proof in [CDL16] is constructed under
the DL and Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumptions and the unforgeability of the Camenisch-
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Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures. In contrast, our game indistinguishability is based on lattice hard
problems, namely Ring-LWE and Ring-SIS, and the unforgeability is supported on the modified Boyen’s
signature scheme, whose security is discussed in 4.2.1. It is shown that there exists no environment ε
that can distinguish the real world protocol Π with an adversary A, from the ideal world Fldaa with a
simulator S. Starting with the real world protocol game, we change the protocol game by game in a
computationally indistinguishable way, finally ending with the ideal world protocol. The sequence of
games is as follows:
Game 1 . The Real World Protocol.
Game 2 . Equivalent to Game 1.
An entity C is introduced. C receives all inputs from the honest parties and
simulates the real world protocol for them.
Game 3 . Similar to Game 2 but with a different structure.
C is split into two parts, F and S. F behaves as an ideal functionality. It
receives all the inputs and forwards them to S, who simulates the real world
protocol for honest parties and sends the output to F. F then forwards the
outputs to ε.
Game 4 . ε will notice no change from Game 3.
F now stores the algorithms for the issuer I in the setup interface and ensures
that the structure of sid is correct for an honest I, and aborts if not. In case I
is corrupt, S extracts the secret key for I and proceeds in the setup interface
on behalf of I.
Game 5 . Same outcomes as Game 4.
F now performs the verification and linking checks instead of forwarding
them to S. There are no protocol messages and the outputs are exactly as in
the real world protocol. However, F doesn’t contain a revocation check in
the verification algorithm. Nonetheless, F can perform this check separately.
Game 6 . In all cases F and S can interact to simulate the real world protocol.
The join interface of F is now changed. F now stores in its records the mem-
bers that have joined. If I is honest, F stores the secret key, extracted from
S, for corrupt TPMs. S always has enough information to simulate the real
world protocol except when the issuer is the only honest party. In this case,
S doesn’t know who initiated the join, so it can’t make a join query with F
on the host’s behalf. Thus, to deal with this case, F can safely choose any
corrupt host and put it into Members. The identities of hosts are only used
to create signatures for platforms with an honest TPM or honest host, so one
needn’t worry about fully corrupted platforms.
Game 7 . A distinguisher between Game 6 and 7 could solve Decision Ring-
LWE.
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F now creates anonymous signatures for honest platforms by running the al-
gorithms defined in the setup interface. Let us start by defining Game 7.k.k′:
in this game F handles the first k′ signing inputs of Mk with algorithms
and subsequent inputs are forwarded to S as before. We note that Game
7.0.0=Game 6. For increasing k′, Game 7.k.k′ will be at some stage equal
to Game 7.k + 1.0, this is because there can only be a polynomial number
of signing queries to be processed. Therefore, for large enough k and k′, F
handles all the signing queries of all TPMs, and Game 7 is indistinguishable
from Game 7.k.k′. To prove that Game 7.k.k′ + 1 is indistinguishable from
Game 7.k.k′, suppose there exists an environment that can distinguish a sig-
nature of an honest party using Xˆt from a signature using a different Xˆ′t, then
the environment can solve the Decision Ring-LWE Problem. Suppose that S
is given tuples {(ai,bi)}k′i=1, (c,d), where bi = ai · x1 +ei for a uniform random
ai and c ∈ Rq, and it is challenged to decide if the pair (c,d) is chosen from
a Ring-LWE distribution (for some secret x1) or uniform random. S proceeds
in simulating the TPM without knowing the secret x1. S can answer all the
H queries, as S is controlling FCRS, on bsnj with H(bsn j) = a j for j ≤ k′.
For j = k′ + 1, S sets H(bsnk′+1) = c, otherwise H(bsn j) = r j for some uni-
form random r j and j > k′ + 1. Signing queries on behalf of Mi for i < k are
forwarded by F to S, which calls the real world protocol. For i > k, tsks are
freshly sampled for each bsni. However, for Mk and i ≤ k′, the simulator S
sets nymi = bi, and for i = k
′ + 1 it sets nym = d. For i > k′ + 1, S samples
fresh xi and generates nymi =H(bsni) · xi + ei, keeping track of all the gen-
erated nymi such that it always output the same nymi for an associated bsni.
For each case, Mk can provide a simulated proof. Any distinguisher between
Game 7.k.k′ and Game 7.k.k′+1 can solve the Decision Ring-LWE Problem.
Game 8 . ε observes no difference between Game 7 and Game 8.
F now no longer informs S about the message and the basename that are
being signed. If the whole platform is honest, then S can learn nothing about
the message µ and the basename bsn. Instead, S knows only the leakage
l(µ,bsn). To simulate the real world, S chooses a pair (µ′,bsn′) such that
l(µ′, bsn′)=l(µ,bsn).
Game 9 . Game 8 and Game 9 are indistinguishable.
If I is honest, then F now only allows platforms that joined to sign. An
honest host will always check whether it joined with a TPM in the real world
protocol, so there is no difference for honest hosts. Also an honest TPM only
signs when it has joined with the host before. In the case that an honest
Mi performs a join protocol with a corrupt host Hj and honest issuer, the
simulator will make a join query with F, to ensure that Mi and Hj are in
Members.
Game 10 . Checks in Game 10 produce the same results as those of Game 9.
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When storing a new tsk = Xˆt, F checks CheckTtdCorrupt(tsk) =
1 or CheckTtdHonest(tsk) = 1. These checks will always pass. Valid
signatures always satisfy nym = H(bsn) · x1 + e where ‖x1‖∞ < β and
‖e‖∞ < β′. By the unique Short Vector Problem, there exists only one tu-
ple (x1,e) such that ‖x1‖∞ < β and ‖e‖∞ < β′ for small enough β and β′.
Thus, CheckTtdCorrupt(tsk) will always give the correct output. Also due
to the large min-entropy of discrete Gaussians the probability that sam-
pling a gsk Xˆ′t = Xˆt is negligible, thus with overwhelming probability there
doesn’t exist a signature already using the same tsk = Xˆt, which implies that
CheckTtdHonest(tsk) will always give the correct output.
Game 11 . Game 11 produces the same results as Game 10 based on Ring-LWE.
In this game, F checks that honestly generated signatures are valid. This
is true as the sig algorithm always produces signatures passing through the
verification checks. Also those signatures satisfy identify(tsk,σ,µ, bsn) = 1
which is checked via nym. F also makes sure, using Members and Do-
mainKeys, that honest users are not sharing the same secret key tsk. If
there exists a key tsk = Xˆt in Members and DomainKeys such that ‖nym−
H(bsn)x1‖∞ < β′, then this breaks the search Ring-LWE problem.
Game 12 . Valid signatures are associated with a single gsk.
Check-IX is added to ensure that there are no multiple tsk values matching
one signature. Since there exists only one pair (x1,eI) such that ‖x1‖∞ < β
and ‖eI‖∞ < β′, satisfying nymI = H(bsn) · x1 + eI, two different tsks can’t
share the same x1.
Game 13 . Game 13 is indistinguishable from Game 12 based on the hardness of
the Ring-ISIS Search Problem.
To prevent accepting signatures that were issued by the use of join credentials
not issued by an honest issuer, F adds a further check Check-X. This is due to
the unforgeability of Boyen signatures.
Game 14 . Game 14 is indistinguishable from Game 13 based on the hardness of
Ring-LWE.
Check-XI is added to F, preventing anyone from forging signatures using an
honest TPM’s tsk and credential. In fact, if a valid signature is given on a
message that the TPM never signed, the proof could not have been simulated.
It would extract x1, breaking the Ring-LWE problem.
Game 15 . Game 15 is indistinguishable from Game 14 based on the hardness of
Ring-LWE.
Check-XII is added to F, ensuring that honest TPMs are not revoked. If a
honest TPM is simulated by means of the Ring-LWE problem instance, if a
proper key in KRL is found, it must be the secret key of the target instance.
This is again equivalent to solving the search Ring-LWE problem.
Game 16 . F now includes all the functionalities of F
l
daa. 
All the remaining checks of the ideal functionality Fldaa that are related to link
queries are now included. Using the fact that if a tsk matches one signature
and not the other, Game 16 is indistinguishable from Game 15.
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Detailed Security Proof for the Proposed LDAA scheme
We now present our detailed security proof for the proposed LDAA scheme in the UC model based on a
sequence of games for Fldaa and the simulator S.
• SETUP
On input (SETUP, sid) from I, output (FORWARD, (SETUP, sid,I) to S.
• JOIN
1. On input (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) from the host Hj, output (FORWARD, (JOIN,
sid, jsid,Mi), Hj) to S.
2. On input (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid) from I, output (FORWARD,
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid),I) to S.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,bsn) from the host Hj, output (FORWARD, (SIGN,
sid, ssid,Mi,bsn), Hj) to S.
2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD,
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V, output (FORWARD, (VERIFY,
sid,µ, bsn,σ,KRL), V) to S.
• LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V, output (FORWARD, (LINK,
sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), V) to S.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P,µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.1: Game 3 for F
• KeyGen
Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (SETUP, sid,I) from F, give “I” (SETUP, sid) .
• JOIN
1. Upon receiving (FORWARD, (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi), Hj) from F, give input (JOIN,
sid, jsid,Mi) to the host “Hj”
2. Upon receiving intput (FORWARD, (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid), I) from F, give “I” in-
put (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid).
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• SIGN
1. Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,bsn), Hj) from F, give “Hj”
input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,bsn).
2. Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) from F, give “Mi”
input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid).
• VERIFY
Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (VERIFY, sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL), V) from F, give “V” in-
put (VERIFY, sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL).
• LINK
Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), V) from F, give “V”
input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn).
• OUTPUT
When any simulated party “P” outputs a message µ, S sends (OUTPUT, P, µ)to F.
Figure 4.2: Game 3 for S
• SETUP
1. On input (SETUP, sid) from I, verify that sid = (I,sid′) and output (SETUP, sid) to S.
2. On input (ALGORITHMS, sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify, Kgen) from S, check that
Verify, Link, and Identify are deterministic. Store ( sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify,
Kgen) and output (SETUPDOE, sid) to I.
• JOIN
1. On input (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) from the host Hj, output (FORWARD, (JOIN,
sid, jsid,Mi), Hj) to S.
2. On input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) from I, output (FORWARD,
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid), I) to S.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,bsn) from the host Hj, output (FORWARD, (SIGN,
sid, ssid,Mi,bsn), Hj) to S.
2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD,
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V, output (FORWARD, (VERIFY,
sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL), V) to S.
• LINK
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On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V, output (FORWARD, (LINK,
sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), V) to S.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.3: Game 4 for F
• KeyGen: Honest I: On input (SETUP, sid) from F
– Check sid = (I,sid′), output ⊥ to I if the check fails.
– Give “I” input (SETUP, sid).
– Upon receiving output (SETUPDONE, sid) from “I”, S takes its private key TˆI.
– Define sig(tsk, µ, bsn) as follows:
∗ Define SamplePre(Aˆid, TˆI,q,uh, s) that outputs a Boyen signature Xˆh [Boy10], where
uh = u−ut with ut = Aˆt ·gsk, Xˆh will be our LDAA credential.
∗ nym =H(bsn) · x1 + e mod q with ‖e‖∞ < β′.
∗ pi = SPK
{
public := {pp, nym, bsn},
witness := {Xˆ = (x1, · · · , x3m), id, e} :
[Aˆt |Aˆh] · Xˆ = u ∧ ‖Xˆ‖∞ ≤ β ∧ nym =H(bsn) · x1 + e mod q ∧ ‖e‖∞ ≤ β′
}
(µ). Output
the LDAA signature σ = (nym,bsn,pi).
– Define ver(σ,µ,bsn) as follows: It parses σ as (nym,bsn,pi), and checks SPK on pi w.r.t
bsn,nym, µ and u. It output 1 if the proof is valid and 0 otherwise.
– Define link(σ,µ,bsn,σ′,µ′): Check whether two signatures (σ,µ) and (σ′,µ′) that were
generated for the same basename bsn stems from the same TPM. Upon input (LINK,
sid,σ,µ,σ′,µ′,bsn) the verifier follow the following steps:
1. Starting from σ = (nym,bsn,pi) and σ′ = (nym′,bsn,pi′), the verifier verifies σ and σ′
individually.
2. If any of the signatures is invalid, the verifier outputs ⊥.
3. Otherwise if ‖nym− nym′‖∞ < 2β′, the verifier outputs 1 (linked); otherwise 0 (not
linked).
– Define identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk) as follows: It parses σ as (nym,bsn,pi) and checks that
tsk = (x1, x2, · · · , xm) ∈ Rmq and ‖tsk‖∞ < β, ver(σ,µ,bsn)=1 and
‖nym− x1 ·bsn‖∞ < β′
If so output 1, otherwise output 0.
– Define Kgen, take tsk ∈ Rmq with ‖tsk‖∞ < β and output tsk.
– S sends (KEYS, sid, sig, ver, link, identify, Kgen) to F.
Corrupt I: S notices this setup as it notices I registering a public key with FCA with sid =
(I,sid′).
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– If the registered key is in the form (AˆI,piI) and piI is valid, then S extracts TˆI from piI.
– S defines the algorithms sig, ver, link, and identify as before, but now depending on the
extracted key. S sends (SETUP, sid) to F on behalf of I. On input (KEYGEN, sid) from
F, S sends (KEYS, sid, sig, ver, link, identify, Kgen) to F.
– On input (SETUPDONE, sid) from F. S continues simulating “I”.
• JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY, LINK: Unchanged.
Figure 4.4: Game 4 for S
• SETUP
1. On input (SETUP, sid) from I, verify that sid = (I,sid′) and output (SETUP, sid) to S.
2. On input (ALGORITHMS, sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify, Kgen) from S, check that
Verify, Link, and Identify are deterministic. Store ( sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify,
Kgen) and output (SETUPDOE, sid) to I.
• JOIN
1. On input (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) from the host Hj, output (FORWARD, (JOIN,
sid, jsid,Mi), Hj) to S.
2. On input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) from I, output (FORWARD,
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid), I) to S.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,bsn) from the host Hj, output (FORWARD, (SIGN,
sid, ssid,Mi,bsn), Hj) to S.
2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD,
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if there is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
– Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
• LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
– Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
– Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
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Figure 4.5: Game 5 for F
• KeyGen, JOIN, SIGN : Unchanged.
• VERIFY, LINK: Nothing to simulate.
Figure 4.6: Game 5 for S
• SETUP
1. On input (SETUP, sid) from I, verify that sid = (I,sid′) and output (SETUP, sid) to S.
2. On input (ALGORITHMS, sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify, Kgen) from S, check that
Verify, Link, and Identify are deterministic. Store ( sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify,
Kgen) and output (SETUPDOE, sid) to I.
• JOIN
1. JOINREQUEST: On input (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) from the host Hj to join the TPM Mi
– Create a join session 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, request 〉.
– Output (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) to S.
2. JOIN REQUEST DELIVERY: Proceed upon receiving delivery notification from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, delivered〉.
– If I or Mi is honest and 〈Mi,∗,∗〉 is already in Members, output ⊥.
– Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
3. JOIN PROCEED: Upon receiving (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) from I
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,sid,Mi,Hj, complete〉.
– Output (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) to S.
4. KEY GENERATION: On input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, tsk) from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, complete〉
– If both Mi and Hj are honest, set tsk = ⊥.
– Insert 〈Mi,Hj, tsk〉 into Members, and output (JOINED, sid, jsid) to Hj.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,bsn) from the host Hj, output (FORWARD, (SIGN,
sid, ssid,Mi,bsn), Hj) to S.
2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD,
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if there is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
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– Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
• LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
– Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
– Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.7: Game 6 for F
• KeyGen: Unchanged.
JOIN: Honest host, I
– When S receives (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) from F
– It simulates the real world protocol by giving “Hj” input (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) and waits
for output (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid,Mi) from “I”.
– If Mi is corrupt, S extracts tsk from the proof of the construction of u1 and stores it. If
Mi is honest, S already knows tsk as it is simulating Mi.
– S sends (JOINSTART, sid, jsid) to F.
– Upon receiving input (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S gives “I” input (JOINPRO-
CEED, sid, jsid) and waits for output (JOINED, sid, jsid) from “Hj”.
– Output (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid, tsk) to F.
Honest host, Corrupt I:
– On input (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) from F, S gives “Hj” input (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi)
and waits for output (JOINED, sid, jsid,Mi) from “Hj”.
– S sends (JOINSTART, sid, jsid) to F.
– Upon receiving input (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINPROCEED,
sid, jsid) to F on behalf of I.
– Upon receiving input (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINCOMPLETE,
sid, jsid,⊥) to F.
Honest TPM , I, Corrupt host:
– S notices this join as “Mi” receives a nonce ρ from Hj.
– S makes a join query on behalf of Hj by sending (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) to F.
– Upon input (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) from F, S continues the simulation of “Mi”
until “I” outputs (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid,Mi).
– S sends (JOINSTART, sid, jsid) to F.
– Upon input (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINCOMPLETE,
sid, jsid, tsk) to F, where tsk is taken from simulating “Mi”.
– Upon receiving (JOINED, sid, jsid) from F as Hj is corrupt, S gives “I” input (JOIN-
PROCEED, sid, jsid).
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Honest I, Corrupt TPM , host:
– S notices this join as “I” receives (SENT, sid′, (u1,piMi ), Hj) from F∗auth.
– Parse sid′ as (Mi,sid,I), S then extracts tsk from the proof piMi .
– S doesn’t know the identity of the host that started this join, so S chooses some corrupt Hj
and proceeds as if this host initiated this join, although this may not be the correct host.
This makes no difference as when creating signatures we only look for corrupt host or
TPM, so fully corrupted platform are not considered in generating signatures.
– S makes a join query with Mi on behalf of Hj by sending (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) to F.
– Upon receiving input (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) from F, S continues simulating “I”
until it outputs (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid,Mi).
– S sends (JOINSTART, sid, jsid) to F.
– Upon receiving (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINCOMPLETE,
sid, jsid, tsk) to F.
– Upon receiving (JOINED, sid, jsid) from F as Hj is corrupt, S gives “I” input (JOIN-
PROCEED, sid, jsid).
Honest TPM, Corrupt host, I:
– S notices this join as Mi receives a nonce ρ from Hj.
– S simply simulates Mi honestly, no need to include F as Mi doesn’t receive inputs or
send outputs in the join interface.
• SIGN, VERIFY, LINK: Unchanged.
Figure 4.8: Game 6 for S
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj) to S.
– SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
∗ If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
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∗ Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
∗ If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
• VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if there is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
– Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
• LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
– Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
– Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.9: Game 7 for F
• KeyGen, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN :Honest TPM, host:
Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj,bsn,µ) from F.
– S starts the simulation by giving “Hj” input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn).
– When “Mi” outputs (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn), S sends (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid)
to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, output (SIGNPROCEED,
sid, ssid) to “Mi”.
– When “Hj” outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ), send (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,⊥) to
F.
Honest host, Corrupt TPM: Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj,bsn,µ) from F.
– Send (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) from F on behalf of Mi, as Mi is
corrupt, S gives “Hj” input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn).
– When “Hj” outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ), S sends (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) to
F on behlaf of Mi.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, send (SIGNCOMPLETE,
sid, ssid,σ) to F.
Honest TPM, Corrupt host:
– S notices this sign as “Mi” receives a message µ and bsn from Hj .
– S sends (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) to F on behalf of Hj.
– Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,µ,bsn,Mi,Hj) from F, continue simulating
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“Mi”, until “Mi” outputs (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn).
– Send (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, send (SIGNCOMPLETE,
sid, ssid,⊥) to F.
– When F outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ) on behalf of Hj, S sends (SIGNPROCEED,
sid, ssid) to “Mi”.
– send (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) to “Mi”.
• VERIFY, LINK: Nothing to simulate.
Figure 4.10: Game 7 for S
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj , l(µ.bsn)) to S .
– SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
∗ If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
∗ Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
∗ If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
• VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if there is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
– Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
• LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
– Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
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– Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.11: Game 8 for F
• KeyGen, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
Honest TPM, host:
Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj, l) from F.
– S takes a dummy pair (µ′,bsn′) such that l(µ′,bsn′) = l.
– S starts the simulation by giving “Hj” input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ′,bsn′).
– When “Mi” outputs (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ′,bsn′), S sends (SIGNSTART,
sid, ssid) to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, output (SIGNPROCEED,
sid, ssid) to “Mi”.
– When “Hj” outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ), send (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,⊥) to
F.
Honest host, Corrupt TPM:
Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj, l) from F.
– Send (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) from F on behalf of Mi, as Mi is
corrupt, S gives “Hj” input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn).
– When “Hj” outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ), S sends (SIGNPROCEED,
sid, ssid,µ, bsn) to F on behlaf of Mi.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, send (SIGNCOMPLETE,
sid, ssid,σ) to F.
Honest TPM, Corrupt host:
– S notices this sign as “Mi” receives a message µ and bsn from Hj .
– S sends (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) to F on behalf of Hj.
– Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj, l) from F, continue simulating “Mi”, until
“Mi” outputs (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn).
– Send (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, send (SIGNCOMPLETE,
sid, ssid,⊥) to F.
– When F outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ) on behalf of Hj, S sends (SIGNPROCEED,
82
sid, ssid) to “Mi”.
– send (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) to “Mi”.
• VERIFY, LINK: Nothing to simulate.
Figure 4.12: Game 8 for S
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
∗ Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj, l(µ.bsn)) to S .
– SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
∗ If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
∗ Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
∗ If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
• VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if there is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
– Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
• LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
– Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
– Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.13: Game 9 for F
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• SETUP: Unchanged.
• JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN: Unchanged.
• VERIFY: Unchanged.
• LINK: Unchanged.
Figure 4.14: Games 9-16 for S
• SETUP: Unchanged.
• JOIN
1. JOINREQUEST: On input (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) from the host Hj to join the TPM Mi.
– Create a join session 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, request 〉.
– Output (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi,Hj) to S.
2. JOIN REQUEST DELIVERY: Proceed upon receiving delivery notification from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, delivered〉.
– If I or Mi is honest and 〈Mi,∗,∗〉 is already in Members, output ⊥.
– Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
3. JOIN PROCEED: Upon receiving (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) from I.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,sid,Mi,Hj, complete〉.
– Output (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) to S.
4. KEY GENERATION: On input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, tsk) from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi,Hj, complete〉.
– If both Mi and Hj are honest, set tsk = ⊥.
– Else, verify that the provided tsk is eligible by performing the following checks:
∗ If Hj is corrupt and Mi is honest, then CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ If Mi is corrupt, then CheckGskCorrupt(tsk)=1.
– Insert 〈Mi,Hj, tsk〉 into Members, and output (JOINED, sid, jsid) to Hj.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
∗ Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj, l(µ.bsn)) to S .
– SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
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– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
∗ If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
∗ Check CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1
∗ Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
∗ If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
• VERIFY, LINK: Unchanged
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.15: Game 10 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
∗ Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj, l(µ.bsn)) to S .
– SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
∗ If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
∗ Check CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1
∗ Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
∗ Check Verify(σ,µ,bsn)=1.
∗ Check identify(σ,µ, bsn, tsk)=1.
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∗ Check the is no TPM other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′)=1.
∗ If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
• VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if:
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
– Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
• LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
– Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
– Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.16: Game 11 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
– SIGN
∗ SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
· Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
· Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
· Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj , l(µ.bsn)) to S .
∗ SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the
session to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
∗ SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
· Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
· Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
∗ SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
· Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
· If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
· If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
· Check CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1.
· Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
· Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
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· Check Verify(σ,µ,bsn)=1.
· Check identify(σ,µ, bsn, tsk)=1.
· Check the is no TPM other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′)=1.
· If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
– VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
∗ Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk)=1.
∗ Set f = 0 if:
· There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
· More than one key tski was found.
∗ If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
∗ Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
– LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
∗ Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
∗ Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
– OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.17: Game 12 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
– SIGN
∗ SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
· Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
· Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
· Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj , l(µ.bsn)) to S .
∗ SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the
session to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
∗ SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
· Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
· Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
∗ SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
· Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
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· If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
· If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
· Check CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1.
· Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
· Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
· Check Verify(σ,µ,bsn)=1.
· Check identify(σ,µ, bsn, tsk)=1.
· Check the is no TPM other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′)=1.
· If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
– VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
∗ Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk)=1.
∗ Set f = 0 if:
· I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
· There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
· More than one key tski was found.
∗ If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
∗ Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
– LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
∗ Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
∗ Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
– OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.18: Game 13 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
– SIGN
∗ SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
· Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
· Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
· Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj , l(µ.bsn)) to S .
∗ SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the
session to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
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∗ SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
· Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
· Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
∗ SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
· Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
· If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
· If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
· Check CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1.
· Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
· Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
· Check Verify(σ,µ,bsn)=1.
· Check identify(σ,µ, bsn, tsk)=1.
· Check the is no TPM other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′)=1.
· If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
– VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
∗ Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk)=1.
∗ Set f = 0 if:
· I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
· An honest Mi was found, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi,bsn〉 was found in Signed.
· There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1.
· More than one key tski was found.
∗ If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
∗ Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
– LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
∗ Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
∗ Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
– OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.19: Game 14 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
– SIGN
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∗ SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
· Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
· Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
· Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj , l(µ.bsn)) to S .
∗ SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the
session to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
∗ SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
· Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
· Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
∗ SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
· Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
· If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
· If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
· Check CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1.
· Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
· Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
· Check Verify(σ,µ,bsn)=1.
· Check identify(σ,µ, bsn, tsk)=1.
· Check the is no TPM other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′)=1.
· If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
– VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid, µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
∗ Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk)=1.
∗ Set f = 0 if:
· I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
· An honest Mi was found, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi,bsn〉 was found in Signed.
· There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1, and no pair (Mi, tski) for
honest Mi was found.
· More than one key tski was found.
∗ If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
∗ Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
– LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
∗ Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
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∗ Set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
– OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.20: Game 15 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
– SIGN
∗ SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ,bsn) from the host Hj,
· Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,Hj,∗〉 exists ML.
· Else create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, request〉.
· Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi,Hj , l(µ.bsn)) to S .
∗ SIGN REUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the
session to 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ,bsn) to Mi.
∗ SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi.
· Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,Hj,µ,bsn, delivered〉.
· Output (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid) to S.
∗ SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
both Mi and Hj are honest then:
· Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
· If bsn , ⊥, then retrieve tsk from the 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 ∈ DomainKeys.
· If bsn = ⊥ or no tsk was found, generate a fresh key tsk← Kgen(1λ).
· Check CheckGskHonest(tsk)=1.
· Store 〈Mi,bsn, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
· Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ,bsn).
· Check Verify(σ,µ,bsn)=1.
· Check identify(σ,µ, bsn, tsk)=1.
· Check the is no TPM other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk′)=1.
· If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi,bsn〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE,
sid, ssid,σ) to Hj.
– VERIFY On input (VERIFY, sid,µ,bsn,σ,KRL) from V
∗ Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk)=1.
∗ Set f = 0 if:
· I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
· An honest Mi was found, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi,bsn〉 was found in Signed.
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· There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk∗) = 1, and no pair (Mi, tski) for
honest Mi was found.
· More than one key tski was found.
∗ If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ,bsn).
∗ Add (σ,µ,bsn,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V.
– LINK
On the input (LINK, sid,σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn) from V
∗ Output ⊥ if at least one of the signatures (σ1,µ1,bsn) or (σ2,µ2,bsn) is not valid.
∗ For each tski in Members and DomainKeys, compute bi ← Identify(σ1,µ1,bsn, tski)
and b′i= Identify(σ2,µ2,bsn, tski) then set:
· f ← 0 if bi , b′i for some i.
· f ← 1 if bi = b′i = 1 for some i.
∗ If f is not defined, set f =Link(σ1,µ1,σ2,µ2,bsn), and output (LINK, sid, f ) to V.
– OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 4.21: Game 16 for F
4.5 Experimental Results
In order to evaluate the proposed LDAA scheme, both the proposed scheme and [BK17] were im-
plemented in C. Basic operations, such as the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT)-based multipli-
cation over Rq and the Issuer’s Gaussian sampling, were implemented once and shared between the
two schemes. The implementations made use of the following cryptographic parameters: n = 256,
q = 8380417, l = 32, m = 24 and β = 256. Moreover, commitments based on Baum et al’s proposal
were used for both cases. The LDAA scheme was implemented by colleagues from INESC-ID, Instituto
Superior Te´cnico, University of Lisbon, Portugal. The experiments were run on an Intel i9 7900X CPU
with 64GB running at 3.3 GHz operated by CentOS 7.5. The code was compiled with gcc 4.8.5 with
the -Ofast and -march=native flags. The average execution time of the signing and the verification
operations was herein measured over 10 generations of fresh cryptographic key material for the Issuer,
Host and TPM, and random messages. The experimental results herein presented focus on the signing
and on the verification operations since they are the most often executed, and mostly target at comparing
the proposed scheme with [BK17].
Fig. 4.22 shows that in practice the size of the TPM private-key share is halved when the proposed scheme
is compared with [BK17]. This is of particular importance for TPM platforms, where memory resources
are constrained. In Fig. 4.23, signature sizes are shown for the proposed scheme, for the proposed scheme
when commitments are not hashed, and for [BK17]. The signature size of the proposed scheme is halved,
when hashing is not considered, in comparison to the scheme in [BK17]. This improvement is achieved
through the exploitation of the modified Baum et al’s commitment scheme, enabling the construction of
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a single proof of knowledge that reflects the secret-key shared between the TPM and Host, instead of
the two required by [BK17]. Moreover, by hashing commitments, the size of the proofs are themselves
reduced, resulting in signatures that are 5 times smaller than [BK17].
While in Section 4.6 it was predicted that the TPM computation during signing would asymptotically
be twice as fast with the proposed scheme than with [BK17], Fig. 4.24 shows that, in practice, other
operations, such as the computation of the commitments, reduce the speed-up to 1.13. Nevertheless,
the verification operation is significantly enhanced when comparing the proposed scheme with [BK17],
as shown in Fig. 4.25. Since a single proof needs to be verified instead of two, speed-ups of 2.04 are
achieved. Notice that in Figures 4.24 and 4.25 the execution times include the hashing of the commit-
ments.
The experimental results suggest that, as the research community develops a deeper knowledge of lattice-
based cryptography, novel DAA schemes will get more efficient. More concretely, while [BK17] uses a
lattice-based commitment scheme in a black-box approach, herein recently discovered properties are ex-
ploited not only to considerably reduce the size of the DAA cryptographic structures, but also to roughly
halve the verification time. While the signing time is still strongly affected by the complexity of the
commitment scheme, one expects that as new properties are researched its efficiency in the context of the
DAA will be improved.
4.6 Comparison Between the LDAA Scheme and the Scheme in [BK17]
In our LDAA scheme, the TPM’s secret key size is reduced to m polynomials in Rq, instead of 2m + 1
polynomials in [BK17]. Such a change significantly reduces the TPM’s computation costs in the join
and sign interfaces, as well as the TPM’s key and the signature sizes. For instance, in the proposed
scheme, the LDAA signature includes c responses to the Fiat-Shamir challenges, where each response
is comprised of O(n)km(2`+ 2) elements in Zq provided by the host and O(n)k(m′ + 1) provided by the
TPM. In [BK17], the size of the response for each round is bounded by O(n)km(2`+ 2) elements in Zq
for both the host and the TPM. Thus in our LDAA scheme, the signature’s size has been significantly
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Schemes LDAA Scheme in [BK17]
TPM’s Secret key mn (2m + 1)n
Credential 2mn 2mn
Issuer’s Secret Key m2n m2n
Signature cO(n)[km ((2`+ 3) + 1)] 2ckmO(n)(2`+ 2)
Verification key ((`+ 3)m + 1)n ((`+ 2)m + 2)n
Table 4.2: Keys and signature sizes in terms of the number of elements in Zq. Our main contribution is reducing the TPM’s
secret key size (less than half the size in [BK17]), as well as the signature size.
reduced especially for large `. Moreover, the hashing of the commitments in pi further reduces the sizes
of the signatures. The verification key set in [BK17] consists of the `+ 2 vectors of polynomials AˆI , Aˆi
for i = 0,1, · · ·` and two polynomials u and b. In our LDAA scheme, we add Aˆt to the verification key
set resulting in `+ 2 vectors of polynomials in Rmq , a vector of polynomials Aˆt ∈ Rmq and a polynomial u.
Table 4.2 compares the space efficiency between the proposed LDAA scheme and the scheme presented
in [BK17].
Computation Costs
To generate the values to be committed for one round of piut and θt in the join and sign interfaces of our
LDAA scheme, the TPM has to perform at most m + 1 polynomial multiplications. In [BK17], the TPM
performs at most 2m + 2 and 2m + 2 + 2`m polynomial multiplications for generating the values to be
committed for each round of pi1 and pi2 in the join and sign interfaces, respectively. The computational
cost for the host is of 2m polynomial multiplications for checking the equality uh = Aˆh · Xˆh in the join
interface, and 2m + 2`m polynomial multiplications for generating the values to be committed for each
round of θh and pi3 in the sign interfaces for both schemes. The Issuer verifies the responses for each
round of piut and pi1 in both schemes in the join interface. Thus, the issuer’s computation cost for each
round is bounded by m+1 polynomial multiplications for our LDAA scheme and 2m+2 in [BK17]. The
verifier validates both the TPM and the host’s responses. Therefore, the verifier’s computation cost in
our LDAA scheme is 1 + 3m + 2`m polynomial multiplications. In [BK17], the verifier’s computation
cost is 4m + 2 + 2`m. All in all, the computational complexity for both the joining and the signing is
approximately halved for the TPM, and verification is accelerated 4/3 times, when the proposed scheme
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Join Sign Verify
Ours In [BK17] LDAA In [BK17] LDAA In [BK17]
TPM m + 1 2m + 2 m + 1 2m + 2 - -
Host 2m 2m 2m+2`m 2m+2`m - -
Issuer m + 1 2m + 2 - - - -
Verifier - - - - 3m + 1 + 2`m 4m + 2 + 2`m
Table 4.3: This table compares the computation costs for the generation of the values to be committed in both schemes, rep-
resented by the total number of polynomial multiplications in Rq for each round of the signatures. The table shows that the
computation costs in our LDAA scheme are significantly reduced for the TPM during joining and signing, and for the issuer and
the verifier.
is compared to that of [BK17].
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Chapter 5
A more Compact Lattice-based Direct Anonymous Attesta-
tion Scheme
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3, we proposed a lattice based DAA (LDAA) [KCB+19] and compare it to
the other lattice based DAA scheme proposed by El Bansarkhani and El Kaafarani [BK17]. Although
experimental results in Section 4.5 showed that the proposed lattice based DAA scheme in [KCB+19]
is much more efficient than the scheme in [BK17], both proposed latticed based DAA schemes require
massive storage and computation resources, which makes them not suitable for inclusion in a future
quantum-resistant TPM. Therefore, this chapter proposes a new compact lattice based DAA scheme
[CEKLL19] and whose signature size is around 2MB, which is (at least) two orders of magnitude smaller
compared to the LDAA scheme. The proposed compact DAA scheme is also faster in terms of the TPM’s
computation costs in the join and sign interfaces, and have smaller TPM keys and signature sizes. The
security of the proposed quantum-safe lattice DAA scheme is proved in the UC model under the hard
assumptions of the Ring-LWE and the Ring-SIS problems.
Chapter organisation: Section 5.2 introduces some preliminaries on the lattice schemes and algorithms
and the zero knowledge proofs used for the construction of our proposed compact DAA scheme. Sec-
tion 5.3 presents a novel compact latticed-based DAA scheme in the UC framework. Section 5.4 provides
a rigorous security proof for the proposed DAA scheme in the UC framework under the security model
proposed in [CDL16] and presented in Subsection 3.3.3. A comparison with related art is presented in
Section 5.5.
5.2 Preliminaries
Notation
In this chapter we use the following notations for the simplicity of writting.
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We define the ring of polynomials Rq = Zq[X]/〈Xd +1〉, where d is the dimension of Rq which is a power
of 2. We write c = c0 +c1x+ . . .+cd−1xd−1 to represent a polynomial in Rq with integer coefficients, ‖c‖∞
denotes the infinity norm of polynomial c, with ‖c‖∞ = max 0≤ j≤n |c j|. We will always assume that q is
a prime such that q ≡ 3 (mod 8), which implies [LN17, Lemma 2.2] that all (non-zero) elements in Rq
whose infinity norm is less than
√
q/2 are invertible. Additionally, with probability almost 1, a random
element in Rq is also invertible.
a = (a1, . . . ,ak) represents a vector of polynomials in Rkq, for some positive integer k and polynomials
a1, . . . ,ak in Rq. A ∈ Rk×`q is a matrix whose entities are polynomials ai j ∈ Rq for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ `.
‖A‖∞ is the infinity norm of the matrix of polynomials A defined by ‖A‖∞ = maxi ‖ai j‖∞.
Lattice Schemes and Algorithms
We recall the following definitions from Chapter 2. For x,c ∈ Rd and σ ∈ R+, we define the Gaussian
function ρc,σ(x) = exp
(
−‖x−c‖2
2σ2
)
, and for a lattice L, we define the distribution DL,c,σ(x) to be 0 whenever
x < L and
DL,c,σ(x) =
ρc,σ(x)∑
v∈L
ρc,σ(v)
(5.1)
when x ∈ L. When we omit the L from the above equation, it is assumed that the lattice is Zd (where
d is evident from context). Omitting the c implies that c = 0. As an additive group, the polynomial ring
R = Z[X]/(Xd + 1) has an obvious mapping to Zd and so we can write v← Dσ to signify sampling a
random centered element from R. For a polynomial vector a = (a1, . . . ,ak) ∈Rkq and t ∈Rq, we can define
a k-dimensional shifted lattice1
L⊥a,t = {s ∈ Rkq : a1s1 + . . .+ ak sk = t mod q}
and we define the distribution D⊥a,t,ξ(x) to be 0 whenever x < L
⊥
a,t and
D⊥a,t,σ(x) =
ρσ(x)∑
v∈L⊥a,t
ρσ(v)
(5.2)
The Ring-SIS problem [LM06b] is defined as finding a short linear combination s1, . . . , sm ∈Rq satisfying
a1s1 + . . .+ amsm = 0 for a given set of randomly-chosen ai ∈ Rq. The decisional Ring-LWE problem
[LPR10] is, for random ai, s ← Rq and random small-coefficient polynomials ei ∈ Rq, to distinguish
tuples (ai,ais + ei) from uniformly random tuples in Rq. Note that because random elements in Rq are
invertible with high probability, the triples (ai,bi,ais + biei) are also indistinguishable from uniform
triples based on Ring-LWE.
1A shifted lattice is a set that is a lattice shifted by some vector v. Note that a shifted lattice does not have the property that the
sum of any two vectors is in the shifted lattice.
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Lattice Trapdoor Sampling
The trapdoor sampler that will be used in our scheme defines a as a 4-element vector (a′,a′R +
(τ,τd √qc)), where a′ = (a,1) for a uniformly-random a ∈ Rq, R ∈ R2×2 consists of polynomials with
random coefficients in {−1,0,1} and τ is some non-zero element in Rq. It was shown in [MP12b,
Lemma 5.3] that one can sample, again using [GPV08b, DP16], elements from D⊥a,t,σ, for any t ∈ Rq,
for σ ≈ 2(s1(R) + 1)
√
q + 1, where s1(R) = maxv,0
‖Rv‖
‖v‖ . For the R generated as above, s1(R) is concen-
trated around 3
√
d, and so one can sample from D⊥a,t,σ with σ ≥ 6
√
dq. We will refer to this algorithm as
the MP-Sampler.
5.2.1 Overview of our proposed compact DAA scheme
Our DAA is related to the recently-proposed group signature scheme [dPLS18], which at the time of this
writing is the most efficient quantum-safe scheme for large group sizes. The high-level idea of the group
signature scheme is for the issuer to create user secret keys by outputting signatures (where messages are
the user’s identity) of the ABB lattice-based signature scheme [ABB10]. More precisely, the secret key
of a group member with identity i ∈ Z∗q is an ABB signature s of the message i. In other words, s was a
small-norm polynomial satisfying
[A | B + iG]s = u, (5.3)
where A,B,G, and u are public parameters over some polynomial ring. To construct a signature of a
message µ, the group member encrypts (a part of) s and gives a non-interactive ZKPoK (using µ in the
hash of the challenge) to prove knowledge of the i ∈ Z∗q and s satisfying (5.3)1 as well as the fact that (a
part of) s was encrypted.
DAA schemes differ from basic group signatures in three ways:
1. Extra privacy properties are required for users in case of a malicious issuer.
2. The user in a DAA scheme is split into two parts - the TPM and the host - and they do signing in a way
that doesn’t reveal the TPM’s secret (even to the host).
3. There is no opener, but there is instead a linking procedure that should allow anyone to link two
signatures for a common basename.
Notice that in the above group signature description, the issuer needs to know the i in order to produce
the group member’s secret key and so there is nothing preventing a malicious issuer from impersonating
a group member. This would not satisfy the security definitions of an analogous DAA scheme. To
remedy this, instead of directly using the selectively-secure ABB scheme, we use the idea in the Ducas-
Micciancio scheme [DM14], which modifies the ABB signature to include a tag τ when signing a low-
norm message m. A signature s of a message m under a tag τ satisfies
[A | B +τG]s = u + am, (5.4)
1Actually, one proves a “relaxed” version of (5.3) involving a lot of extra small-norm polynomial multiplicands due to the fact
that the most efficient zero-knowledge proofs for commitments (c.f. [BDL+18]) only prove knowledge of approximate solutions.
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where a is now an additional public parameter and τ is chosen fresh for every signature that is created.1
The way in which we utilize this construction by observing that if the group member sends v = am, along
with a proof of knowledge of m, then the authority can create a signature on m without its knowledge.
In this way, the group signature scheme of [dPLS18] can be modified to satisfy the stronger definition of
dynamic group signatures in which a malicious issuer cannot impersonate a group member.
The above-described dynamic group signature issuance procedure can now be easily converted to an
issuance procedure of a DAA scheme. In particular, m (or at least a part of it) will be the TPM secret key,
while s is the secret membership credential of the host. This information, together with τ, is then used
by the TPM and the host to create a ZKPoK, much in the same way as the ZKPoK of (5.3) was generated
in [dPLS18], of (5.4) to sign messages.
The other difference between group signatures and DAA schemes is that DAA schemes have a “linking”
procedure instead of an opening. So instead of encrypting the TPM’s secret, we will instead create a Ring-
LWE instance (b,nym = bm1 + e) where b is the basename, m1 is part of the TPM’s secret, and e is an
error term that is an output of a PRF evaluated at b and m1.2. To allow efficient linking (i.e. there should
be a public procedure that allows to determine whether the same TPM signed under the same basename)
we need to take care about how the TPM proves knowledge of m1,e satisfying nym = bm1 + e. If we use
the most efficient proof that also proves knowledge of a low-norm c¯, m¯1, e¯ such that c¯nym = bm¯1 + e¯, then
linking would require guessing the c¯ (which could come from an exponentially-large space). Instead,
we use the slightly less-efficient proof from [BCK+14] which proves the knowledge of m¯1, e¯ satisfying
2nym = bm¯1 + e¯. Putting this proof together with the proof of (5.4) (and using the message µ in the hash
of the challenge), as well as making several small adjustments to allow the UC proof to go through,
completes the signature.
5.2.2 Zero Knowledge Proofs for the Compact DAA scheme
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 present some useful zero knowlege proofs required in our proposed DAA scheme,
Figure 5.1 explains a proof of Knowledge for small secrets r¯, c¯ satisfying Ar¯ = c¯t, while figure 5.2
presents a proof of Knowledge of a small secret r¯, in the particular case when c¯ = 2, satisfying Ar¯ = 2t.
5.2.3 Lattice-based Commitments
In this chapter we use the version of the commitment scheme from [BDL+18] that commits to k ring
elements. Define the public parameter C as
C =

a1 a2 . . . ak ak+1 1
b1 0 . . . 0 b′1 0
b2 0 . . . b′2 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bk b′k . . . 0 0 0

=
AB
 , (5.5)
1The scheme of [dPLS18] only proved non-adaptive security of their signature schemes where the adversary needs to choose
the messages he wants to see the signatures of before seeing the signatures. It is converted to a standard signature scheme using a
chameleon hash. We show in our proof how to go around the requirement of the chameleon hash.
2The reason for using a PRF to generate the error is that it would be insecure to output bm1 + e and bm1 + e′ for e , e′
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Prover Verifier
A,r, t = Ar A, t
y← Dmy
w := Ay
w−→
c← C
c←−
z := cr + y
if rej(z,cr) = 1, Abort
z−→
Accept iff:
‖z‖ ≤ βz,
Az = ct + w,
Figure 5.1: Proof of knowledge for r¯, c¯ satisfying Ar¯ = c¯t.
Prover Verifier
A,r, t = Ar A, t
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `,
yi← Dmy
wi := Ayi
w1,...,w`−−−−−−→
c1, . . . ,c`← Cx
c1,...,c`←−−−−−
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `,
zi := cir + yi
if rej(z1, . . . ,z`,c1r, . . . ,c`r) = 1,
Abort
z1,...,z`−−−−−→
Accept iff for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `:
‖zi‖ ≤ βz,
Azi = cit + wi,
Figure 5.2: Proof of knowledge for r¯ satisfying Ar¯ = 2t.
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where A is the top row and B is the rest of the matrix. The commitment of k elements in Rq, m =

m1
. . .
mk
,
consists of creating an r ← Dk+2r and outputting
Cr +
0m
 = tAtB
 = t (5.6)
From the above definitions, observe that we have tA = Ar and tB = Br + m.
Given a public C and a commitment t to messages m1, . . . ,mk ∈ Zq, there is a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of an m¯ ∈ Zkq, r¯ ∈ S r, and c¯ ∈ C¯ satisfying
Cr¯ +
 0c¯m¯
 = c¯t and Lm¯ = u (5.7)
If we only needed that m¯ ∈ Rkq and Lm¯ = u, then we could just apply (a slight generalisation) of the proof
system from [BDL+18]. But our complete proof will also require showing that m¯ is in Zkq. Additionally
proving this above-mentioned restriction on m¯ involves using the “automorphism stability” modification
from [dPLS18]. The latter work uses the fact that an element m ∈ Rq is in Zq if and only if it satisfies
m = σ−1(m) = σ5(m), where σ j is the automorphism defined by: σ j(X) = X j.
Lemma 7. The protocol in Figure 5.3 is a proof of knowledge of (5.7).
Sketch. To prove zero-knowledge in the case that z,z1,z2 are sent, we observe that due to the rejection
sampling procedure the distribution of z,z1,z2 is exactly Dy. Therefore one can simulate the view of the
verifier by generating z,z1,z2 ← Dy, c← C and setting w,w1,w2,v1,v2,vL according to the verification
equations.
To show that the protocol is a proof of knowledge, note that the usual rewinding of the prover after the
first step allows us to extract z¯, z¯1, z¯2, c¯ satisfying
Az¯ = c¯tA (5.8)
σ−1−1(A)z¯1 = c¯σ
−1
−1(tA) (5.9)
σ−15 (A)z¯2 = c¯σ
−1
5 (tA) (5.10)
Bz¯−σ−1−1(B)z¯1 = c¯(tB−σ−1−1(tB)) (5.11)
Bz¯−σ−15 (B)z¯2 = c¯(tB−σ−15 (tB)) (5.12)
LBz¯ = c¯(LtB−u) (5.13)
We would like to now prove that (5.8) and (5.10), along with the SIS assumption, imply that
σ5(c¯)z¯ = c¯σ5(z¯2). (5.14)
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Prover Verifier[
A
B
]
,r,L,u,
[
0
m
]
s.t. m ∈ Zkq, Lm = u,
[
tA
tB
]
=[
A
B
]
r +
[
0
m
]
[
A
B
]
,
[
tA
tB
]
,L,u
y,y1,y2← Dk+2y
w := Ay,
w1 := σ−1−1(A)y1,w2 := σ
−1
5 (A)y2
v1 := By−σ−1−1(B)y1,
v2 := By−σ−15 (B)y2
vL := LBy
w,w1,w2,v1,v2,vL−−−−−−−−−−−−→
c← C
c←−
z := cr + y,
z1 := cσ−1−1(r) + y1,z2 := cσ
−1
5 (r) + y2
if rej(z,z1,z2,cr,cσ−1−1(r),cσ
−1
5 (r)) = 1,
Abort
z,z1,z2−−−−→
Accept iff:
‖z‖,‖z1‖,‖z2‖ ≤ βz,
Az = ctA + w,
σ−1−1(A)z1 = cσ
−1
−1(tA) + w1,
σ−15 (A)z2 = cσ
−1
5 (tA) + w2,
Bz−σ−1−1(B)z1 = c(tB−σ−1−1(tB)) + v1
Bz−σ−15 (B)z2 = c(tB−σ−15 (tB)) + v2
LBz = c(LtB−u) + vL
Figure 5.3: Proof of Knowledge of r¯, c¯, m¯ satisfying
[
A
B
]
r¯ +
[
0
c¯m¯
]
= c¯
[
tA
tB
]
, Lm¯ = u, and m¯ ∈ Zkq.
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To show the above, multiply (5.8) by σ5(c¯), multiply σ5((5.10)) by c¯ and subtract to obtain
A(σ5(c¯)z− c¯σ5(z¯2)) = 0. (5.15)
Since we assumed that the SIS problem is hard, then the above can only be true if (5.14) holds.
Because c¯ is invertible, it is possible to define m¯ such that
c¯m¯ = c¯tB−Bz¯ (5.16)
Using (5.12), we also obtain
c¯m¯ = c¯σ−15 (tB)−σ−15 (B)z¯2. (5.17)
Applying the automorphism σ5 to the above equation and multiplying by c¯, and then applying (5.14), we
get
c¯σ5(c¯)σ5(m¯) = c¯σ5(c¯)tB− c¯Bσ5(z¯2) = c¯σ5(c¯)tB−σ5(c¯)Bz¯ (5.18)
Subtracting the above from σ5(c¯) times (5.16), we obtain that
c¯σ5(c¯)σ5(m¯) = c¯σ5(c¯)m¯,
and since both c¯ and σ5(c¯) are invertible, this implies that σ5(m¯) = m¯. Exactly the same proof yields
that σ−1(m¯) = m¯ and so m¯ ∈ Zkq. Also note that combining (5.8) with (5.16) gives (5.7). Now, combining
(5.13) and (5.16), we obtain
L(c¯tB− c¯m¯) = c¯(LtB−u),
which implies Lm¯ = u.

For our proposed DAA scheme, we recall an important relation from CRYSTALS-Dilithium [DKL+18]
signature scheme that was presented in Subsection 2.2.4.This relation is necessary for the correctness and
the security of our scheme, we refer to [DKL+18] for the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 8. [DKL+18] : Let p and f be two polynomials in R, s.t. ‖ f ‖∞ ≤ β and ‖LowBits(p,α)‖∞ <
α/2−β, then:
HighBits(p,α) = HighBits(p + f ,α)
We also recall the following theorem from [dPLS18] to prove that if a committed message (identity) is
preserved under some set of automorphisms (σ−1,σ5), then the identity belongs to a certain subfield of
Rq (Zq for prime q).
Theorem 9. Let µ ∈ Rq such that µ is fixed under the automorphisms σ−1 and σ5, then µ ∈ Zq.
Check the proof of theorem 3.1 in [dPLS18].
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5.3 A Compact Lattice-Based DAA Scheme
5.3.1 High Level Description
Let q be a prime and the ring Rq = Zq[X]/〈Xd + 1〉. We will denote by Rα for some positive integer α a
subset of Rq with coefficients in the range between −α and α. For some domain D, we will denote HD to
be a domain extension function (e.g. SHAKE) that takes an element from {0,1}∗ and maps onto D.
The issuer secret key is a matrix R← R2×21 , and his public key is a uniformly-random polynomial h←Rq
and a vector b = [h 1]R. By the Ring-LWE assumption, (h,b) is indistinguishable from uniform. For
convenience, we will write the public matrix associated to the issuer as
[h | b] ∈ R4q (5.19)
where h = [h 1]. If g = [1
√
q] ∈ R2q, then using the Micciancio-Peikert inversion algorithm, for any
nonzero τ ∈ Zq and u ∈Rq, it is possible to use the trapdoor R to find a short, Gaussian distributed, vector
s ∈ R4q satisfying [h | b + τg]s = u. The issuer will also keep state of one integer tag τ ∈ Zq. He will
initialize τ = 1 and increment it by one with every new join. Since the prime q in our scheme will be
somewhat large (around 270), every join procedure will have a unique tag – this is crucial for security.
We also define a = [a1 a2]← R2q and u← Rq to be random public parameters.
Join Procedure. A TPM’s secret consists of a polynomial vector e =
e1e2
← R23 and a secret key skli ∈
{0,1}256.1 The TPM computes
u1 = a · e = a1e1 + a2e2 (5.20)
and sends u1 along with a proof of knowledge of short e satisfying (2). Since the TPM will do the join
only once, it’s not important for this proof to be efficient, and so it can be done using a zero-knowledge
proof system in [LNSW13] that proves exact knowledge of e. The issuer, upon receiving u1, will check
the proof and then use the Micciancio-Peikert sampling algorithm [MP12a] to compute an s with small
norm satisfying
[h | b +τg]s = u + u1, (5.21)
where τ is a fresh tag which the issuer tracks as described above. The issuer sends τ and s to the TPM as
the credential. The TPM keeps his secret e and skli, while the host stores the credential s and τ.
Signing. To sign a message µ with respect to basename bsn, the TPM creates a value d = HRq (bsn)
and an error polynomial e′ = HR3 (skli,bsn) and output the pseudonym nym = de1 +e′ ∈Rq. Notice that d
is (and needs to be) publicly computable, while e′ is only computable by the TPM. The reason that the e′
is generated deterministically based on bsn (and skli) rather than just chosen arbitrarily at random is that
the TPM might be asked to create a pseudonym with respect to the same basename multiple times, and
1The reason that we choose e to have coefficients in a range larger than {−1,0,1} is because the TPM will give out a lot of
Ring-LWE samples with this secret and so the space of the secrets needs to be a little larger to avoid the Arora-Ge attack [AG11].
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it would be insecure to send de1 + e′1, . . . ,de1 + e
′
κ for different e
′
κ. Thus, for the TPM’s safety, the same
basename should lead to the same pseudonym.
At this point, the TPM and the Host know short e, s,e′ and τ ∈ Zq satisfying
nym = de1 + e′ (5.22)
[h | b +τg]s = u + ae. (5.23)
Ideally, the signature would consist of nym as well as a proof of knowledge of short e, s,e′ and τ ∈ Zq
satisfying the above two equations. The main problem with creating the above proof is that it’s unclear
how to efficiently keep secret the τ inside the matrix [h | b + τg] and, even ignoring the τ, giving an
exact proof of r,e, s,r′ is very costly in terms of proof size (at least dozens of megabytes.) We instead
use the techniques from Figures 5.1 and 5.2 to prove the above equations approximately as well as the
proof of automorphism stability from 5.3 to prove that τ ∈ Zq. The Host commits to τ and τ√q using the
commitment scheme from Subsection 5.2.3 as
Cr +

0
τ
τ
√
q
 =

t0
t1
t2
 . (5.24)
Define C1 and C2 to be the second and the third row of the matrix C in (5.5) (i.e. the rows corresponding
to the commitments of messages m1 and m2 in (5.6). The Host and the TPM then jointly give a zero-
knowledge proof of (using the message µ inside the random oracle in the Fiat-Shamir transofrmation):
Cr¯ + c¯

0
τ
τ
√
q
 = c¯

t0
t1
t2
 and τ ∈ Zq (5.25)
[h |b + [t1 t2]]s¯−C1v¯1−C2v¯2−ae¯ = c¯u (5.26)
de¯1 + e¯′ = c¯nym (5.27)
de˜1 + e˜′ = 2nym (5.28)
Equations (5.25), (5.26), and (5.27) are proved simultaneously (to ensure that the values of c¯ and e¯1 are
consistent throughout) and jointly by the TPM and the Host. In particular, (5.25) is proved using the
“automorphism stability” proof from Figure 5.3 to ensure that τ ∈ Zq, while the other two equations are
proved using the standard “Fiat-Shamir with Aborts” technique using Gaussian sampling from Figure
5.1. The TPM needs to additionally prove (5.28) because having a c¯ in front of the nym is not sufficient
for linking since one would actually have to know c in order to perform the linking operation. This proof
(which is less compact than the one in Figure 5.1 is done via the protocol in Figure 5.2.
While it’s obvious that the fact that the TPM and Host satisfying (5.22) and (5.24) allows them to prove
(5.25),(5.26), and (5.28), the validity of (5.27) is a little less straight-forward. But observe that replacing
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τg = [τ τ
√
q] in (5.23) with τ = t1−C1r and √qτ = t2−C2r from (5.24) gives us the equation
[h | b1 + t1 | b2 + t2]

s0
s1
s2
− s1C1r − s2C2 · r −ae = u,
where we have conveniently rewritten b = [b1 b2] and the vector s =

s0
s1
s2
 where s0 is multiplied with h,
s1 is multiplied by b1 + t1 and s2 is multiplied by b2 + t2. Since s1, s2 and r have small coefficients, it’s
now evident that one can give a proof of the equation in (5.26) using the protocol in Figure 5.1.
The goal of obtaining proofs of (5.25) and (5.26) is to combine them into one proof as follows: by
multiplying (5.26) by c¯ and substituting c¯ti with C¯ir¯ + c¯τ, we obtain
[h | c¯b1 +C1r¯ + c¯τ | c¯b2 +C2r¯ + c¯√qτ]

c¯s¯0
s¯1
s¯2
−C1c¯v¯1−C2c¯v¯2−a · e¯c¯ = c¯2u, (5.29)
which can be rewritten as
c¯[h | b +τg]s¯ = c¯2u + a′ · w¯, (5.30)
where a′ = [a C1 C2] and w¯ =

e¯c¯
c¯v¯1− r¯
c¯v¯2− r¯
.
Linking. Given pseudonyms nym1 and nym2 for the same basename bsn, we will say that they are
linked to the same TPM if 2(y1− y2) is a polynomial in Rq with small norm.
5.3.2 Detailed Description of the Scheme
We now present our DAA scheme 1 in details. Before proceeding with the DAA scheme, we define
some standard functionalities that are used in the UC model of DAA, as specified in [CDL16], a detailed
describtions of these functionalities is presented in Chapter 3.
• FCA is a common certificate authority functionality that is available to all parties.
• FCRS is a common reference string functionality that provides participants with all system parameters.
• F∗auth is a special authenticated communication functionality that provides an authenticated channel
between the issuer and the TPM via the host.
• FSMT is a secure message transmission functionality that provides an authenticated and encrypted com-
munication between the TPM and the host.
1note that the practicality of our proposed scheme depends on the implementation results, thus at this stage we may not claim
that the scheme is practical.
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The DAA scheme includes the SETUP, JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY, and LINK processes as follows:
SETUP: FCRS creates the system parameters: sp = (λ,k,β,γ1,γ2). The issuer’s public key consists
of the uniformly-random polynomials h ← Rq, u ← Rq, a vector a = [a1 a2] ← R2q and the matrix
C = [A|B]←Rk×(k+2)q . The issuer’s secret key is R← R2×21 . Define the vectors h = [h 1] and b = [h 1] ·R.
Define the hash functions HRq : {0,1}∗→Rq, HR3 : {0,1}∗→ R3, HC : {0,1}∗→ C and HCx : C→ Cx ⊂ R`1.
Issuer’s public key is pp := (sp,A,B,a,u,h,b,HRq ,HR3 ,HCx ,HC). The issuer initializes the joining
Memeber List ML← ∅, Join Records JR← ∅ and the Key Revocation List KRL← ∅. The issuer proves
that his secret key is well formed by generating a proof of knowledge piI, registers the key (b,piI) with
FCA and stores R. I initialize τ = 1 that will be incremented by one with every new join and outputs
(SETUPDONE,sid), where sid is a unique session identifier.
JOIN: The Join process is a protocol running between the Issuer I and a platform, consisting of a TPM
Mi and a Host Hj. More than one Join session may run in parallel. A unique sub-session identifier jsid is
used and this value is given to all parties. The issuer I checks that the TPM-host is qualified to make the
trusted computing attestation service, then issues a credential enabling the platform to create attestations.
Via the unique session identifier jsid, the issuer can differentiate between various Join sessions that are
executed simultaneously. A Join session works in two phases, Join request and Join proceed, as follows:
Join Request: On input query (JOIN,sid, jsid,Mi), the host f˝orwards (JOIN,sid, jsid) to I, who replies
by sending (sid, jsid,ρ,bsnI) back to Hj, where ρ is a uniform random nonce ρ← {0,1}λ and bsnI ∈ Rq
represents the issuer’s basename. This message is then forwarded to Mi who proceeds as follows:
1. Samples a secret that consists of a polynomial vector e =
e1e2
← R23 and a secret key skli ∈ {0,1}256.
2. Computes the corresponding public key
u1 = a · e = a1e1 + a2e2
3. Mi calculates a link token
nymI = HRq (bsnI)e1 + eI
where eI = HR3 (skli,bsnI) ∈ R3
4. Mi creates a proof of knowledge piMi to show the exact knowledge of a short e and eI satisfying the
construction of u1 and nymI, using the same techniques of Stern proof as in [KCB
+19] and explained
in Chapter 2.
5. Sends σI = (u1,piMi ,nymI) to the issuer I via Hj by means of F
∗
auth, i.e., it gives F
∗
auth an input
(SEND,σI, jsid, ,Mi,Hj,ρ), and stores the key (sid,Hj,e) in it’s record.
I upon receiving (SENT,σI, jsid,Mi,Hj,ρ) from F∗auth, it verifies piMi . It stores (sid, jsid,σI,Mi,Hj),
and generates the message (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi).
I Join Proceed: The join session is completed when the issuer recieves an explicit input telling him to
proceed with the join session jsid.
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1. I checks the rogue TPM list KRL to make sure that the request is not from a rogue TPM. To do this,
∀e∗1 ∈ KRL , if ‖nymI−HRq (bsnI)e∗1‖∞ ≤ 3, the issuer will abort.
2. ∀ nym′
I
in previous Join Records JR, I checks ‖nymI−nym′I‖∞ ≤ 6. If this is the case, the issuer checks
whether u′1 = u1 holds; if yes, the issuer treats this session as a retun of the Join process and return the
existing credential (s′, τ′). If ‖nymI − nym′I‖∞ ≤ 6 and u′1 , u1, I abort. Note that this double check
will make sure that any two DAA keys will not use the same e1.
3. I samples an identity τi ← Zq which wasn’t given to any platform before, and using the Micciancio-
Peikert sampling algorithm [MP12a] and his secret key R, I computes the credential s with small norm
satisfying
[h | b +τig] · s = u + u1,
with ‖s‖∞ < β, and τi is a fresh tag which the issuer tracks as described in the setup interface.
4. I adds τi to the Member List ML.
5. I sends (sid, jsid, s, τi) to Hj via F∗auth.
6. Upon receiving (sid, jsid, s, τi) from F∗auth, Hj verifies that the credential satisfies:
[h | b +τig] · s = u + u1,
with ‖s‖∞ < β, and τi ∈ Zq
7. Hj stores (sid,Mi, s, τi) and outputs (JOINED,sid, jsid).
SIGN: After obtaining the credential from the Join process, Mi and Hj can sign a message µ with respect
to a basename bsn. We use a unique sub-session identifier ssid to allow multiple Sign sessions. Each
session has two phases, Sign request and Sign proceed.
Sign request: Upon input (SIGN,sid, ssid,Mi,bsn,µ), Hj produce the commitments of τi and τi
√
q using
the commitment scheme from Section 5.2.3) as
Cr +

0
τi
τi
√
q
 =

t0
t1
t2
 .
Define C1 and C2 to be the second and the third row of the matrix C in (5.5) (i.e. the rows corresponding
to the commitments of messages m1 and m2 in (5.6). Thus from the above equation we have τig =
[τi τi
√
q] with τi = t1 −C1r and √qτi = t2 −C2r, replacing τi and √qτi by their values corresponding
gives us the following equation
[h | (b1 + t1−C1 · r) | (b2 + t2−C2 · r) | −a]

s0
s1
s2
e
 = u, (5.31)
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where b = [b1 b2] and the vector s =

s0
s1
s2
 where s0 is multiplied with h, s1 is multiplied by b1 + t1−C1 · r
and s2 is multiplied by b2 + t2 −C2 · r. Since s1, s2 and r have small coefficients, then we may write
equation 5.31 as follows:
[h | (b1 + t1) | (b2 + t2) | −C1 | −C2 | −a]

s0
s1
s2
s3
s4
e

= u, (5.32)
with s3 = r · s1 and s4 = r · s2.
Thus we have the equation
P ·S −a · e = u, (5.33)
where P = [h | (b1 + t1) | (b2 + t2) | −C1 | −C2] and S =

s0
s1
s2
s3
s4

.
The host generates Π1, while Π2 is jointly generated by the host and the TPM and Π3,Π4 are done by the
TPM:
• Π1: This is a proof of knowledge of c¯ ∈ C¯, r¯ ∈ S r, such that c¯t1 opens to c¯τ¯i such that σ−1(τ¯i) =σ5(τ¯i) =
τ¯i, and c¯t2 opens to c¯
√
qτ¯i such that σ−1(
√
qτ¯i) = σ5(
√
qτ¯i) =
√
qτ¯i, using the proof in Figure 5.3.
• Π2: This is a proof of knowlege of c¯ and a small S¯ , e¯ satisfying P · S¯ − a · e¯ = c¯u, using the proof in
Figure 5.1.
• Π3: This is a proof of knowledge of c¯, e¯1 and e¯′ satifying c¯nym = de¯1 + e¯′, using the proof in Figure
5.1, and this proof shows that e¯1 used in the construction of c¯nym is the same as the first component of
e¯ used in Π2.
• Π4: This is a proof of knowledge of e˜1 and e˜′, satisfying de˜1 + e˜′ = 2nym , using the proof in Figure
5.2.
The host does the following parts proofs:
1. For Π1: The host samples y,y1,y2← Dk+2y and calculates the following:
• w0 := Ay
• w1 := σ−1−1(A)y1
• w2 := σ−15 (A)y2
• v1 := By−σ−1−1(B)y1
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• v2 := By−σ−15 (B)y2
• vL := LBy
2. For Π2, the host samples a small element Y h← D2k+6ξ1 , calculates wh = PY h.
3. ch = HC(w0|w1|w2|v1|v2|vL)
4. The host sends (sid, ssid,bsn,µ,ch,wh) to the TPM.
Upon recieving the above message, Mi does the following:
1. It asks Hj for a permission to proceed.
2. It makes sure to have a Join record (sid, jssid,e,Hj).
3. It generates a sign entry (sid, ssid,bsn,µ) in its record.
4. Finally it outputs (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid,bsn,µ).
Sign Proceed: When Mi gets permission to proceed for ssid, it proceeds as follows:
1. For Π2, the TPM generates a masking random polynomial yt = (y1,y2) ∈ S 2γ1−1, with coefficients less
than γ1, where γ1 is large enough so that the final signature doesn’t reveal the secret key (the signing
algorithm is zero-knowledge), yet γ1 is small enough so that the signature is not easily forged. The
TPM sets wt = a · yt.
2. The TPM calculates w = wh−wt.
3. Mi calculates the link token nym = de1 + e′, for some small random error polynomial e′ =
HR3 (skli,bsn) ∈ R3, and d = HRq (bsn).
4. For Π3,Mi calculates v = d ·y1. The polynomial v can be written in a canonical way as v = v1 ·2γ2 +v0,
where |v0| ≤ γ2; i.e. v1 = HighBits(v,2γ2).
5. The TPM computes c as a HC(w|v1|ch|µ).
6. The TPM creates its signature part for Π2 as zt = (zt1 ,zt2 ) = yt + ce.
7. The scheme uses the rejection sampling to avoid the dependency of zt on the secret key, the TPM
checks that all the coefficients of zt are less than γ1 −β. For correctness of the scheme, the signing is
also restarted if any coefficient of the low-order bits of (dzt1 − cnym) is greater than γ2−β.
8. For Π4, Mi calculates HCx (c) = (c1,c2, · · · ,c`)
9. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ `, Mi samples y(i,e1),y(i,e′)← Dy and calculates wi := dy(i,e1) + y(i,e′).
10. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ `, Mi calculates the signatures z(i,e1) := cie1 + y(i,e1) and z(i,e′) := cie′ + y(i,e′). If
rej(z(1,e1), . . . ,z(`,e1),c1e1, . . . ,c`e1) = 1, or rej(z(1,e′), . . . ,z(`,e′),c1e
′, . . . ,c`e′) = 1. Abort.
11. Mi sends (sid, ssid,bsn,µ,zt,z(i,e1),z(i,e′),wi,nym,c) to the host.
12. The host signature part is then computed as
• Zh = Y h + cS
• z0 := cr + y
• z1 := cσ−1−1(r) + y1
• z2 := cσ−15 (r) + y2
• If rej(Zh,z0,z1,z2,cS ,cr,cσ−1−1(r),cσ−15 (r)) = 1, Abort
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13. The host outputs:
(SIGNATURE,sid, ssid,zt,Zh,c,w,nym,w0,w1,w2,v1,v2,vL,z0,z1,z2,z(i,e1),z(i,e′),wi, tA, tB)
VERIFY: The verify algorithm allows anyone to check whether a signature σ on a message µ with
respect to a basename bsn is valid. Let KRL denotes a revocation list with all the rogue TPM’s secret
keys. Upon input (VERIFY,bsn,sid,σ,µ,KRL), the verifier proceeds as follows:
1. The verifier first checks if the signature was signed by a rogue TPM, i.e., ∀ e∗1 ∈ KRL , if ‖nym−de∗1‖∞ ≤
2, the verifier will abort. (Note that if the TPM belongs to KRL, then e′ may also extracted).
2. The verifier then computes v′1 to be the high order bits of dzt1 − cnym, accepts if all the coefficients of
zt1 are less than γ1−β. In particular we have
HightBits(dzt1 − c ·nym,2γ2) = HightBits(dyt1 ,2γ2),
since
• dzt1 − c ·nym = dyt1 − ce′,
• ‖LowBits(dyt1 − ce′,2γ2)‖∞ < γ2−β,
• ‖ce′‖∞ < β,
3. The verifier checks the following:
• Az = ctA + w0
• σ−1−1(A)z1 = cσ−1−1(tA) + w1
• σ−15 (A)z2 = cσ−15 (tA) + w2
• Bz−σ−1−1(B)z1 = c(tB−σ−1−1(tB)) + v1
• Bz−σ−15 (B)z2 = c(tB−σ−15 (tB)) + v2
• LBz = c(LtB−u) + vL
4. The verifier checks the following:
PZh−azt ?= cu + w
5. ch = HC(w0|w1|w2|v1|v2|vL)
6. Checks c ?= HC(w|v′1|ch|µ)
7. Calculates HCx (c) = (c1,c2, · · · ,c`)
8. ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `,
cinym + wi
?
= dz(i,e1) + z(i,e′)
9. If all checks pass, the verifier outputs (VERIFIED,sid,1), (VERIFIED,sid,0) otherwise.
LINK: The link algorithm allows anyone to check whether or not two signatures (σ,µ) and (σ′,µ′) gen-
erated for the same basename bsn were signed by the same TPM. Upon input (LINK,sid,σ,µ, σ′,µ′,bsn)
the verifier follows the following steps:
1. If any of the signatures are invalid, the verifier outputs ⊥.
2. Otherwise if ‖nym−nym′‖ is a short polynomail in Rq, the verifier outputs 1 (linked); otherwise 0 (not
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linked).
5.4 Security Proof
A Sketched Security Proof
In this section, we provide a sketch of the security proof, followed by the detailed security proof. During
the proof, we present a sequence of games based on Camenish et al. in [CDL16], and show that there
exists no environment E that can distinguish the real world protocol Π with an adversary A, from the
ideal world Fldaa with a simulator S. Starting with the real world protocol game, we change the protocol
game by game in a computationally indistinguishable way, finally ending with the ideal world protocol.
We will explain the sequence of games as follows:
Game 1: This is the real world protocol.
Game 2: An entity C is introduced, C receives all inputs from the honest parties and simulates the real
world protocol for them. This is equivilent to Game 1.
Game 3: We now split C into two parts, F and S, where F behaves as an ideal functionality, it receives
all the inputs and forwards them to S, who simulates the real world protocol for honest parties, and
sends the outputs to F. F then forwards the outputs to E. This game is simply Game 2 but with different
structure, so Game 3=Game 2.
Game 4: F now behaves differently in the setup interface, it stores the algorithms for the issuer I, F also
does checks and ensures that the structure of sid is correct for an honest I, and aborts if not. In case I is
corrupt, S extracts the secret key for I and proceeds in the setup interface on behalf of I. Clearly E will
notice no change, so Game 3=Game 4.
Game 5: F now performs the verification and linking checks instead of forwarding them to S. There
are no protocol messages and the outputs are excatly as in the real world protocol. However, the only
difference is that the verification algorithm that F uses doesn’t contain a revocation check, so F can
perform this check separately so the outcomes are equal, Game 4=Game 5.
Game 6: The join interface of F is now changed, F stores in it’s records the members that joined. If
I is honest, F stores the secret key tsk, extracted from S, for corrupt TPM’s. S always has enough
information to simulate the real world protocol except when the issuer is the only honest party. In this
case, S doesn’t know who initiated the join, so can’t make a join query with F on the host’s behalf.
Thus, to deal with this case, F can safely choose any corrupt host and put it into Member List ML, the
identities of hosts are only used to create signatures for platforms with an honest TPM or honest host, so
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fully corrupted platforms don’t matter. In the only case, when the TPM is already registered in Members
List ML, F may abort the protocol, but I has already tested this case before continuing with the query
JOINPROCEED, hence F will not abort. Thus in all cases, F and S can interact to simulate the real
world protocol, and Game 6=Game 5.
Game 7 (Simulating TPM wihout knowing the secret): In this game, F creates anonymous signatures for
honest platforms by running the algorithms defined in the setup interface. Let us start by defining Game
7.k.k′, in this game F handles the first k′ signing inputs of Mk, subsequent inputs are then forwarded to
S. For i < k, F handles all the signing queries withMi using algorithms. For i > k, F forwards all signing
queries with Mi to S who creates signatures as before. Now from the definition of Game 7.k.k′, we note
that Game 7.0.0=Game 6. For increasing k′, Game 7.k.k′ will be at some stage equal to Game 7.k + 1.0,
this is because there can only be a polynomial number of signing queries to be processed. Therefore, for
large enough k and k′, F handles all the signing queries of all TPM’s, and Game 7 is indistinguishable
from Game 7.k.k′.
We want to prove now that Game 7.k.k′ + 1 is indistinguishable from Game 7.k.k′. Suppose that there
exists an environment that can distinguish a signature of an honest party using tsk = e1 from a signature
using a different tsk′ = e′1, then the environment can solve the Decision Ring-LWE Problem.
The first j ≤ k′ signing queries on behalf of Mk are forwarded by F to S, which calls the real world
protocol. Now suppose that S is given tuples {(z jt = (z j1,z j2),z j(i,e1),z
j
(i,e′),w
j
i ,nym
j,c j,bsn j)}k′j=1, where z j1 =
y j1 +c
je1, nym j = H(bsn j)e1 +e′j for e
′
j = HR3 (skli,bsn
j) ∈R3, z j(i,e1) := c
j
i e1 +y
j
(i,e1)
and z j(i,e′j)
:= c ji e
′
j +y
j
(i,e′j)
where c ji = HCx (c
j).
The k′ + 1 query for Mk is {(z∗t = (z∗1,z∗2),z∗(i,e1),z∗(i,e′),w∗i ,nym∗,c∗,bsn∗)}, such that ‖z∗1‖∞ < γ1 − β. S
it is challenged to decide, if {(z∗t = (z∗1,z∗2),z∗(i,e1),z∗(i,e′),w∗i ,nym∗,c∗,bsn∗)} is chosen from a Ring LWE
distribution for some secret e1 or uniform random. S proceeds in simulating the TPM without knowing
the secret e1. S can answer all the H queries, as S is controlling FCRS. The issuer’s proof piI helps the
simulation of a TPM without knowing e1. Let u∗1 be randomly sampled from Zq[X]/〈Xd +1〉 and τ∗← Zq
not given before to any TPM. Since the issuer’s secret key R can be extracted from piI. Thus S can create
credential s∗ even with out knowing the TPM’s secret key and satifying the equation:
[h | b +τ∗g] · s∗ = u + u∗1 (5.34)
However, the commitments and all other host’s contributions on the signature are calculated as our de-
fined sign algorithm. Let w∗ = P∗ ·Z∗h − a · z∗t − c∗u and v∗1 = HighBits(d∗z∗1 − c∗nym∗ mod q), finally S
sest HC(v∗1|w∗|c∗h) = c∗, and w∗i = −c∗i nym∗+ d∗z∗(i,e1) + z∗(i,e′) where c∗i = HCx (c∗) and d∗ = H(bsn∗).
For i > k′ + 1, S outputs {(z jt = (z j1,z j2),z j(i,e j1)
,z j(i,e′j)
,w ji ,nym
j,c j,bsn j)} j>k′+1 for fresh e j1. It generates
nym j = H(bsn j)e j1 + e
′
j for a random e
′
j ← R3, keeping track all the generated nym j such that it
always output the same nym j for an associated bsn = bsn j, z j1 = y
j
1 + c
je j1, z
j
(i,e j1 )
:= c ji e
j
1 + y
j
(i,e j1)
and
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z j(i,e′j)
:= c ji e
′
j + y
j
(i,e′j)
where c ji = HCx (c
j). For each case, Mk can provide a simulated proofs. Any
distingisher between Game 7.k.k′ and Game 7.k.k′+ 1 can solve the Decision Ring-LWE Problem.
Game 8: F now no longer informs S about the message and the basename that are being signed. If the
whole platform is honest, then S can learn nothing about the message µ and the basename bsn. Instead,
S knows only the leakage l(µ,bsn). To simulate the real world, S chooses a pair (µ′,bsn′) such that
l(µ′,bsn′)=l(µ,bsn). Therefore Game 8=Game 7.
Game 9: If I is honest, then F now only allows the platform that joined to sign. An honest host will
always check whether it joined with a TPM in the real world protocol, so no difference for honest hosts.
Also an honest TPM only signs when it has joined with the host before. In the case that an honest Mi
performs a join protocol with a corrupt host Hj and honest issuer, the simulator will make a join query
with F, to ensure that Mi and Hj are in ML. Therefore Game 9=Game 8.
Game 10: When storing a new tsk, F checks CheckTtdHonest(tsk) = 1 or CheckTtdCorrupt(tsk) = 1.
We want to show that these checks will always pass. In fact, valid signatures always satisfy
nym = HRq (bsn) ·e1 +e′ where ‖e1‖∞,‖e′‖∞ ≤ 3. By the Unique Short Vector problem (SVP), there exists
only one secret (e1,e′) satisfying the nym construction. Thus, CheckTtdCorrupt(tsk) = 1 will always
give the correct output. Also due to large min-entropy of the uniform distribution the probability that
sampling a selected e1 is negligible, thus with overwhelming probability there doesn’t exist a signature
already using the same tsk = e1, which implies thatCheckTtdHonest(tsk) = 1 will always give the correct
output. Hence Game 10=Game 9.
Game 11: In this game F checks that honestly generated signatures are always valid. This is true as sig
algorithm always produces signatures passing through verification checks, also those signatures satisfy
identify(tsk,σ,µ,bsn) = 1 which is checked via nym. F also makes sure, using it’s internal records ML
and DomainKeys that honest users are not sharing the same secret key tsk. If there exists a key tsk = e1
in DomainKeys such that ‖nym−HRq (bsn)e1‖∞ ≤ 3, then this breaks the search Ring-LWE problem,
and hence Game 11=Game 10.
Game 12: Add Check (ix) to ensure that there are no multiple e values matching to one signature.
However, since there exists only one tuple (e1,e2) such that ‖e1‖∞ ≤ 3 and ‖e2‖∞ ≤ 3 , satisfying
u1 = a1e1 + a2e2, thus two different signatures can’t share the same e . If there exists two signatures
sharing the same e then this breakes the SIS problem, thus any valid signature should be identified to
one tsk. Thus Game 12=Game 11.
Game 13: To prevent accepting signatures that were issued by use of join credentials not issued by
honest issuer, F adds a further check Check (x). This is due to the unforgeability of our signature
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scheme adopted by the issuer to sign the TPM’s public key, the hardness is based on the Ring SIS Search
Problem, so we get Game 13=Game 12.
Game 14: Check (xi) is added to F, this would prevent anyone forging signatures using honest TPM’s
tsk and credential. In fact, if a valid signature is given on a message, that the TPM never signed, the
proof could not have been simulated. It extracts e1, and thus breaks the Ring-LWE problem. So Game
14=Game 13.
Game 15: Check (xii) is added to F, this ensures that honest TPMs are not being revoked. If an honest
TPM is simulated by means of the Ring-LWE problem instance, if a proper key KRL is found, it must be
the secret key of the target instance. This is again equivilant to solving the search Ring-LWE problem.
Game 16: All the remaing checks of the ideal functionality Fldaa that are related to link queries are
now included. Using the fact that if a tsk matches to one signature and not the other, Game 16 is in-
distinguishable from Game 15, and F now includes all the functionalities of Fldaa. This concludes the
proof.
Detailed Security Proof for the Compact Lattice based DAA Scheme
The detailed security proof is the same as the security proof of the LDAA scheme presented in Chapter
4. The only change is in Game 4 for the simulator S. Thus we only present game 4 for S in this chapter.
• KeyGen: Honest I: On input (SETUP, sid) from F
– Check sid = (I,sid′), output ⊥ to I if the check fails.
– Give “I” input (SETUP, sid).
– Upon receiving output (SETUPDONE, sid) from “I”, S takes its private key R.
– Define Sign(tsk,skliµ,bsn) as follows: Define SamplePre(h,b,u1,u,g, τi) that outputs a
signature s as satisfying
[h | b +τig] · s = u + u1,
with ‖s‖∞ < β, and τi is a fresh tag will be the DAA credential.
∗ r ← Dk+1r and C as defined in the commitment scheme in (5.5) such that:
Cr +

0
τi
τi
√
q
 =

t0
t1
t2
 .
∗ y,y1,y2← Dk+2y
∗ w0 := Ay
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∗ w1 := σ−1−1(A)y1
∗ w2 := σ−15 (A)y2
∗ v1 := By−σ−1−1(B)y1
∗ v2 := By−σ−15 (B)y2
∗ vL := LBy
∗ Y h← D2k+4ξ1
∗ wh = PY h.
∗ ch = HC(w0|w1|w2|v1|v2|vL)
∗ yt = (y1,y2) ∈ S 2γ1−1
∗ wt = a · yt
∗ w = wh−wt
∗ nym = de1 + e′, where e1 = tsk, e′ = HR3 (skli,bsn) ∈ R3, and d = HRq (bsn)
∗ v = d · y1, v = v1 ·2γ2 + v0
∗ c = HC(w|v1|ch|µ)
∗ zt = (zt1 ,zt2 ) = yt + ce
∗ Restart if any coefficient of the low-order bits of (dzt1 − cnym) is greater than γ2−β.
∗ Checks that all the coefficients of zt are less than γ1−β
∗ HCx (c) = (c1,c2, · · · ,c`)
∗ y(i,e1),y(i,e′)← Dy, set wi := dy(i,e1) + y(i,e′)
∗ z(i,e1) := cie1 + y(i,e1) and z(i,e′) := cie′+ y(i,e′).
∗ If rej(z(1,e1), . . . ,z(`,e1),c1e1, . . . ,c`e1) = 1,
or rej(z(1,e′), . . . ,z(`,e′),c1e′, . . . ,c`e′) = 1, Abort
∗ Zh = Y h + cS
∗ z0 := cr + y
∗ z1 := cσ−1−1(r) + y1
∗ z2 := cσ−15 (r) + y2
∗ If rej(Zh,z0,z1,z2,cS ,cr,cσ−1−1(r),cσ−15 (r)) = 1, Abort
∗ output:(SIGNATURE,sid, ssid,zt,Zh,c,w,nym,w0,w1,w2,v1,v2,vL,z0,
z1,z2,z(i,e1),z(i,e′),wi, tA, tB,u,L)
– Define ver(σ,µ,bsn) as follows:
∗ Az ?= ctA + w0
∗ σ−1−1(A)z1
?
= cσ−1−1(tA) + w1
∗ σ−15 (A)z2
?
= cσ−15 (tA) + w2
∗ Bz−σ−1−1(B)z1
?
= c(tB−σ−1−1(tB)) + v1
∗ Bz−σ−15 (B)z2
?
= c(tB−σ−15 (tB)) + v2
∗ LBz ?= c(LtB−u) + vL
∗
PZh−azt ?= cu + w
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∗ ch = HC(w0|w1|w2|v1|v2|vL)
∗ c ?= HC(w|v′1|ch|µ)
∗ HCx (c) = (c1,c2, · · · ,c`)
∗ ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ `,
cinym + wi
?
= dz(i,e1) + z(i,e′)
∗ If all checks pass, output (VERIFIED,sid,1), (VERIFIED,sid,0) otherwise.
– Define Link(σ,µ,bsn,σ′,µ′):
– If any of the signatures are invalid, the verifier outputs ⊥.
– Otherwise if ‖nym− nym′‖ is a short polynomail in Rq, the verifier outputs 1 (linked);
otherwise 0 (not linked).
– Define Identify(σ,µ,bsn, tsk) as follows: It parses σ as (nym,bsn) and checks that tsk ∈
R3, ver(σ,µ,bsn)=1 and ‖nym−d · tsk‖∞ ≤ 3. If so output 1, otherwise output 0.
– Define Kgen, take tsk ∈ R3 and output tsk.
– S sends (KEYS, sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify, Kgen) to F.
Corrupt I: S notices this setup as it notices I registering a public key with FCA with sid =
(I,sid′).
– If the registered key is in the form (b,piI) and piI is valid, then S extracts R from piI.
– S defines the algorithms Sign, Verify, Link, and Identify as before, but now depending on
the extracted key. S sends (SETUP, sid) to F on behalf of I. On input (KEYGEN, sid)
from F, S sends (KEYS, sid, Sign, Verify, Link, Identify, Kgen) to F.
– On input (SETUPDONE, sid) from F. S continues simulating “I”.
• JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY, LINK: Unchanged.
Figure 5.4: Game 4 for S
5.5 Comparison with the Existing lattice-based DAA Schemes
In our proposed scheme, the TPM’s secret key consists of two short polynomials in the ring Rq =
Zq[X]/(Xd + 1). In the LDAA scheme [KCB+19], the TPM’s secret key consists of m = 24 polyno-
mials, and there are 2m + 1 = 49 polynomials in [BK17]. The degree of our ring should be set to 4096
(as in [dPLS18]), whereas it’s possible that the degree of the ring in the other schemes could be 2048 or
1024. Still, our scheme should be faster in terms of the TPM’s computation costs in the join and sign
interfaces, and have smaller TPM keys and signature sizes.
In our proposed scheme, the signature consists of around 45 polynomials in Rq. Using the same values
of q ≈ 270 and d = 4096 as in [dPLS18] and also account for the fact that most polynomials in Rq have
coefficients smaller than q, a rough estimate for the size of the signatures is 2MB.
The LDAA signature includes c responses to the Fiat-Shamir challenges, where each response is com-
prised of approximately km(2`+2) polynomials provided by the host and k(m′+1) provided by the TPM.
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In [BK17], the size of the response for each round is bounded by km(2`+ 2) polynomials for both the
host and the TPM (where ` = 32,m′ = 24,k = 8,c = 8).
Even if the degree of the rings in [KCB+19] and [BK17] are 4× smaller (i.e. the ring dimension is 1024)
than in our scheme and the bit-length of the polynomial coefficients are also 4× smaller (the modulus q is
less than 218), the signature produced by our scheme is still more than two order of magnitudes shorter.
We should point out that this is still around 5 - 6 orders of magnitude longer than discrete logarithm based
DAA schemes (e.g. [CDL16, CCD+17]).
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Chapter 6
A Lattice based Enhanced Privacy ID (LEPID)
6.1 Introduction
The Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) scheme is a fundamental part of the security model underpinning
Software Guard Extensions (SGX)’s functioning [JSR+16]. It gives the ability to attest that a hardware
enclave was successfully established on an Intel platform.
EPID can be seen as Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) with different linkability require-
ments [BCC04]. The DAA scheme was built having the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) standard in
mind. In this context, the TPM holds a representation of the host machine state and wishes to pro-
vide a verifier with a signature of the state representation, without revealing their identity. During an
offline phase, an issuer provisions the TPM and the host with membership credentials. Based on this
cryptographic material, the TPM and the host jointly prove that they belong to the DAA community in
zero-knowledge while producing the above-mentioned signature. Unlike other privacy-preserving sys-
tems, like group signatures, DAA does not support the property of traceability, wherein a group manager
can identify the signer from a given signature.
The DAA provides two approaches to prevent a malicious signer from abusing their anonymity. Firstly,
when a private key is leaked, anyone can check whether a specific DAA signature was created under this
key or not. Secondly, two DAA signatures created by the same signer may or may not be linked from
a verifier’s point of view. The linkability is controlled by a parameter called basename. When the same
basename is used by the same signer for two signatures, they are linked; otherwise they are not. However,
there are situations where this model does not suffice to prevent malicious actions. For instance, should
an attacker corrupt a TPM and obtain the private-key without ever publishing it, there is no way to revoke
it.
EPID is a more general scheme than DAA and thus does not split signers into TPMs and hosts, but also
targets the creation of anonymous signatures. An EPID scheme consists of an issuer, signers, verifiers
and a revocation manager. Like with DAA, one can check whether a certain signature was generated
119
by a leaked private-key. Nonetheless, the ability to link signatures with the same basename is removed.
Instead, whenever a signer is corrupted, they may be revoked by including one of their signatures as part
of a revocation list. As a result, EPID is capable of revoking corrupted signers from the system, even
when their private-key is kept hidden, whilst providing maximum privacy for the platforms.
A post-quantum EPID scheme has been proposed in [BEF19] built on hash and pseudorandom functions.
More concretely, the EPID credential corresponds to a hash-based signature generated by the issuer, and
proofs-of-knowledge are constructed from the Multi-Party Computation (MPC) in the head technique
from Ishai et al. [IKOS07]. While [BEF19] achieves signature sizes in the order of MBs, execution
times are not considered. The main goal of this article is not to outperform [BEF19], but rather to ignite
research on lattice-based EPID partially propelled by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)’s effort on post-quantum cryptography standardisation [oST17]. By basing our construction on
lattices, future versions of EPID might leverage the research resulting from this standardisation process
to improve their efficiency. Moreover, since post-quantum cryptography is still in its infancy, it might be
useful for implementers to consider multiple security assumptions, to mitigate the effects of cryptanalysis
against one of them.
Lattices have proven to be a flexible tool in constructing cryptographic schemes, with applications rang-
ing from digital signatures to public-key encryption and zero-knowledge proofs, while offering post-
quantum security [Lyu08b, BDOP16, BCK+14]. One expects that as this type of cryptography ma-
tures, an increasing number of platforms exploiting EPID ship with accelerators for lattice-based con-
structs [NDBC18]. Herein, by building from a recently proposed DAA scheme [KCB+19], the range
of cryptographic constructs supported by lattice-based cryptography is extended to EPID [EKFM+20].
Compared to the state-of-the-art Lattice-based DAA (LDAA), the storage requirements of the signer are
reduced 1.5 times. Furthermore, experimental results show that the signing and verification operations
are accelerated up to 1.4 and 1.1 times, respectively. Finally, the signature size compares favourably to
LDAA for small and medium-sized communities.
Chapter organisation: The next section introduces the lattice-based hard problems and the two building
blocks that support the proposed LEPID scheme, namely the LDAA scheme from [KCB+19] and the
Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPoK) of Ring-Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) secrets from
[BCK+14]. Section 6.3 presents a new security model for EPID in the UC framework. The novel LEPID
scheme is proposed in Section 6.4 and proven secure in Section 6.5. Experimental comparison with
related art is presented in Section 6.6. The performance of the LEPID scheme is discussed in Section 6.7.
6.2 Preliminaries
We recall the following hard problems from Chapter 2, the LDAA scheme discussed in Chapter 4 and
the Zero-knowledge proofs from Chapter 5.
Definition 2 (The Ring Short Integer Solution Problem (Ring-SISn,m,q,β) [P+16]). Given m uniformly
random elements ai ∈ Rq defining a vector Aˆ = (a1,a2, . . . ,am), find a nonzero vector of polynomials
Zˆ ∈Rmq of norm ‖Zˆ‖∞ ≤ β such that: fAˆ(Zˆ) =
∑
i∈[m] aizi = 0 ∈Rq. The Ring Inhomogeneous Short Integer
Solution (Ring-ISISn,m,q,β) problem asks to find Zˆ of norm ‖Zˆ‖∞ ≤ β, and such that: fAˆ(Zˆ) = y ∈ Rq for
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some random polynomial y.
Definition 3 (The Ring Learning With Error Problem (Ring-LWE) [Reg10]). Let χ be an error distri-
bution defined over R and s ← Rq a uniformly random ring element, the Ring-LWE distribution As,χ
over Rq ×Rq is sampled by choosing a ∈ Rq uniformly at random, randomly choosing the noise e ← χ
and outputting (a,b) = (a, sa + e mod q) ∈ Rq×Rq. Let u be uniformly sampled from Rq. The decision
problem of Ring-LWE asks to distinguish between (a,b)← As,χ and (a,u) for a uniformly sampled secret
s←Rq. The search Ring-LWE problem asks to return the secret vector s ∈Rq given a Ring-LWE sample
(a,b)← As,χ.
6.2.1 Lattice-based Direct Anonymous Attestation
The DAA scheme proposed in [KCB+19] can be split at a high level into three parts. In a first part, a
TPM-host pair with identifier id= (id1, ..., id`) ∈ {0,1}` joins a DAA community. This consists of the TPM
sampling small Xˆt = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rmq , and sending ut = AˆtXˆt to the issuer, where Aˆt ∈ Rmq is part of the
issuer’s public key. A signature proof of knowledge based on [LNSW13], showing that u is well-formed
is also sent, along with a link token that prevents two TPMs from having the same secret-key. Using
its private key, the issuer then samples small Xˆh = (xm+1, . . . , x3m) ∈ R2mq such that AˆhXˆh = u − ut, where
Aˆh = [AˆI|Aˆ0 +∑li=1 idiAˆi] ∈ R2mq , and u ∈ Rq, AˆI ∈ Rmq and Aˆi ∈ Rmq ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , l} are part of the issuer’s
public key. The vector Xˆh is sent back to the host. After this process, the TPM and host own small
key-shares satisfying
[Xt |Xh][Aˆt |Aˆh] = u, (6.1)
In the second part, the TPM and the host jointly generate a signature with respect to a message µ. The
signature corresponds to a tuple (nym,bsn,pi), where nym is a link token, bsn is the basename and pi is a
signature-based proof:
pi = SPK
{
public := {pp,nym,bsn},witness := {Xˆ = (x1, . . . , x3m), id, e} :
u = Xˆ[Aˆt |Aˆh] mod q ∧ ‖Xˆ‖∞ ≤ β ∧ nym =H(bsn)x1 + e mod q ∧ ‖e‖∞ ≤ β
}
(µ)
demonstrating not only (6.1) but also that nym = H(bsn)x1 + e mod q, where H is a random oracle
mapping bsn to a polynomial and e is small.
A final part deals with signature verification. First, pi is verified. Then, the verifier iterates over the list
of revoked private-keys, consisting of the elements x(i)1 of the Xˆ
(i)
t in (6.1) of the corrupt signers. In the
case that ‖nym−H(bsn)x(i)1 ‖∞ is small, the signature has been generated by the i-th revoked user and is
rejected. Similarly, two signatures (nym,bsn,pi) and (nym′,bsn,pi′) having the same basename are linked
when ‖nym−nym′‖∞ is small.
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6.2.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of the Ring-LWE Secrets
The technique presented in [BCK+14] will herein be used to modify the LDAA and support the more
effective revocation method of EPID. This technique allows one to efficiently prove in zero-knowledge
possession of s and e, with 2s and 2e being short, such that 2y = 2as + 2e, for public a and y. Random
r s,re←Ds are initially produced, and t = ar s + re is computed. A challenge c = H(t) ∈ {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}
is generated and ss = r s + Xcs, se = re + Xce are outputted in response with probability P(ss, se), where
P is chosen in a way that prevents ss and se from depending on the prover’s secret inputs.
6.3 UC based Security Model for EPID
The security model for the DAA given by Camenisch et al. in [CDL16] has been modified by replac-
ing linkability with a revocation interface, adding the signature revocation check from [CCD+17], and
introducing other modifications to meet the security requirements of EPID. The security definition is
given in the Universal Composability (UC) model with respect to an ideal functionality FlEPID. In UC, an
environment E should not be able to distinguish with a non-negligible probability between two worlds:
the real world, where each party in the EPID protocol Π executes its assigned part of the protocol and
the network is controlled by an adversary A that communicates with E; and the ideal world, in which
all parties forward their inputs to FlEPID, which internally performs all the required tasks and creates the
party’s outputs. A protocol Π is said to securely realise FlEPID if, for every adversary A performing an
attack in the real world, there is an ideal world adversary S that performs the same attack in the ideal
world.
An EPID scheme should satisfy: i) unforgeability, i.e. for honest issuer and signers, no adversary can
output a valid signature on a message µ without knowing the signer’s secret key; ii) correctness, i.e.
honestly generated signatures are always valid, and iii) anonymity, i.e. even for a corrupt issuer, no
adversary can tell whether two honestly generated signatures were produced by the same signer.
The ideal interfaces of FlEPID are described below. The UC framework allows us to focus on the analysis
of a single protocol instance with a globally unique session identifier sid. FlEPID uses session identifiers
of the form sid = (I,sid′) for some issuer I and a unique string sid′. In the procedures, functions
CheckTtdHonest and CheckTtdCorrupt are used that return ‘1’ when a key belongs to an honest signer
that has produced no signature, and when a key belongs to a corrupt user such that there is no signature
simultaneously linking back to the inputted key and another one, respectively; and return ‘0’ otherwise.
We label the checks that are done by the ideal functionality in roman numerals.
FlEPID Setup: On input (SETUP,sid) from the issuer I, F
l
EPID verifies that (I,sid
′) = sid and outputs
(SETUP,sid) to S. FlEPID receives from the simulator S the algorithms Kgen, sig, ver, identify and revoke.
These algorithms are responsible for generating keys for honest signers, creating signatures for honest
signers, verifying the validity of signatures, checking whether a signature was generated by a given key,
and updating the revocation lists respectively. FlEPID stores the algorithms, checks that the algorithms ver,
identify and revoke are deterministic [Check-I], and outputs (SETUPDONE,sid) to I.
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FlEPID Join:
1. JOIN REQUEST: On input (JOIN,sid, jsid) from a signerMi, create a join session 〈 jsid,Mi, request〉.
Output (JOINSTART,sid, jsid,Mi) to S.
2. JOIN REQUEST DELIVERY: Proceed upon receiving delivery notification from S by updating the
session record to 〈 jsid,Mi,delivery〉.
• If I or Mi is honest and 〈Mi,∗,∗〉 is already in Member List ML, output ⊥ [Check II].
• Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
3. JOIN PROCEED: Upon receiving an approval from I, FlEPID updates the session record to
〈 jsid,sid,Mi,complete〉. Then it outputs (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) to S.
4. KEY GENERATION: On input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, tsk) from S.
• If the signer is honest, set tsk = ⊥, else verify that the provided tsk is eligible by performing the
following two checks that are described above:
– CheckTtdHonest(tsk)=1 [Check III].
– CheckTtdCorrupt(tsk)=1 [Check IV].
• Insert 〈Mi, tsk〉 into ML, and output JOINED.
FlEPID Sign:
1. SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN,sid, ssid,Mi,µ, p) from the signer on a message µ with respect to
p, the ideal functionality aborts if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists in ML, else creates a sign
session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉 and outputs (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ, p)) to S.
2. SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART,sid, ssid) from S, update the session to
〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉, and output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid, µ, p) to Mi.
3. SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi, FlEPID updates the records
〈ssid,Mi,µ, p,delivered〉, and outputs (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,KRL,SRL) to S, where KRL and
SRL represent the key and the signature revocation lists respectively.
4. SIGNATURE GENERATION: On input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ,KRL,SRL) from S, if Mi is
honest then FlEPID will:
• Ignore an adversary’s signature σ, and generate the signature for a fresh or established tsk.
• Check CheckTtdHonest(tsk)=1 [Check V], and store 〈Mi, tsk〉 in DomainKeys.
• Generate the signature σ← sig(tsk,µ, p).
• Check ver(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL)=1 [Check VI], and check identify(σ,µ, p, tsk) = 1 [Check VII].
• Check that there is no signer other thanMi with key tsk′ registered in Members or DomainKeys such
that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk′)=1 [Check VIII].
• For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
– Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
– Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
• If Mi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid, σ,KRL,SRL).
FlEPID Verify: On input (VERIFY,sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL), from a party V to check whether σ is a valid
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signature on a message µ with respect to p, KRL and SRL, the ideal functionality does the following:
• Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and ML, for which identify(σ, µ, p, tski)=1. Set b = 0
if any of the following holds:
– More than one key tski was found [Check IX].
– I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found [Check X].
– An honest Mi was found, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi, p〉 was found in Signed [Check XI].
– There is a key tsk∗ ∈ KRL, such that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗)=1 and no pair (tsk,Mi) for an honest Mi
was found [Check XII].
– For some matching tski and (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗, tski) = 1
• If b , 0, set b←ver(σ,µ, p,SRL,KRL). [Check XIII]
• Add 〈σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL,b〉 to VerResults, and output (VERIFIED, sid,b) to V.
FlEPID Revoke : On input (tsk
∗,KRL) or/and (σ∗,µ∗,SRL), the ideal functionality updates the revoca-
tion lists using the revoke algorithm as follows: KRL∪ tsk∗ ← revoke(tsk∗,KRL), or/and SRL∪σ∗ ←
revoke(σ∗,µ∗,SRL).
6.4 The Proposed LEPID Scheme
The DAA scheme proposed in [KCB+19] and presented in Chapter 4 is herein modified so as to support
the security model described in Section 6.3. We give a general overview of the proposed Lattice-based
EPID (LEPID) scheme in Section 6.4.1 before proceeding with the details in Section 6.4.2.
6.4.1 High-Level Description of the LEPID Scheme
The first part of the DAA protocol described in Section 6.2.1 is herein mirrored, with the exception
that the TPM and the host are fused into a single signer. In particular, the issuer makes one further
polynomial b available in Procedure 8. When requesting to join a DAA community in Procedure 9, the
signer with identifier id = (id1, ..., id`) ∈ {0,1}` samples a small Xˆt = (x1, . . . , xm+1) ∈ Rm+1q and sends ut =
[b|AˆI]Xˆt mod q to the issuer, along with a link token nymI =H(bsnI)x1 +eI and a zero-knowledge proof
piut [KCB
+19] showing that ut is well-formed. Upon receiving this message, the issuer uses nymI to check
that no other signer has the same x1, verifies piut and samples small Xˆh = [Xˆh1 |Xˆh2 ] = (y2, . . . ,y2m+1) ∈
Rmq ×Rmq such that AˆhXˆh = u − ut mod q, with Aˆh = [AˆI|Aˆ0 +
∑l
i=1 idiAˆi] ∈ R2mq . Xˆh is sent back to the
signer, that updates their key as Xˆ = (x1,∀i=(2,...,m+1)xi := xi + yi,∀i=(m+2,...,2m+1)xi := yi) in Procedure 10.
Signatures are generated in Procedures 11 and 12 as in Section 6.2.1 for the DAA, but the basename
is always chosen at random, generating link tokens nym = px1 + e mod q for a uniformly random p,
and the proof-of-knowledge pi is as described in Section 6.4.2. In particular, this allows one to main-
tain linkability in the case of leaked private-keys, whilst maintaining full anonymity. In addition, when
signing a message, the signer is presented with a list of signatures from revoked users and proves in
zero-knowledge that their underlying x1 was not used to produce any of those signatures. We achieve
this by firstly randomising the (nym∗i = p
∗
i f i + li, p
∗
i ) pairs from the list of revoked signatures, where f i
corresponds to the x1 polynomial of the i-th revoked user and li has small norm, as
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d i = nym∗i qi + l
′′′
i (6.2)
oi = p∗i qi + l
′
i (6.3)
for small qi, l
′′′
i and l
′
i sampled from a Gaussian distribution. Note that d i = oi f i + ei for a small ei.
The signature includes not only d i and oi, but also ki = oix1 + l
′′
i along with a zero-knowledge proof of
the construction of d i, oi and ki. This zero-knowledge proof is an adaptation of the one described in
section 6.2.2, the details of which can be found in section 6.4.2.
Signature verification in Procedure 13 is similar to that of the DAA, with the difference that now the
proof of the shape of d i, oi and ki is verified, and the norm of d i − ki is assessed to ascertain whether the
x1 used to produce the signature under verification is the same as the one used to produce the i-th revoked
signature. Finally, the community revocation manager may revoke users by updating the list of revoked
private-keys (KRL) or the list of signatures of revoked users (SRL) using Procedure 14.
6.4.2 Detailed Description of the LEPID Scheme
We now present our LEPID scheme in detail. We start by recalling some standard functionalities that are
used in the UC model of the DAA [CDL16]:
• FCA is a common certificate authority functionality that is available to all parties.
• FCRS is a common reference string functionality that provides participants with all system parameters.
• F∗auth is a special authenticated communication functionality that provides an authenticated channel
between the issuer and the signer.
The LEPID scheme includes the Setup, Join, Sign, Verify and Revoke procedures that are as follows.
Procedure 8 (Setup). FCRS creates the system parameters: sp = (λ, t, q, n, m, Rq, β, `, r, s, ξ), where λ, t
are positive integer security parameters, β is a positive real number such that β < q, ` is the length of the
users’ identifiers, and r, s and ξ represent standard deviations of Gaussian distributions.
Upon input (SETUP,sid), where sid is a unique session identifier, the issuer first checks that sid = (I,sid′)
for some sid′, then creates its key pair. The Issuer’s public key is pp = (sp,b, AˆI, Aˆ0, Aˆ1, ..., Aˆ`, u,
H0,H,H), where AˆI, Aˆi(i = 0,1, ..., `) ∈ Rmq , b,u ∈ Rq, H0 : {0,1}∗ → {1,2,3}t, H : {0,1}∗ → Rq, and
H : {0,1}∗→{0,1,2, . . .2n−1}. The Issuer’s private key is TˆI, which is the trapdoor of AˆI with ‖TˆI‖∞ ≤ β.
The issuer initialises the Member List ML←∅. The issuer proves that his secret key is well formed in piI,
and registers the key (TˆI,piI) with FCA and outputs (SETUPDONE,sid).
Procedure 9 (Join Request). On input query (JOIN,sid, jsid,M), the signerM forwards (JOIN,sid, jsid)
to I, who replies by sending (sid, jsid,ρ,bsnI) back to the signer, where ρ is a uniform random nonce
ρ← {0,1}λ, and bsnI is the issuer’s base name. The signer M proceeds as follows:
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1. It checks that no such entry exists in its storage.
2. It samples a private key: x1←Ds and (x2, . . . , xm+1)←Dmr . Let Xˆt = (x1, . . . , xm+1) correspond to M’s
secret key with the condition ‖(x2, . . . , xm+1)‖∞ ≤ β/2 and ‖x1‖∞ ≤ β. M stores its key as (sid, Xˆt),
and computes the corresponding public key ut = [b|AˆI]Xˆt mod q, a link token nymI =H(bsnI)x1 +eI
mod q for some error eI←Ds such that ‖eI‖∞ ≤ β, and generates a signature based proof:
piut = SPK
{
public := {pp,ut,bsnI,nymI},witness := {Xˆt = (x1, . . . , xm+1),eI}
ut = [b|AˆI]Xˆt mod q∧ ‖Xˆt/x1‖∞ ≤ β/2 ∧‖x1‖ ≤ β
∧nymI =H(bsnI)x1 + eI mod q ∧ ‖eI‖∞ ≤ β
}
(ρ).
3. It sends (nymI,ut,piut ) to the issuer by giving F
∗
auth an input (SEND, nymI, piut , sid, jsid).
I, upon receiving (SENT,nymI,piut ,sid, jsid,M) from F
∗
auth, verifies the proof piut and makes
sure that the signer M < ML. I stores ( jsid,nymI,piut ,M), and generates the message
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid, id,piut ), for some identity id ∈ {0,1}` assigned to M, and not used before by
any joined member.
Procedure 10 (Join Proceed). If the signer chooses to proceed with the Join session, the message
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) is sent to the issuer, who performs as follows:
1. It checks the record ( jsid,nymI, id,M,piut ). For all nym
′
I
from the previous Join records, the issuer
checks whether ‖nymI −nym′I‖∞ ≤ 2β holds; if yes, the issuer further checks if ut = u′t . If the equality
ut = u′t holds, the issuer will jump to Step 4 returning Xˆh = Xˆ′h, if not the issuer will abort. Note that
this double check will make sure that no two EPID keys will include the same x1 value.
2. For all nym∗
I
in the Issuer’s Revocation record IR, the issuer checks whether the equation
‖nymI−nym∗I‖∞ ≤ 2β
holds, if yes the issuer aborts.
3. It calculates the vector of polynomials Aˆh = [AˆI|Aˆ0 +∑`i=1 idiAˆi] ∈ R2mq .
4. It samples, using the issuer’s private key TˆI, a preimage Xˆh = [Xˆh1 |Xˆh2 ] = (y2, ..., y2m+1) ∈Dmr ×Dms of
u−ut such that Aˆh · Xˆh = uh = u−ut mod q and ‖Xˆh1‖∞ ≤ β/2 and ‖Xˆh2‖∞ ≤ β.
5. The issuer adds (nymI, id,M,piut ) to his data base, and sends (sid, jsid, Xˆh) to M via F
∗
auth.
When M receives the message (sid, jsid, Xˆh), it checks that the equations AˆhXˆh = uh mod q and u =
ut +uh are satisfied with ‖Xˆh1‖∞ ≤ β/2 and ‖Xˆh2‖∞ ≤ β. It stores (sid,M, id, Xˆh,ut) and outputs (JOINED,
sid, jsid). M then computes Xˆ = (x1, ∀i=(2,...,m+1) xi := xi + yi, ∀i=(m+2,...,2m+1) xi := yi), where ‖Xˆ‖∞ ≤ β.
Procedure 11 (Sign Request). Upon input (SIGN,sid, ssid,M,µ), the signer does the following:
1. It makes sure to have a Join record (sid, id, Xˆ,M).
2. It generates a sign entry (sid, ssid,µ) in its record.
3. Finally, it outputs (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid,µ).
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Procedure 12 (Sign Proceed). When M gets permission to proceed for ssid, the signer proceeds as
follows:
1. It retrieves the records (sid, id,piut ) and (sid, ssid,µ).
2. M samples a random polynomial p and computes the polynomial nym = px1 + e mod q, for an error
term e←Ds such that ‖e‖∞ ≤ β. M then generates a signature based knowledge proof pi.
pi = SPK
{
public := {pp,nym, p},
witness := {Xˆ = (x1, ..., x2m+1), id,e} :
[b|Aˆh]Xˆ = u ∧ ‖Xˆ‖∞ ≤ β ∧ nym = px1 + e ∧ ‖e‖∞ ≤ β
}
(µ).
3. The signer proves that it is not using any of the keys that produced a revoked signature (σ∗i , p
∗
i ,nym
∗
i )
in the signature revocation list.
• Let nym∗i = p∗i f i + li, where ( f i, li) were used before to create nym∗i by some Mi∗ that generated a
revoked signature σ∗i ∈ SRL. M proceeds as follows:
– qi, l
′
i , l
′′
i , l
′′′
i ←Ds
– oi = p∗i qi + l
′
i , ki = oix1 + l
′′
i , d i = nym
∗
i qi + l
′′′
i
– r x1 ,re,rqi ,r l′i ,r l′′i ,r l′′′i ←Ds
– tnym = pr x1 + re, toi = p
∗
i rqi + r l′i ,
tki = oir x1 + r l′′i , tdi = nym
∗
i rqi + r l′′′i .
• Calculates the challenge cv = H(tnym|toi |tki |tdi |µ) ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,2n−1}.
• The following responses are computed:
– sx1 = r x1 + X
cv x1, se = re + Xcve, sqi = rqi + X
cvqi,
sl′i = r l′i + X
cv l′i , sl′′i = r l′′i + X
cv l′′i , sl′′′i = r l′′′i + X
cv l′′′i .
Abort if any of these rejection samples outputs 1:
– rej(sx1 ,X
cv x1, ξ), rej(se,Xcve, ξ), rej(sqi ,X
cvqi, ξ),
rej(sl′i ,X
cv l′i , ξ), rej(sl′′i ,X
cv l′′i , ξ) or rej(sl′′′i ,X
cv l′′′i , ξ).
4. Finally, M outputs σ = (pi,nym,oi,ki,d i, sx1 , se, sqi , sl′i , sl′′i , sl′′′i ,cv,KRL,SRL).
Procedure 13 (Verify). Let KRL denotes the revocation list with all the rogue signer’s secret keys x∗1.
Upon input (VERIFY,sid,σ,µ,KRL,SRL), the verifier proceeds as follows:
1. It checks the zero-knowledge proof regarding the statement: {[b| Aˆh] Xˆ = u ∧ ‖ Xˆ‖∞ ≤ β ∧ nym = p x1
+ e mod q ∧ ‖ e ‖∞ ≤ β }
2. For all x∗1 ∈ KRL, if ‖px∗1−nym‖∞ ≤ β the verifier outputs 0.
3. For all σ∗i = (pinym∗i ,nym
∗
i , p
∗
i ) ∈ SRL, the verifier
(a) computes:
• t′ki=oisx1 + sl′′i −Xcvki, t′di=nym∗i sqi + sl′′′i −Xcv d i,
t′oi=p∗i sqi + sl′i −Xcvoi, t′nym=psx1 + se−Xcv nym.
(b) checks cv
?
= H(t′nym|t′oi |t′ki |t′di |µ) and that all the following norms satisfy ‖sx1‖∞,
‖se‖∞,‖sqi‖∞,‖sl′i ‖∞,‖sl′′i ‖∞,‖sl′′′i ‖∞ ≤ β+
√
nβ.
4. For all σ∗i = (pinym∗i ,nym
∗
i , p
∗
i ), the verifier checks 2‖d i − ki‖ < Γ, where Γ is a function of β. If 2‖d i −
ki‖ < Γ the verifier outputs 0, otherwise 1.
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Procedure 14 (Revoke). On input (Revoke, sid, x∗1,KRL) or (Revoke, sid,σ
∗,µ∗, SRL), the revocation
manager adds x∗1 to KRL or σ
∗ to SRL after verifying σ∗.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs for the LEPID Scheme
The details of pi Now we explain the details of how to compute pi. Let k = blogβc + 1 and
let {β1, ...,βk} ∈ {0,1}k be the binary representation of β. Since we are operating in the ring
Rq = Zq[X]/〈Xn + 1〉 with n = O(λ), then we can transform any linear transformation into a ma-
trix vector product. We construct the matrices A¯i = rot(ai) for i = (1,2, ..., (`+2)m+1) for all polynomials
ai in b, AˆI , Aˆ0, ..., Aˆ` respectively.
Let’s consider the following extensions:
• id = {id1, ..., id`} ∈ {0,1}` is extended to id∗ ∈ B2` which is the set of vectors in {0,1}2` of hamming
weight `.
• A¯∗i = [A¯i|0 ∈ Zn×2n] for i = 1 to i = (2 + `)m + 1.
We apply the techniques of decomposition and extension described in [LNSW13] on each of the vectors
of Xˆ and the vector e, to get the vectors:
{e j}kj=1, {x j1}kj=1, {x j2}kj=1, . . . , {x j2m+1}kj=1 ∈ B3n.
Let A¯∗i+( j+1)m+1 = 0 for j > `, and let x(1+i)m+ j = id
∗xm+1+ j for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2` and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and xi = 0 ∈ Zn
for 2m + 1 < i ≤ (2 + 2`)m + 1. Then,
u = [b|Aˆh]Xˆ = [b|AˆI|Aˆ0 +
∑`
i=1
idiAˆi]Xˆ
=
2m+1∑
i=1
A¯ixi +
∑`
j=1
id j
m∑
i=1
A¯i+( j+1)m+1xi+m+1
=
2m+1∑
i=1
A¯∗i
 k∑
d=1
βd xdi
+ 2∑`
j=1
id∗j
m∑
i=1
A¯∗i+( j+1)m+1
 k∑
d=1
βd xdi+m+1

Before proceeding with the proof, the prover:
1. Samples the following masking vectors: {r je← Z3nq }kj=1, {r ji ← Z3nq }kj=1 for i ∈ [2(1+`)m+1] and j ∈ [k],
and r id∗ ← Z2`q .
2. Defines the following terms: D = [rot(p)|0] ∈ Zn×3nq , v ji = x ji + r ji , v je = e j + r je , and vid∗ = id∗+ r id∗ .
Note that the above selection needs to satisfy the following equation:
u +
2(1+`)m+1∑
i=1
A¯∗i
 k∑
j=1
β jr
j
i
 = 2(1+`)m+1∑
i=1
A¯∗i
 k∑
j=1
β jv
j
i

3. Samples the permutations as follows: τ← S2` for id∗, {φ j ← S3n}kj=1 for Xˆ1, {ψ j ← S3n}kj=1 for Xˆ2,
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where Xˆ = [Xˆ1 ∈ Rm+1q |Xˆ2 ∈ Rmq ],
Now, we are ready to explain the result.
To create pi, M first generates the commitments CMT = (C1,C2,C3) where:
• C1 = COM(∑m+1i=1 A¯∗i (∑kj=1 β jr ji ) +∑2(1+`)m+1i=m+2 A¯∗i (∑kj=1 β jr ji ),D(∑kj=1 β jr j1)
+[I |0](∑kj=1 β jr je), τ, {φ j}kj=1, {ψ j}kj=1, {ϕ j}kj=1).
• C2 = COM({φ j(r j1), . . . ,φ j(r jm+1),ψ j(r jm+2), . . . ,ψ j(r j2m+1), ψ j(r j(τ(1)+1)m+2),
. . . ,ψ j(r
j
(τ(1)+2)m+1), . . . ψ j(r
j
(τ(2`)+1)m+2), . . . , ψ j(r
j
(τ(2`)+2)m+1)}kj=1,
{ϕ j(r je)}kj=1, τ(r id∗ )).
• C3 = COM({φ j(v j1), · · · ,φ j(v jm+1),ψ j(v jm+2), . . . ,ψ j(v j2m+1), ψ j(v j(τ(1)+1)m+2),
. . .ψ j(v
j
(τ(1)+2)m+1), . . . ,ψ j(v
j
(τ(2`)+1)m+2), . . . ,ψ j(v
j
(τ(2`)+2)m+1)}kj=1,
{ϕ j(v je)}kj=1, τ(vid∗ )).
The following step is the Fiat-Shamir transformation, which has been used in the existing DAA schemes.
The only difference is that the hash-function output is used as a random distribution of {1,2,3}t.
Challenge: The prover generates the challenges using Fiat-Shamir’s hash-function transformation, which
is based on a random oracle, which should only include CMT :
{CH j}tj=1 =H0(µ, {CMT j}tj=1,pp) = {1,2,3}t.
Response: For each challenge, M sends its own response to to the verifier. The resulting responses are
treated as follows:
• CH = 1 : reveal C2 and C3, i.e., output all the permuted τ(id∗), τ(r id∗ ),
{φ j(x ji )}kj=1, {ψ j(x ji )}kj=1, {ϕ j(e j)}kj=1, {ϕ j(r je)}kj=1, {φ j(r ji )}kj=1,
{ψ j(r ji )}kj=1.
• CH = 2 : reveal C1 and C3, i.e., output all the permutations τ, {φ j}kj=1,
{ψ j}kj=1, {ϕ j}kj=1, and all the v values.
• CH = 3 : reveal C1 and C2, i.e., output all the permutations τ, {φ j}kj=1,
{ψ j}kj=1, {ϕ j}kj=1, and all the r values.
Verification: Depending on the prover’s inputs, the verifier can always check 2 out 3 commitments. Note
that the responses to all 3 commitments allows to deduce the witness.
Signature Proof of knowledge piki
The proofs piki , pidi , and pioi allow the prover to efficiently demonstrate knowledge of small secrets
2qi,2l
′
i ,2l
′′
i ,2l
′′′
i ←Ds′ such that:
• 2oi = 2p∗i qi + 2l′i
• 2ki = 2oix1 + 2l′′i
129
• 2d i = 2nym∗i qi + 2l′′′i
We now explain in detail the proof piki and show its properties: completeness, honest-verifier zero-
knowledge and special soundness.
The following lemma shows that there is always a subset of polynomials in the ring Rq that are invertible
such that their inverses have only small coefficients.
Lemma 9. [BCK+14] Let 0 < i, j < 2n−1, then the polynomial 2(Xi −X j)−1 has infinity norm at most 1
over the ring Rq.
Let ki = oix1 + l′′i , where x1 and l
′′
i are chosen from Ds and play the roles of the LWE-secrets. Our
scheme convinces the verifier that the signer knows some secret x¯1 and a random polynomial ¯l′′i with
norms larger than β such that c¯vki = oi x¯1 + ¯l′′i . However c¯v ∈ C¯ is unknown to the verifier. On the other
hand, to check that σ is not in SRL we need to measure the exact distance between the kis and d is, thus
the verifier has to know c¯v. Therefore, we need the signer M to construct a proof that allows a verifier to
check the distance even without knowing c¯v. We adopt the ZKP from [BCK+14] to let the signer prove
that it knows small secrets x¯1 and ¯l′′i with norms greater then β that satisfy the equation 2ki = 2oi x¯1 +2 ¯l
′′
i ,
i.e. the verifier ensures that the prover knows short secrets for twice ki (same proof for d i,oi applies).
Proof. We prove now that our modified SPK satisfies completeness, honest verifier zero-knowledge and
special soundness:
Lemma 10. [Lyu08b]: Let a and b be two polynomials in Zq/(Xn + 1). If a polynomial b is chosen
randomly with mean 0, then with high probability ‖ab‖∞ ≈ √n‖a‖∞‖b‖∞.
• Completeness: In fact, the verifier can always verify the equation since:
Xcvki + tki
= Xcv (oix1 + l′′i ) + oir x1 + r l′′i
= Xcv (oix1 + l′′i ) + oi(sx1 − xcv x1) + sl′′i − xcv l
′′
i
= oisx1 + sl′′i
For the norms we have that ‖sx1‖∞ ≈ β+
√
nβ with overwhelming probability using lemma 10, and the
same applies for ‖sl′′i ‖∞.
• Honest verifier zero-knowledge: Given a challenge cv, a simulator S proceeds as follows: chooses sx1
and sl′′i randomly from Ds′ , computes tki = oisx1 + sl′′i −Xcvki. Finally S outputs (cv, tki ,ki, sx1 , sl′′i ). If
no abort occurs, then the distribution of (sx1 , sl′′i ) does not depend on (x1, l
′′
i ), thus the simulated and
real protocol transcripts are indistinguishable.
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• Special soundness: Given two accepted transcripts (c1v , s1x1 , s1l′′i ) and (c
2
v , s
2
x1 , s
2
l′′i
), that share the same
tki . We also proved the verification equality X
cvki + tki = oisx1 + sl′′i . Therefore,
we have:
Xc
1
v ki + tki = ois
1
x1 + s
1
l′′i
(6.4)
and
Xc
2
v ki + tki = ois
2
x1 + s
2
l′′i
(6.5)
Subtracting the two above equations we get:
ki(Xc
1
v −Xc2v ) = oi(s1x1 − s2x1 ) + (s1l′′i − s
2
l′′i
)
dividing both sides by (Xc
1
v −Xc2v ) and multiplying by 2 we get:
2ki = oi
2(s1x1 − s2x1 )
(Xc1v −Xc2v ) +
2(s1l′′i
− s2l′′i )
(Xc1v −Xc2v )
The equation can be written in the form:
2ki = oi x¯1 + ¯l′′i (6.6)
where x¯1 = 2
(s1x1−s2x1 )
(Xc
1
v−Xc2v )
and ¯l′′i = 2
(s1
l′′i
−s2
l′′i
)
(Xc
1
v−Xc2v )
.
Thus, relying on lemmas 9 and 10, the infinite norm of the extracted witness x¯1 is as follows:
‖x¯1‖∞ ≤
√
n‖(s1x1 − s2x1 )‖∞‖2(Xc
1
v −Xc2v )−1‖∞ ≤ 2
√
n(β+
√
nβ)
Similarly, for the extracted ¯l′′i , we have
‖ ¯l′′i ‖∞ ≤
√
n‖(s1l′′i − s
2
l′′i
)‖∞‖2(Xc1v −Xc2v )
−1‖∞ ≤ 2
√
n(β+
√
nβ)
since ‖(s1x1 − s2x1 )‖∞ ≤ 2(β+
√
nβ) and ‖2(Xc1v −Xc2v )−1‖∞ = 1 from lemma 9.

6.5 Security Proof for the LEPID Scheme
In this section, we provide a sketch of the security proof of the LEPID followed by a detailed security
proof.
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A Sketched Security Proof for LEPID
A variant of the sequence of games of [CDL16] is presented, showing that no environment E can dis-
tinguish the real world protocol Π with an adversary A, from the ideal world FlEPID with a simulator S.
Starting with the real world protocol game, we change the protocol game by game in a computationally
indistinguishable way, finally ending with the ideal world protocol.
Game 1. This is the real world protocol.
Game 2. An entity C is introduced, that receives all inputs from the honest parties and simulates Π for
them. This is equivalent to Game 1.
Game 3. C is split into F and S. F behaves as an ideal functionality, receiving all inputs and forwarding
them to S, who simulates the real world protocol for honest parties. S sends the outputs to F, who
forwards them to E. This game is similar to Game 2, but with a different structure.
Game 4. F now behaves differently in the setup interface. It stores the algorithms for the issuer I, and
checks that the structure of sid is correct for an honest I, aborting if not. In case I is corrupt, S extracts
the secret key for I and proceeds in the setup interface on behalf of I. Clearly E will notice no change.
Game 5. F now performs the verification and key revocation checks instead of forwarding them to
S. There are no protocol messages and the outputs are exactly as the real world protocol. However, the
verification algorithm that F uses does not contain any key or signature revocation checks. F can perform
this check separately, so the outcomes are equal.
Game 6. F stores in its records the members that have joined. If I is honest, F stores the secret key
tsk, extracted from S, for corrupt platforms. S always has enough information to simulate the real world
protocol except when the issuer is the only honest party. In this case, S does not know who initiated
the join, and so cannot make a join query with F on the signer’s behalf. Thus, to deal with this case,
F can safely choose any corrupt signer and put it into Members. The identities of signers are only used
for creating signatures for honest signers, so corrupted signers do not matter. In the case that the signer
is already registered in Members, F would abort the protocol, but I will have already tested this case
before continuing with the query JOINPROCEED. Hence F will not abort. Thus in all cases, F and S
can interact to simulate the real world protocol.
Game 7. (Anonymity). In this game, F creates anonymous signatures for honest platforms by running
the algorithms defined in the setup interface. Let us start by defining Game 7.k.k′. In this game F handles
the first k′ signing inputs of Mi for i < k using algorithms, and subsequent inputs are forwarded to S who
creates signatures as before. We note that Game 7.0.0=Game 6. For increasing k′, Game 7.k.k′ will be
at some stage equal to Game 7.k + 1.0, this is because there can only be a polynomial number of signing
queries to be processed. Therefore, for large enough k and k′, F handles all the signing queries of all
signers, and Game 7 is indistinguishable from Game 7.k.k′. To prove that Game 7.k.k′ + 1 is indistin-
guishable from Game 7.k.k′, suppose that there exists an environment that can distinguish a signature of
an honest party using tsk = x1 from a signature using a different tsk j = x
j
1, then the environment can solve
the Decision Ring -LWE Problem.
132
The first j ≤ k′ signing queries on behalf of Mk are handled by F using the algorithms, and
subsequent inputs are then forwarded to S as before. Now suppose that F outputs the tu-
ples (nym j, p j,o ji ,k
j
i ,d
j
i , s
j
x1 , s
j
e, s
j
qi , s
j
l′i
, s jl′′i
, s jl′′′i
,c jv,SRL) for j ≤ k′, with nym j = p jx1 + e j, for an
error term e j ← Ds, and the remaining proofs are honestly generated. The j = k′ + 1-th
query for Mk is as follows: (nymS, pS,oSi ,k
s
i ,d
S
i , s
S
x1 , s
S
e , s
S
qi , s
S
l′i
, sSl′′i
, sSl′′′i
,cSv ,µ
S,SRL). S is chal-
lenged to decide if (nymS, pS,oSi ,k
s
i ,d
S
i , s
S
x1 , s
S
e , s
S
qi , s
S
l′i
, sSl′′i
, sSl′′′i
,cSv ,µ
S,SRL) is chosen from a Ring-
LWE distribution for some secret x1 or uniformly at random. S proceeds in simulating the
signer without knowing the secret x1. S can answer all the H queries, as S is controlling
FCRS. S sets: tSki=o
S
i s
S
x1 + s
S
l′′i
− XcSv kSi ; tSdi=nym∗i sSqi + sSl′′′i − X
cSv dSi ; t
S
oi=p
∗
i s
S
qi + s
S
l′i
− XcSv oSi ;
tSnym=p
SsSx1 + s
S
e − XcSv nymS; and, finally, cSv : =H(tSnym|tSoi |tSki |tSdi |µS).For i > k′ + 1, S outputs the tuples
(nym j, p j,o ji ,k
j
i ,d
j
i , s
j
x1 , s
j
e, s
j
qi , s
j
l′i
, s jl′′i
, s jl′′′i
,c jv,µ j,SRL), with nym j = p jx
j
1 + e
j mod q, for some freshly
generated secret x j1 and error term e
j ← Ds. For each case, Mk can provide a simulated proof as fol-
lows. S sets t jki=o
j
i s
j
x1 + s
j
l′′i
−Xc jvk ji ; t jdi=nym∗i s
j
qi + s
j
l′′′i
−Xc jvd ji ; t joi=p∗i s jqi + s jl′i −X
c jvo ji ; t
j
nym=p js
j
x1 + s
j
e−
Xc
j
v nym j; and, finally, c jv : =H(t
j
nym|t joi |t jki |t
j
di
|µ j).
Thus, any distinguisher between Game 7.k.k′ and Game 7.k.k′ + 1 can solve the Decision Ring-LWE
Problem.
Game 8. F now no longer informs S about the message and p that are being signed. If the signer M is
honest, then S can learn nothing about the message µ and p. Instead, S knows only the leakage l(µ, p). To
simulate the real world, S chooses a pair (µ′, p′) such that l(µ′, p′)=l(µ, p). An environment E observes
no difference, and thus Game 8=Game 7.
Game 9. If I is honest, then F now only allows members that joined to sign. An honest signer will
always check whether it has joined before signing in the real world protocol, so there is no difference for
honest signers. Therefore Game 9=Game 8.
Game 10. When storing a new tsk = x1, F checks CheckTskCorrupt(tsk)=1 or CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
We want to show that these checks will always pass. In fact, valid signatures always satisfy nym = px1 +e
where ‖x1‖∞ ≤ β and ‖e‖∞ ≤ β. By the unique Shortest Vector Problem, there exists only one tuple (x1,e)
such that ‖x1‖∞ ≤ β and ‖e‖∞ ≤ β for small enough β. Thus, CheckTskCorrupt(tsk) will always give
the correct output. Also, due to the large min-entropy of discrete Gaussians the probability of sampling
x′1 = x1, and thus of having a signature already using the same tsk = x1, is negligible, which implies
that CheckTskHonest(tsk) will give the correct output with overwhelming probability. Hence Game
10=Game 9.
Game 11. (Completeness). In this game, F checks that honestly generated signatures are always valid.
This is true as sig algorithm always produces signatures passing through verification checks. Those
signatures satisfy identify(tsk,σ,µ, p) = 1, which is checked via
nym. F also makes sure, using its internal records Members and DomainKeys that honest users are not
sharing the same secret key tsk. If there exists a key tsk′ = x′1 in Members and DomainKeys such that
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‖nym− px′1‖∞ ≤ β, then this breaks search Ring-LWE.
Game 12. Check-IX is added to ensure that there are no multiple tsk tracing back to the same signature.
Since there exists only one pair (x1,eI), ‖x1‖∞ ≤ β, ‖eI‖∞ ≤ β, satisfying nymI = H(bsnI)x1 + eI, two
different signers cannot share the same x1, thus any valid signature traces back to a single tsk.
Game 13. (Unforgeability). To prevent accepting signatures that were issued by the use of join creden-
tials not issued by an honest issuer, F further adds Check-X. This is due to the unforgeability of Boyen
signatures [Boy10].
Game 14. (Unforgeability). Check-XI is added to F, preventing the forging of signatures with honest tsk
and credentials. If a valid signature is given on a message that the signer has never signed, the proof could
not have been simulated. x1 would be extracted and Ring-LWE would be broken. So Game 14=Game
13.
Game 15. Check-XII is added to F, ensuring that honest signers’ keys are not being revoked. If an honest
signer is simulated by means of the Ring-LWE problem instance and a proper key KRL is found, it must
be the secret key of the target instance. This is equivalent to solving the search Ring-LWE problem.
Game 16. F now performs signature-based revocation when verifying signatures. F checks that
there is no (σ∗,nym∗, p∗) ∈ SRL such that for some matching tski and (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, we have
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗, tski) = 1. By the soundness of the proof presented in Section 6.4.2, this check will
always pass with overwhelming probability. 
Detailed Security Proof of the LEPID Scheme
• SETUP
On input (SETUP, sid) from I, output (FORWARD, (SETUP, sid,I) to S.
• JOIN
1. On input (JOIN, sid, jsid) from the platform Mi, output (FORWARD, (JOIN,
sid, jsid,Mi)) to S.
2. On input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) from I, output (FORWARD,
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid), I) to S.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN,sid, ssid, p) fromMi, output (FORWARD, (SIGN,sid, ssid,Mi, p)) to S.
2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD, (SIGNPROCEED,
sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V , output (FORWARD, (VERIFY,
sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL), V) to S.
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• REVOKE: On the input tsk∗ from a party R, output (FORWARD, (REVOKE,
sid,µ, tsk∗,KRL,SRL), R) to S.
On the input (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) from a party R, (FORWARD, (REVOKE, sid,µ∗, p∗,σ∗,KRL,SRL),
R) to S.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.1: Game 3 for F
• KeyGen
Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (SETUP, sid,I)from F, give “I” (SETUP, sid) .
• JOIN
1. Upon receiving (FORWARD, (JOIN, sid, jsid,Mi) from F, give input (JOIN, sid, jsid)
to “Mi”
2. Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid), I) from F, give “I” input
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid).
• SIGN
1. Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi, p) from F, give “Mi” input
(SIGN, sid, ssid, p).
2. Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) from F, give “Mi”
input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid).
• VERIFY
Upon receiving input (FORWARD, (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL), V) from F, give “V”
input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL).
• REVOKE
Upon receiving (FORWARD, (REVOKE, sid,µ, tsk∗,KRL,SRL), R) from F, give “R” an
input (REVOKE, sid,µ, tsk∗,KRL,SRL).
Upon receiving (FORWARD, (REVOKE, sid,µ∗, p∗,σ∗,KRL,SRL), R) from F, give “R” an
input (REVOKE, sid,µ∗, p∗,σ∗,KRL,SRL).
• OUTPUT
When any simulated party “P” outputs a message µ, S sends (OUTPUT, P,µ)to F.
Figure 6.2: Game 3 for S
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• SETUP
1. On input (SETUP, sid) from I, verify that sid = (I,sid′) and output (SETUP, sid) to S.
2. On input (ALGORITHMS, sid, sign, ver, revoke, identify, Kgen) from S, check that ver,
revoke, and identify are deterministic. Store ( sid, sign, ver, revoke, identify, Kgen) and
output (SETUPDONE, sid) to I.
• JOIN
1. On input (JOIN, sid, jsid) from the platform Mi, output (FORWARD, (JOIN,
sid, jsid,Mi)) to S.
2. On input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) from I, output (FORWARD,
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid), I) to S.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN, sid, ssid, p) from Mi, output (FORWARD, (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi, p)) to
S.
2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD,
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V , output (FORWARD, (VERIFY,
sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL), V) to S.
• REVOKE
On the input tsk∗ from a party R, output (FORWARD, (REVOKE, sid,µ, tsk∗,KRL), R) to S.
On the input (σ∗,µ∗, p∗,KRL,SRL) from a party R, (FORWARD, (REVOKE,
sid,µ∗, p∗,σ∗,KRL,SRL), R) to S .
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.3: Game 4 for F
• KeyGen: Honest I: On input (SETUP, sid) from F
– Check sid = (I,sid′), output ⊥ to I if the check fails.
– Give “I” input (SETUP, sid).
– Upon receiving output (SETUPDONE, sid) from “I”, S takes its private key TˆI.
– Define Sign(tsk,µ, p,KRL,SRL) as follows:
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Define SamplePre(TˆI,ut,u, id) that outputs a signature Xˆh = [Xˆh1 |Xˆh2 ] as satisfying
AˆhXˆh = uh mod q,
with ‖Xˆh1‖∞ ≤ β/2 and ‖Xˆh2‖∞ ≤ β, and id is a fresh tag will be the L-EPID credential.
∗ nym = ptsk + e mod q, for an error term e←Ds such that ‖e‖∞ < β.
∗ ∀(σ∗i , p∗i ,nym∗i ) ∈ SRL
· qi, l′i , l′′i , l′′′i ←Ds
· oi = p∗i qi + l′i
· ki = oix1 + l′′i
· d i = nym∗i qi + l′′′i
· r x1 ,re,rqi ,r l′i ,r l′′i ,r l′′′i ←Ds
· tnym = pr x1 + re
· toi = p∗i rqi + r l′i .
· tki = oir x1 + r l′′i .
· tdi = nym∗i rqi + r l′′′i .
· cv = H(tnym|toi |tki |tdi |µ) ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,2n−1}.
· sx1 = r x1 + xcv x1
· se = re + xcve
· sqi = rqi + xcv qi
· sl′i = r l′i + xcv l
′
i
· sl′′i = r l′′i + xcv l
′′
i
· sl′′′i = r l′′′i + xcv l
′′′
i
∗ rej(sx1 , xcv x1, ξ), rej(se, xcve, ξ), rej(sqi , xcvqi, ξ), rej(sl′i , xcv l
′
i , ξ), rej(sl′′i , x
cv l′′i , ξ)
or rej(sl′′′i , x
cv l′′′i , ξ).
∗ σ = ( pi, nym, oi, ki, d i, sx1 , se, sqi , sl′i , sl′′i , sl′′′i , cv, KRL, SRL)
– Define ver(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL) as follows:
∗ ∀ tsk∗ ∈ KRL, if ‖ptsk∗−nym‖∞ ≤ β outputs 0.
1. ∀ σ∗i = (pinym∗i ,nym∗i , p∗i ) ∈ SRL,
2. compute:
3. t′ki=oisx1 + sl′′i − xcvki
4. t′di=nym∗i sqi + sl′′′i − xcvd i
5. t′oi=p∗i sqi + sl′i − xcvoi
6. t′nym=psx1 + se− xcvnym
7. cv
?
= H(t′nym|t′oi |t′ki |t′di |µ).
8. check ‖sx1‖∞, ‖se‖∞,‖sqi‖∞,‖sl′i ‖∞,‖sl′′i ‖∞,‖sl′′′i ‖∞ ≤ β+
√
nβ.
9. check 2‖d i− ki‖ < Γ, where Γ is a function of β. If 2‖d i− ki‖ < Γ the verifier outputs
0, otherwise 1.
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∗ If all checks pass, output (VERIFIED,sid,1), (VERIFIED,sid,0) otherwise.
– Define revoke( tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), add tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL after verifying σ∗.
– Define Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk) as follows: It parses σ as (nym, p) and checks that tsk ∈Ds,
ver(σ,µ, p)=1 and ‖nym− ptsk‖∞ ≤ β. If so output 1, otherwise output 0.
– Define Kgen, take tsk ∈Ds and output tsk.
– S sends (KEYS, sid, Sign, Verify, Revoke, Identify, Kgen) to F.
Corrupt I: S notices this setup as it notices I registering a public key with FCA with sid =
(I,sid′).
– If the registered key is in the form (AˆI,piI) and piI is valid, then S extracts TˆI from piI.
– S defines the algorithms Sign, Verify, Revoke, and Identify as before, but now depending
on the extracted key. S sends (SETUP, sid) to F on behalf of I. On input (KEYGEN, sid)
from F, S sends (KEYS, sid, Sign, Verify, Revoke, Identify, Kgen) to F.
– On input (SETUPDONE, sid) from F. S continues simulating “I”.
• JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY, REVOKE: Unchanged.
Figure 6.4: Game 4 for S
• SETUP
1. On input (SETUP, sid) from I, verify that sid = (I,sid′) and output (SETUP, sid) to S.
2. On input (ALGORITHMS, sid, sign, ver, revoke, identify, Kgen) from S, check that ver,
revoke, and identify are deterministic. Store ( sid, sign, ver, revoke, identify, Kgen) and
output (SETUPDONE, sid) to I.
• JOIN
1. On input (JOIN, sid, jsid) from the platform Mi, output (FORWARD, (JOIN,
sid, jsid,Mi)) to S.
2. On input (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid) from I, output (FORWARD,
(JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid), I) to S.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN, sid, ssid, p) from Mi, output (FORWARD, (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi, p)) to
S.
2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD,
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p).
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– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.5: Game 5 for F
• KeyGen, JOIN, SIGN : Unchanged.
• VERIFY, REVOKE: Nothing to simulate.
Figure 6.6: Game 5 for S
• SETUP
1. On input (SETUP, sid) from I, verify that sid = (I,sid′) and output (SETUP, sid) to S.
2. On input (ALGORITHMS, sid, sign, ver, revoke, identify, Kgen) from S, check that ver,
revoke, and identify are deterministic. Store ( sid, sign, ver, revoke, identify, Kgen) and
output (SETUPDONE, sid) to I.
• JOIN
1. JOINREQUEST: On input (JOIN, sid, jsid) from Mi
– Create a join session 〈 jsid,Mi, request 〉.
– Output (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi) to S.
2. JOIN REQUEST DELIVERY: Proceed upon receiving delivery notification from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi, delivered〉.
– If I or Mi is honest and 〈Mi,∗〉 is already in Members, output ⊥.
– Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
3. JOIN PROCEED: Upon receiving (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) from I
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,sid,Mi, complete〉.
– Output (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) to S.
4. KEY GENERATION: On input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, tsk) from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi, complete〉
– If Mi is honest, set tsk = ⊥.
– Insert 〈Mi, tsk〉 into Members, and output (JOINED, sid, jsid) to Mi.
• SIGN
1. On input (SIGN, sid, ssid, p) from Mi, output (FORWARD, (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi, p)) to
S.
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2. On input (SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid) from Mi, output (FORWARD,
(SIGNPROCEED,sid, ssid), Mi) to S.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.7: Game 6 for F
• KeyGen: Unchanged.
JOIN: Honest Mi, I
– When S receives (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi) from F
– It simulates the real world protocol by giving “Mi” input (JOIN, sid, jsid) and waits for
output (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid,Mi) from “I”.
– As Mi is honest, S already knows tsk as it is simulating Mi.
– S sends (JOINSTART, sid, jsid) to F.
– Upon receiving input (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S gives “I” input (JOINPRO-
CEED, sid, jsid) and waits for output (JOINED, sid, jsid) from “Mi”.
– Upon receiving input (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINCOMPLETE,
sid, jsid,⊥) to F.
Honest I, Corrupt Mi :
– S notices this join as “I” receives (SENT, sid′, (ut,piut )) from F∗auth.
– S doesn’t know the identity of the signer that started this join, so S chooses any corrupt
M∗ and proceeds as if this signer initiated this join, although this may not be the correct
signer. This makes no difference as when creating signatures we only look for corrupt
signers as they are not considered in generating signatures.
– S then extracts tsk from the proof piut .
– S makes a join query with M∗ by sending (JOIN, sid, jsid,M∗) to F.
– Upon receiving input (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,M∗) from F, S continues simulating “I”
until it outputs (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid,M∗).
– S sends (JOINSTART, sid, jsid) to F.
– Upon receiving (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINCOMPLETE,
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sid, jsid, tsk) to F.
– Upon receiving (JOINED, sid, jsid) from F as Mi is corrupt, S gives “I” input (JOIN-
PROCEED, sid, jsid).
Honest Mi, Corrupt I:
– On input (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi) from F, S gives “Mi” input (JOIN, sid, jsid) and
waits for output (JOINED, sid, jsid,Mi) from “Mi”.
– S sends (JOINSTART, sid, jsid) to F.
– Upon receiving input (JOINPROCEED, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINPROCEED,
sid, jsid) to F on behalf of I.
– Upon receiving input (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) from F, S sends (JOINCOMPLETE,
sid, jsid,⊥) to F.
• SIGN, VERIFY, LINK: Unchanged.
Figure 6.8: Game 6 for S
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if
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∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.9: Game 7 for F
• KeyGen, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN :Honest Mi
Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, p,µ) from F.
– S starts the simulation by giving “Mi” input (SIGN, sid, ssid,,µ, p).
– When “Mi” outputs (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p), S sends (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid)
to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, output (SIGNPROCEED,
sid, ssid) to “Mi”.
– When “Mi” outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ), send (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,⊥)
to F.
Corrupt Mi
Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, p,µ) from F, send (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) to
F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) from F on behalf of Mi, as Mi is cor-
rupt, S sends (SIGN, sid, ssid,Mi,µ, p) to F on behalf of Mi.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, S sends (SIGNCOMPLETE,
sid, ssid,σ) to F.
• VERIFY, LINK: Nothing to simulate.
Figure 6.10: Game 7 for S
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
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– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.11: Game 8 for F
• KeyGen, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
Honest Mi:
Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l) from F.
– S takes a dummy pair (µ′,bsn′) such that l(µ′,bsn′) = l.
– S starts the simulation by giving “Mi” input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ′, p′).
– When “Mi” outputs (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ′, p′), S sends (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid)
to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, output (SIGNPROCEED,
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sid, ssid) to “Mi”.
– When “Mi” outputs (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ), send (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,⊥)
to F.
Corrupt Mi
Upon receiving (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l) from F.
– Send (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) to F.
– Upon receiving (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) from F on behalf of Mi, as Mi is cor-
rupt, S sends (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to F on behalf of Mi.
– Upon receiving (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from F, send (SIGNCOMPLETE,
sid, ssid,σ) to F.
• VERIFY, LINK: Nothing to simulate.
Figure 6.12: Game 8 for S
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if
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∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.13: Game 9 for F
• SETUP: Unchanged.
• JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN: Unchanged.
• VERIFY: Unchanged.
• LINK: Unchanged.
Figure 6.14: Games 9-16 for S
• SETUP: Unchanged.
• JOIN
1. JOINREQUEST: On input (JOIN, sid, jsid) from Mi
– Create a join session 〈 jsid,Mi, request 〉.
– Output (JOINSTART, sid, jsid,Mi) to S.
2. JJOIN REQUEST DELIVERY: Proceed upon receiving delivery notification from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi, delivered〉.
– If I or Mi is honest and 〈Mi,∗〉 is already in Members, output ⊥.
– Output (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) to I.
3. JOIN PROCEED: Upon receiving (JOINPROCEED,sid, jsid,Mi) from I
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,sid,Mi, complete〉.
– Output (JOINCOMPLETE, sid, jsid) to S.
4. KEY GENERATION: On input (JOINCOMPLETE,sid, jsid, tsk) from S.
– Update the session record to 〈 jsid,Mi, complete〉
– If Mi is honest, set tsk = ⊥.
– Else, verify that the provided tsk is eligible by performing the following checks:
∗ If Mi is honest, then CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ If Mi is corrupt, then CheckTskCorrupt(tsk)=1.
– Insert 〈Mi, tsk〉 into Members, and output (JOINED, sid, jsid) to Mi.
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• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ Check CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.15: Game 10 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
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– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ Check Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL)=1.
∗ Check identify(σ,µ, p, tsk)=1.
∗ Check the is no signer other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk′)=1.
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Set f = 0 if
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.16: Game 11 for F
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• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ Check CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ Check Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL)=1.
∗ Check identify(σ,µ, p, tsk)=1.
∗ Check the is no signer other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk′)=1.
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ, p, tski)=1.
– Set f = 0 if
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
∗ More than one key tski was found.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
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after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.17: Game 12 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ Check CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ Check Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL)=1.
∗ Check identify(σ,µ, p, tsk)=1.
∗ Check the is no signer other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk′)=1.
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ, p, tski)=1.
– Set f = 0 if
∗ I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
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∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
∗ More than one key tski was found.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.18: Game 13 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ Check CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ Check Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL)=1.
∗ Check identify(σ,µ, p, tsk)=1.
∗ Check the is no signer other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk′)=1.
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
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• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ, p, tski)=1.
– Set f = 0 if
∗ I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
∗ An honest Mi was found, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi, p〉 was found in Signed.
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1
∗ More than one key tski was found.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.19: Game 14 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ Check CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ Check Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL)=1.
∗ Check identify(σ,µ, p, tsk)=1.
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∗ Check the is no signer other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk′)=1.
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ, p, tski)=1.
– Set f = 0 if
∗ I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
∗ An honest Mi was found, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi, p〉 was found in Signed.
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1, and no pair (Mi, tski) for
honest Mi was found.
∗ More than one key tski was found.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.20: Game 15 for F
• SETUP, JOIN: Unchanged.
• SIGN
– SIGN REQUEST: On input (SIGN, sid, ssid,µ, p) from Mi,
– Abort if I is honest and no entry 〈Mi,∗〉 exists ML.
∗ Create a sign session 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, request〉.
∗ Output (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid,Mi, l(µ.bsn)) to S.
– SIGN REQUEST DELIVERY: On input (SIGNSTART, sid, ssid) from S, update the ses-
sion to 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
– Output (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid,µ, p) to Mi.
– SIGN PROCEED: On input (SIGNPROCEED, sid, ssid) from Mi
∗ Update the records 〈ssid,Mi,µ, p, delivered〉.
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∗ Output (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) to S.
– SIGNATURE GENERATION: On the input (SIGNCOMPLETE, sid, ssid,σ) from S, if
Mi is honest then:
∗ Ignore the adversary’s signature σ.
∗ Generate the signature σ← S ign(tsk,µ, p).
∗ Check CheckTskHonest(tsk)=1.
∗ Check Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL)=1.
∗ Check identify(σ,µ, p, tsk)=1.
∗ Check the is no signer other than Mi with key tsk′ registered in Members or Do-
mainKeys such that identify(σ,µ, p, tsk′)=1.
∗ For all (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, find all (tsk∗,M∗) from Members and DomainKeys such that
identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗,∗, tsk∗) = 1
· Check that no two distinct keys tsk∗ trace back to σ∗.
· Check that no pair (tsk∗,Mi) was found.
∗ IfMi is honest, then store 〈σ,µ,Mi, p〉 in Signed and output (SIGNATURE, sid, ssid,σ)
to Mi.
• VERIFY
On input (VERIFY, sid,µ, p,σ,KRL,SRL) from V
– Extract all pairs (tski,Mi) from the DomainKeys and Members, for which
Identify(σ,µ, p, tski)=1.
– Set f = 0 if
∗ I is honest and no pair (tski,Mi) was found.
∗ An honest Mi was found, but no entry 〈∗,µ,Mi, p〉 was found in Signed.
∗ There is a tsk∗ ∈ KRL such that Identify(σ,µ, p, tsk∗) = 1, and no pair (Mi, tski) for
honest Mi was found.
∗ For some matching tski ∈ ML and (σ∗,µ∗, p∗) ∈ SRL, such that identify(σ∗,µ∗, p∗, tski) =
1.
∗ More than one key tski was found.
– If f , 0, set f =Verify(σ,µ, p,KRL,SRL).
– Add (σ,µ, p,KRL, f ) to VerResults, output (VERIFIED, sid, f ) to V .
• REVOKE
On input (REVOKE, tsk∗,σ∗,µ∗, p∗), the revocation manager adds tsk∗ to KRL or σ∗ to SRL
after verifying σ∗.
• OUTPUT
On input (OUTPUT, P, µ) from S, output µ to P.
Figure 6.21: Game 16 for F
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6.6 Experimental Results
Both LDAA and LEPID were implemented in C, emulating all entities in a single machine. The code
was compiled with gcc 4.8.5 with the -O3 and -march=native flags and executed on an Intel i9 7900X
CPU with 64GB running at 3.3 GHz operated by CentOS 7.5. The obtained experimental results can be
found in Table 6.1. Note that the measured times for signing and verification do not take into account
transfer times between the entities or object creation and destruction.
The LEPID implementation was performed by colleagues from INESC-ID, Instituto Superior Te´cnico,
University of Lisbon, Portugal. By construing the signer as a single entity instead of two as in the
LDAA, the proposed LEPID scheme achieves a reduction of the private-key size of 1.5 times. While the
comparison in signatures sizes between both schemes yields favourably for the proposed LEPID scheme
with a small amount of rejected users, as the number of users in the SRL increases, its signature size
increases linearly at a rate of 18kB per rejected user (9 polynomials and an integer). When the SRL
contains 500 users, the LEPID signature size closely matches that of the LDAA scheme. Should LEPID
signing be implemented on a device with limited computational resources like the TPM, its constrained
memory resources and the cost of data transfer might limit its application to small and medium-sized
communities. In particular, if one considers a revocation rate of 0.1%, LEPID signatures will compare
favourably in size to LDAA signatures for communities with fewer than 500,000 users.
The signing time in the LEPID scheme is dominated by the signature-based knowledge proof pi. The
addition of the SRL , and consequently of 13 polynomial multiplications per rejected user shows no
meaningful impact in the final signing time, where LEPID maintains a speedup of 1.4 over the LDAA
scheme. Likewise, in the verification time, the additional 2 polynomial multiplications per rejected user
incurred by the SRL are negligible compared to the verification of pi. Hence, the proposed LEPID scheme
achieves a speedup of 1.1 when compared with the LDAA scheme across both small and medium re-
jection lists. For the computational complexity introduced by the SRL to be meaningful, the number of
rejected users must be in the order of millions. Once more, the proposed LEPID scheme shows improved
signature and verification times for small and medium communities when compared with the LDAA.
Scheme
Private-key
(kB)
Signature
(MB)
Signing
Time (s)
Verification
Time (s)
LDAA 147 847 541 129
LEPID (no revoked users) 100 836 361 114
LEPID (100 users in SRL ) 100 838 371 117
LEPID (500 users in SRL ) 100 845 372 119
LEPID (1000 users in SRL ) 100 854 374 121
Table 6.1: Experimental results for the proposed LEPID and LDAA [KCB+19] for n = 512, q = 8380417, l = 32, m = 24 and
β = 256 obtained on an Intel i9 7900X
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6.7 Comparison with the LDAA Scheme
A post-quantum EPID supported on symmetric-key primitives has been proposed in [BEF19]. However, a
different security model is therein used, requiring signers to frequently rejoin their community. Therefore,
we do not compare the proposed scheme with [BEF19], but instead, focus on the differences between
LDAA [KCB+19] and LEPID. When no revoked users are considered since LEPID construes the signer
as a single entity rather than two as in LDAA, the proof pi in
Section 6.4 is simplified, and the signature size is reduced from tkmO(n)(2l + 3) elements in Zq
in [KCB+19] to tkmO(n)(2l + 2). The improved revocation method of LEPID comes, however, with a
cost. As SRL grows, 9 more polynomials and an integer are added per user to the signature to prove that
the key being used has not been revoked. Similarly, when no user has been revoked, the signing and
verification operations will execute faster for LEPID than LDAA, since fewer polynomials have to be
committed to during the computation of pi, but SRL will add the time of 13 polynomial multiplications
per user to the signing time, and of 2 polynomial multiplications to the verification time.
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Chapter 7
A Study on the DAA Join Protocol
7.1 Introduction
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a cryptographic coprocessor. As stated by the developer of the TPM
specifications, the trusted computing group [Rot11], more than a billion devices use the TPM technology;
virtually all enterprise PCs, many servers and embedded systems include the TPM.
The TPM is designed to be used as a Root-of-Trust-for-Measurement by providing an attestation ser-
vice on behalf of its host platform, although it also supports general cryptographic functionalities, such
as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, key exchange, random number generation,
hash functions and message authentication codes, for many other applications. Following its design goal,
the TPM attestation service will eventually make the whole platform trustworthy from an external entity’s
point of view, when this entity remotely communicates with the platform and verifies the attestation in-
formation reported by the TPM. The attestation service is based on digital signatures: the TPM measures
the platform software/firmware state, then provide a digitally signed software/firmware measurement re-
port to the external entity (also called the external verifier). The signing and verification key pair used
for this service is named as an Attestation Key (AK). Generally speaking, the attestation service can be
much broader than just reporting the software/firmware state, e.g., it can be used to reliably provide a
time stamp, a cryptographic key or a key certificate.
For the reason of preserving user privacy, the AK is not used as the TPM’s identity. The TPM can be
involved in many applications; for example, a user can use it to make a mobile phone call, to deliver an
online payment, to search information via an Internet searching engine, to join social networks, to watch
movies online, etc. There are many obvious reasons, the user may not want to let service providers of
these applications connect the user’s activities to their identified TPM. Furthermore, to support different
requirements of user privacy, the AK can be used to provide conventional digital signatures or Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) signatures [BCC04]. The latter can achieve either pure anonymity or
pseudonymity [PCD]. Presenting an identified AK is a contradiction to anonymity.
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But on the other hand, the external verifier wants to make sure that a given attestation report was created
by a genuine TPM even if it is unidentified. To meet this requirement, an attestation Certificate Authority
(CA) (also called a credential provider) is involved to authenticate that the AK holder is a genuine TPM
and then to issue a credential to the AK. In order to make the TPM authentication possible, it is necessary
that the TPM needs a cryptographic identity. In the TCG TPM technology, each TPM has an Endorsement
Key (EK) represented as its identity, which can be injected into the TPM when it is manufactured, and
the EK is usually certified by the TPM manufacturer.
Interestingly enough, the EK is an asymmetric (public) encryption and (private) decryption key pair,
rather than a (private) signing and (public) verification key pair. This is again for the privacy-preserving
reason. An encryption key has the deniability nature. Imaging a communication between an encryptor
and decryptor. After receiving a ciphertext and decrypting it to obtain the plaintext, the decrypter can
deny what they have done, and the encrypter cannot convince a third party that the communication has
ever existed, because the encryptor can simulate all the message flows from the communication and the
encryptor has not provided a proof-of-possession of the private decryption key. This is the opposite of a
digital signature.
Now the question is how to make a cryptographic binding between a TPM’s AK and EK? This question
is equivalent to how to convince the credential provider that a certified EK and a given AK belong to the
same TPM. This sounds a typical authenticated key certification problem. But, it turns out that there is not
a standard solution to solve this problem. One evidence is that ISO/IEC specify several types of entity
authentication mechanisms (in ISO/IEC 9798 [ISO]) and key management mechanisms (in ISO/IEC
11770 [Int18]), which make use of symmetric encryption, digital signatures, message authentication
codes or other techniques, but no mechanism is based on asymmetric encryption.
For this purpose, the TCG suggests a challenge-response protocol, which is originally specified for TPM
1.2 in [Tru04] and then modified for TPM 2.0 in [Tru14]. The core ideas of these two versions are same.
Given the public portions of a certified EK and an unauthenticated AK, the credential provider encrypts a
challenge and then “wraps” the challenge encryption key together with the public key of the AK under the
public key of the EK. The encrypted challenge and the wrapped keys are then delivered to the TPM’s host
platform, which loads the EK and AK onto the TPM and asks the TPM to return the challenge encryption
key. This TPM operation is called “activate credential”. The TPM will first decrypt the wrapped keys
using the private key of the EK and then validate that both the public and private portions of the AK are
loaded on the TPM. If so, the TPM will return the challenge encryption key, that will be used by the host
to decrypt the challenge. After seeing the challenge back, the credential provider creates a credential to
the AK and makes it available to the host.
In 2010, Chen and Warinschi [CW10] discussed the TPM 1.2 version [Tru04] and proved that the proto-
col is secure under the unpleasant assumption that no single TPM has been compromised or any corrupted
TPM must be included in the rogue TPM list that is accessible by the credential provider. They demon-
strated that a corrupted and undetected TPM can mount a man-in-the-middle attack between an honest
TPM and the credential provider. As the result, the credential provider will accept a mismatched EK and
157
AK pair, i.e., the EK belongs to the corrupted TPM and the AK belongs to the honest TPM, but from
the credential provider’s point of view, they both belong to the corrupted TPM. In order to remove this
assumption, Chen, Lee and Warinschi suggested [CLW12] to let the TPM sign the EK under the AK, and
the credential provider verifies the signature before issuing the credential to the AK. In this chapter, we
further discuss their mitigation and show that this mitigation relies on another unpleasant assumption that
the host of the honest TPM must be trusted because the host can fool a TPM to sign the EK belonging to
the corrupted TPM.
Solving the key binding problem can be straightforward if there is an authenticated channel between
the TPM and credential provider. By this channel, we mean that every message sent between these two
entities can be authenticated by its receiver. But unfortunately, such a channel does not exist during the
credential issuing process. As shown in Figure 7.1, the TPM is embedded inside the host, any commu-
nication between the TPM and the outside environment is done via the host, but the host is not always
trusted to behaviour correctly, that is the reason why introducing a TPM in the first place. Given a public
encryption key of the TPM’s Endorsement Key (EK), how a credential provider can establish an au-
thenticated channel with a TPM via a malicious host is unclear. Other way around, if the key binding
problem can be solved, establishing a one-way authenticated channel from the TPM to the credential
provider is possible, since the AK can be used to sign message flows. In many TPM applications in the
literature, including DAA papers and international standards in this field, it is required to have an authen-
ticated channel or a secure and authenticated channel as a condition for generating credentials without
demonstrating how to achieve it. It seems a Chicken-Egg problem. In this chapter, we aim to tackle this
demanding problem. As DAA is designed for achieving user privacy in the TPM environment [BCC04]
and has already drawn a lot of attention from the academic and industrial community, throughout the
remaining part of this chapter, we will take DAA as an example in our discussion on key binding.
DAA is a group-type of anonymous digital signature scheme. There are several features making DAA
different from traditional group signatures. One of them is that a signer role in DAA is split into two
parties: a principal signer (i.e. the TPM) and an assistant signer (i.e. the host). This key binding
problem has been ignored by many DAA researchers so far. ISO/IEC 20008-2 [Int13] specifies several
group signature schemes and DAA schemes. Let us quote from this document in the description of an
RSA-based DAA scheme (Mechanism 2) and a EC-based DAA scheme (Mechanism 4): “The group
membership issuing process requires a secure and authentic channel between the principal signer and
the group membership issuer. How to establish such a channel is out scope of this mechanism.” In the
literature, there are several solutions for issuing DAA credentials to the DAA keys (that will be reviewed
in Section 7.3) and several DAA security models (that will be reviewed in Section 7.4). Recall that a
DAA key is an Attestation Key (AK). Our review will show that neither of these solutions can achieve
key binding by using real TPM chips, and that neither of these security models have given a precise
definition of the key binding property.
No doubt that the key binding property is critical for the privacy-CA solution, since the CA is used to trace
an AK back to the corresponding EK. But, is the key binding property important for DAA? The answer
may be “No” in 2004 when the DAA concept and first scheme was proposed by Brickell, Camenisch,
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Figure 7.1: TPM communication diagram
and Chen [BCC04], since the first DAA scheme was only designed for creating pure anonymous or
pseudonymous signatures. But, nowadays, the answer should certainly be “Yes”, since DAA has been
considered for a variety of applications. One of them is a rewarding service that allows users to earn
incentives in an anonymous way, i.e., a user can choose linked or unlinked their transaction to their
identity and/or other transactions. If a user reaches to a rewarding point, they can choose to link their
DAA signature to the original Join protocol. This can be done by using the same base name in two DAA
signatures. Based on the key binding property, the credential provider can confirm which TPM should
obtain the reward. If the credential provider has a mismatching record binding a honest user’s AK with
a corrupted TPM’s EK, as a result, the corrupted TPM will benefit from the honest TPM’s contributions.
In Section 7.3, we will show that the majority of the existing DAA schemes suffer from this issue.
We will first discuss the security requirements and properties of an AK credential issuing process in
Section 7.2, and then review the related works in this field, which will demonstrate various issues or
limitations in the existing solutions and security models in Section 7.3. It will be followed by a new
security model of such a process in Section 7.5. We will in Section 7.6 propose our new solution that
is based on the current TPM 2.0 commands. Our solution has been implemented using the real TPM
2.0 chip and the performance is satisfactory. In Section 7.7, we will prove that the proposed solution is
secure under the security model given. We will give a comparison between our proposed scheme and the
existing solutions in Section 7.9.
7.2 Security Requirements
As shown in Figure 7.1, a TPM is a small chip that is embedded inside its host platform, and any com-
munication between the TPM and the outside environment is via the host. In the security threat model
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of the trusted computing technology, the host can be an active attacker i.e. who can read the messages,
block the communication, append messages and coordinates some malicious TPMs. The presence of the
host with such physical proximity to the TPM, and the limited ability for the TPM to authenticate itself
directly to the credential provider, i.e. the TPM can only respond to the host’s commands, makes the
secure and authentic communications between the TPM and the credential provider very challenging.
A TPM AK credential issuing scheme involves three players: a set of TPMs, a set of hosts and a credential
provider. The credential provider has a public and secret key pair (cpk,csk), which is used for a signature
scheme. Each TPM has a public and secret Endorsement Key (EK) pair (epk,esk), which is used for an
asymmetric encryption scheme. The endorsement key is usually certified by the TPM manufacturer, so
we refer such a certificate of the endorsement key to as cert. It is assumed that the credential provider
has access to an authentic copy of the public endorsement key and its certificate, which are referred to as
cert/epk. The TPM also has a public and secret Attestation Key (AK) pair, which is used for a signature
scheme (either a conventional signature scheme or a DAA anonymous signature scheme).
We informally give the definition of the security requirements introduced by Chen, Lee, and Warinschi
[CLW12] for the privacy-CA solution, adopt these definitions and add a new fourth security requirement
(key bond) for the purpose of our construction of an authentication communication channel in a DAA
protocol in the presence of malicious parties.
• Third-party anonymity: Given a pair (pk,C), we say that the protocol is third-party anonymous if no
third party can determine which TPM is issued a credential C on its DAA public key pk, except the
engaged TPM and the privacy-CA. We assume that the adversary can collude with any malicious CAs
or TPMs except the two engaged TPMs and the corresponding CA that creates credential for one of the
engaged TPMs.
• Unforgeability: We say that a protocol is unforgeable if no adversary can forge a credential on a TPM’s
DAA public key.
• Deniability We say that a protocol is deniable if a TPM can deny that it was engaged in a transaction
with some privacy-CA even if this transaction actually took place.
• Key Binding: We say that a protocol has a key binding property if there exist an authentication that
binds the TPM’s endorsement key and the TPM’s DAA key. In a DAA protocol, this property ensures
that the issuer must be able to authenticate a TPM with a given endorsement key associated with a
DAA key.
We will show that our protocol catches all of the above security requirements and provide a full security
proof in Section 7.7.
7.3 Analysis of the Related Work
In this section, we discuss two types of related work: the first is the existing schemes of issuing a TPM
Attestation Key (AK) credential, and the second is the security models of such a scheme. The discussed
schemes include the privacy-CA services and the DAA join protocols. The security models also include
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the privacy-CA security models and the DAA security models. Our focus is to analyse whether each
scheme holds the security properties discussed in Section 7.2 and can be implemented by following
the TPM specifications, and whether each security model covers the security properties discussion in
Section 7.2 .
Analysis of the Existing Schemes
In the literature, the process of issuing a TPM AK credential is addressed by using either a privacy-
CA solution or a DAA join protocol. These two mechanisms aim to achieve the same target. The
difference is that the privacy-CA solution creates a X509 certificate to an AK that is used in a conventional
cryptographic scheme while the DAA join protocol issues a DAA credential to an AK that is used in a
DAA scheme. In the following discussion, we do not distinguish these two types of schemes, and omit
their certificate/credential details and the specific AK formats. We refer to these schemes as TPM AK
credential issuing schemes in general, and use SIGcsk(apk) to denote such a certificate/credential.
In the remainder of the chapter we use the following notation. If S is a set, we denote the act of sampling
from S uniformly at random and assigning the result to the variable x by x← S . We let {0,1}∗ and {0,1}t
denote the set of binary strings of arbitrary length and length t respectively. If A is an algorithm, we write
x← A(y1, ...,yn) to indicate that x is obtained by invoking A on inputs y1, ...,yn. The algorithms that we
consider may have access to oracles. We write AO to indicate that adversary A has access to oracle O.
The schemes that we consider may also make use of (symmetric or asymmetric) encryption/decryption
algorithms and signature/verification algorithms. We denote an encryption algorithm on a plaintext p
under a key k by ENCk(p) and a decryption algorithm on a ciphertext c under a key k′ by DECk′ (c). For
simplicity, we do not distinguish the encryption algorithm is symmetric and asymmetric. The difference
can be told by their keys without confused. We denote the output, saying A, of a signature algorithm on
a message m under a key k by A← SIGk(m) and simply refer to the corresponding verification algorithm
as “Verify A”. We denote concatenation of two date strings x and y as x|y.
In a TPM AK credential issuing scheme, the input to the TPM is its secret EK and AK, esk and ask, the
input to the host is the certificate of epk along with epk, written as cert/epk, the public AK apk and the
public key of the credential provider cpk, and the input to the credential provider is its secret key csk and
cret/epk. The output to the host is the credential of the AK, which is referred to as cred, and the output
to the credential provider is a record of pairing the EK and AK along with the AK credential, written as
(epk,cred/apk).
As shown in Figure 7.2, the Join protocol of the first DAA scheme, introduced by Brickell et al. in
2004 [BCC04], works as follows: After receiving a join request with cert/epk and apk, the credential
provider (called the DAA Issuer in their paper) chooses a nonce nI and encrypts it under epk, the TPM
decrypts the nonce, computes a hash code, a, of apk and nI and sends the value a to the credential
provider. The purpose of this protocol is to convince the credential provider of the key binding between
the certified epk and the given apk, i.e., the value apk stems from the TPM that owns cert/epk. However,
we now show that this Join protocol does not hold such a key binding if there is a corrupted TPM, which,
from the credential provider’s view point, still has a valid cert/epk. We refer to the corrupted TPM as
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TPM Host Credential provider
ask,esk cert/epk,apk,cpk cert/epk,csk
cert/epk,apk−−−−−−−−−→ If cert/epk is invalid,
return ⊥
nI ← {0,1}t
nI ←DECesk(c) c←−−− c←−−− c← ENCepk(nI)
a←H(apk|nI) a−−−→ a−−−→ Check a←H(apk|nI)
Return ⊥ if the check
fails
Verify cred
cred←−−−−− cred← SIGcsk(apk)
Record (epk,cred/apk)
Figure 7.2: The DAA Join protocol in the original DAA paper [BCC04](2004)
TPMA and the honest TPM as TPMB. TPMB sends the credential provider certB/epkB,apkB but this
message is blocked by TPMA, who, instead, sends the credential provider certA/epkA together with
apkB. The credential provider follows the protocol and returns the value cA ← ENCepkA (nI). TPMA
decrypts it, recomputes cB ← ENCepkB(nI) and sends it to TPMB, who then follows the protocol and
returns a←H(apkB|nI) to the credential provider. As the result, the credential provider will issue the
credential of apkB and record (epkA,cred/apkB). Obviously this is a mismatched key pair.
As shown in Figure 7.3, Chen, Morrissey and Smart [CMS09] suggested another Join protocol for DAA.
The notation comm used in this protocol stands for a commitment to the secret key ask, which we can
understand as a proof of possession of the AK (apk,ask). In this protocol, the endorsement key EK is
used for creating a digital signature. The TPM signs the commitment together with a challenge nonce
using its secret portion of EK, esk, while the credential provider verifies the signature w.r.t epk. By a
quick glance, this protocol satisfies the key binding property between the TPM’s EK and AK, as this is “a
standard certificate” solution. However, since the commitment is separated from the signature under the
EK, a corrupted TPM can still fool the credential provider. Again, we refer to the corrupted TPM as TPMA
and the honest TPM as TPMB. TPMB sends the credential provider certB/epkB,apkB but this message is
blocked by TPMA, who sends the credential provider certA/epkA,apkB instead. The credential provider
follows the protocol by returning the nonce nI . TPMA lets it go to TPMB, who follows the protocol by
creating the commitment, commB, of askB, computing the signature σB on commB|nI under eskB, and
sending it along with commB to the credential provider. This message again is blocked by TPMA, who,
instead, computes and sends σA ← SIGeskA (commB|nI) to the credential provider. As the result, like the
attack to the previous Join protocol in [BCC04], the credential provider will issue the credential of apkB
and record (epkA,cred/apkB). This is again a mismatched key pair.
Except for the problem of missing the key binding property, this protocol has two other issues:
1. Since the Endorsement Key (EK) is a signature key, such authentication destroys the property of deni-
ability.
2. In the TPM specifications, an EK is only an encryption/decryption key pair, so this protocol cannot be
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TPM Host Credential provider
ask,esk cert/epk,apk,cpk cert/epk,csk
cert/epk,apk−−−−−−−−−→ If cert/epk is invalid,
return ⊥
comm← comm(ask) nI←−−−− nI←−−−− nI ← {0,1}t
σ← SIGesk(comm|nI) comm, σ−−−−−−→ comm, σ−−−−−−→ If σ not valid, return ⊥
Verify cred
cred←−−−−− cred← SIGcsk(apk)
Record (epk,cred/apk)
Figure 7.3: The DAA Join protocol in [CMS09](2009)
TPM Host Credential provider
ask,esk cert/epk,apk,cpk cert/epk,csk
epk/cert,apk−−−−−−−−−→ If cert/epk is invalid
return ⊥
nI ← {0,1}t
apk|nI ←DECesk(a) a←−−− a←−−− a← ENCepk(apk|nI)
If apk is unknown reject
nI−−−−→ nI−−−−→ If nI is invalid, reject
create k
c← ENCepk(apk|k)
cred← SIGcsk(apk)
apk|k←DECesk(c) c←−−− c, d←−− d← ENCk(cred)
If apk is unknown reject
k−−−→ cred←DECk(d) Record (epk,cred/apk)
Verify cred
Figure 7.4: The TPM 1.2 privacy-CA solution (PCAS), presented in [CW10](2010)
implemented by using any existing TPM chips.
Figure 7.4 presents the privacy-CA solution (PCAS) designed by the Trusted Computing Group TCG for
the TPM version 1.2. The protocol lets the TPM self check the possession of its AK twice, the first one
is associated with releasing a nonce from the credential provider and the second one is associated with
releasing the encryption key that allows the host to obtain the credential of the AK. As analysed by Chen
and Warinschi in [CW10], PCAS can not convince the credential provider that the EK and AK belonging
to a TPM, if there is any corrupted TPM whose corrupted condition is not known by the credential
provider. Similar to the attack on the DAA Join protocol of [BCC04], discussed before, a corrupted TPM
can amount a man-in-the-middle attack, and force the credential provider to make a mismatching key
binding.
In order to solve the problem in PCAS, Chen, Lee and Warinschi [CLW12] proposed an enhanced PCAS
(ePCAS), as shown in Figure 7.5, and proved that this modified solution is third party anonymous, un-
forgeable and deniable. The major modification is to let the TPM create a signature on its EK using
its AK. To do this, it is required that the TPM needs to check on the validation of the (apk,epk) list to
ensure that both the AK and EK belonging to the TPM. However, in reality the TPM cannot do this check
because of its limited capabilities, so this key validation checking is just an assumption. On the other
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TPM Host Credential provider
ask,esk cert/epk,apk,cpk cert/epk,csk
load ak = (apk,ask)
If ak is unknown reject
scer← SIGask(epk) scer−−−→ apk,cert/epk,scer−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
If cert/epk is invalid,
return ⊥
If scer/apk/epk is in-
valid, return ⊥
create k
c← ENCepk(apk|k)
cred← SIGcsk(apk)
apk|k←DECesk(c) c←−−− c, d←−−−−− d← ENCk(cred)
If apk is unknown reject
k−−−→ cred←DECk(d) Record (epk,cred/apk)
Verify cred
Figure 7.5: The enhanced privacy-CA solution (ePCAS) in [CLW12](2010)
hand, the host may be corrupted; without the key validation checking, the malicious host can take the
EK of a corrupt TPM, say TPMA, and ask an honest TPM, say TPMB, to create SIGaskB(epkA). This can
be done since, if a signing is not “restricted”, the TPM does not check the input message to be signed.
In [CLW12], the conditions of the AK is not required and the credential provider has no way to check
whether the self-certificate scer was created in the full control of the TPM or in the control of the host.
As shown in Figure 7.6, Chen, Page and Smart [CPS10a] proposed another DAA Join protocol, where
the credential provider creates a one-time Message Authentication Code key (k←Mk), encrypts it along
with a nonce nI under to the TPM’s EK, and sends the ciphertext to the TPM. The TPM decrypts
the ciphertext, computes a commitment of its AK in a similar method of [CMS09] and a MAC value
τ←MACk(comm|nI), and returns comm,nI , τ to the credential provider. After verifying these values,
the credential provider creates and returns the credential of the AK and record (epk,cred/apk). Re-
cently, Whitefield et. al [WCS+19] have demonstrated that this protocol also suffers from the man-in-
the-middle attack by a corrupted but undetected TPM. Their attack is similar to the one discussed in
the attack [CW10] to the TPM 1.2 privacy-CA solution and the attack to the first DAA Join protocol as
discussed in the earlier part of this section. The DAA scheme of [CPS10a] has been adopted by the TCG
and specified in the TPM 2.0 specifications [Tru14], and also been adopted by the ISO/IEC and specified
in ISO/IEC 20008-2 [Int13]. The TCG has taken the MAC idea from this paper and modified the TPM
1.2 “activate credential” command to obtain the TPM 2.0 “activate credential” command by adding the
MAC function, but does not let the TPM output the MAC value τ. As mentioned in the earlier part of this
paper, ISO/IEC 20008-2 simply ignores on how to authenticate the TPM but requires a secure and au-
thentic channel between the TPM and credential provider, which, unfortunately, can not be implemented
by using any TPM chips.
Several other papers have also discussed on building an authentication channel between the TPM and cre-
dential provider, although they have not proposed any new scheme. Bernhard et al. [BFG+13] highlighted
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TPM Host Credential provider
ask,esk cert/epk,apk,cpk cert/epk,csk
cert/epk−−−−−−→ If cert/epk is invalid,
return ⊥
k←Mk,nI ← {0,1}t
comm← comm(ask) c←−−− c←−−− c← ENCepk(k|nI)
k|nI ←DECesk(c)
τ← MACk(comm|nI) comm,nI ,τ−−−−−−−→ comm,nI ,τ−−−−−−−→ If nI or τ is invalid,
return ⊥
Verify cred
cred←−−−−− cred← SIGcsk(apk)
Record (epk,cred/apk)
Figure 7.6: The DAA Join protocol in [CPS10a](2010)
some existing authentication channels. Later Camenisch et al. [CDL16] proposed a model for the au-
thentication channel F∗auth, discussed in Subsection 7.4, however the authors didn’t provide any concrete
authentication channel instead they said “We design a functionality F∗auth modeling the desired chan-
nel, which allows us to rather use the abstract functionality in the protocol design instead of a concrete
sub-protocol. Then, any protocol that securely realizes F∗auth can be used for the initial authentication”.
Camenisch et al. [CDL17] and [CCD+17] totally ignored the authentication channel and only used F∗auth
from [CDL16].
7.4 Analysis of the Existing Security Models
In this section we briefly define the existing security models and discuss their limitation in modelling the
security channel for the TPM/ Issuer communication channel in a DAA join protocol, other limitations
of these models were discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Simulation-Based models
A simulation-based security model defines an ideal functionality, which can be realized as a central
trusted authority that receives inputs from all parties and provides them with outputs. In a simulation
model, we say that a protocol is secure if its behaviour is indistinguishable from the ideal functionality.
A major limitation of simulation models, is that all the simulation models didn’t clearly model the com-
munication channel between the TPM and the issuer in a DAA join interface, few papers gave concrete
schemes for such communication channel whose security was proved in the simulation based model such
as Brickell et al. [BCC04] but can be attacked, or secure schemes but can’t be implemented in a TPM
chip such as in Chen et al. [CMS09] (details are discussed in Section 7.3), however no simulation-based
model for the channel was clearly presented.
Game-Based models
Game-based models are designed to capture the DAA features via game-based definitions. Such defini-
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tions capture every security property in a separate security game.
As the simulation models, a major limitation the game models is that they all failed to present a clear
game-based model for the communication channel between the TPM and the issuer in the DAA join
protocol. Most of the schemes that were proved secure in the game based model have ignored the com-
munication channel between the TPM and privacy-CA. Two concrete protocols PCAS and ePCAS were
proposed by Chen et al. in [CW10] and [CLW12] respectively for the communication channel and proved
secure in the game-based model, however these protocols can be attacked for the reasons explained in
Section 7.3. The DAA scheme by Chen et al. in [CPS10a] proposed an authentication channel in the
game-based model, however this channel lacks the key binding security requirement as explained in
Section 7.3.
UC models
The UC model for DAA protocol was first introduced by Camenish et al. [CDL16]. In the UC model
framework the security of protocols is preserved under a general protocol composition operation. An
environment ε should not be able to distinguish with a non-negligible probability between two worlds:
1. The real world, where each part in the DAA protocol Π executes its assigned part of the protocol. The
network is controlled by an adversary A that communicates with ε.
2. The ideal world, in which all parties forward their inputs to a trusted third party, which is the ideal
functionality, that internally performs all the required tasks and creates the party’s outputs.
A protocol Π is said to securely realize the ideal functionality if for every adversary A performing an
attack in the real world, there is an ideal world adversary S that performs the same attack in the ideal
world.
Unlike the simulation and game based models, Camenish et al. [CDL16] proposed a UC model that
defines an abstract functionality F∗auth to model the authentication channel between the TPM and the
Issuer in the Join interface of DAA protocol, however this definition is very abstract and not clearly
explained. Camenish et al. [CDL17] and [CCD+17] totally ignored the TPM/Issuer communication
channel.
Semi-Authenticated Channels via F∗auth Figure7.7 recalls F
∗
auth functionality from Subsection 3.3.3.
This functionality must captures the fact that a sender S sends a message containing both authenticated
and unauthenticated parts to a receiver R, while giving the host F the power to block the message,
replace it and block the communication. F∗auth capture these requirements. The fuctionality ensures that
even if a corrupted party change the unathenticated part of a message, this change should not affect the
authenticated part. Clearly, F∗auth realizes the above described authentication channels. However, F
∗
auth
is a very abstract (assumption) model that has never been used in the security proofs for the UC models,
nor in the implementation.
Note that F∗auth model doesn’t realize all the abilities of the host (Forwarder F in the model), as the host
can simply coordinates a set of corrupted TPMs and infleunces the message flow by sending the issuer’s
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1. On input (SEND, sid, ssid,µ1,µ2,F) from S , check that sid = (S ,R,sid′) for some R and output
(REPLACE1, sid, ssid,µ1,µ2,F) to S;
2. On input (REPLACE1,sid, ssid,µ′2,F) from S, output (APPEND, sid, ssid,µ1,µ
′
2) to F.
3. On input (APPEND, sid, ssid,µ′′2 ) from F, output (REPLACE2, sid, ssid,µ1,µ
′′
2 ) to S.
4. On input (REPLACE2, sid, ssid,µ′′′2 ) from S, output (SENT, sid, ssid,µ1,µ
′′′
2 ) to R
Figure 7.7: The special authenticated communicatioin functionality F∗auth
messages to a corrupt TPM and blocking some messages for another honest TPM. Thus the above model
fails to realize the real power of the host and cannot catch many possible attacks that can be done by the
host. Also the above model is very abstract and cannot be implememted in a real TPM chip as the TPM
is not able to handle the sessions sid, jsid and ssid that are required in the UC model.
7.5 The New Security Model
In this section we present a security model for an authentication channel. We first define some lists
and oracles that will be used for our security model, then present the four security properties that are
realized by our model: third-party anonymity, unforgeability, deniablity and key authentication binding.
We adopt the security requirements that were initially defined in Chen et al. [CLW12] for the enhanced
PCAS (ePCAS), but we split the unforgeability defined in [CLW12] into two categories: 1. Our definition
of the unforgeability states that no adversary can forge a credential on a TPM’s DAA public key, this is
the first part of the unforgeability defined in [CLW12]. 2. The second part of the unforgeability defined
in [CLW12] is that no adversary can output a valid self-certificate scer issued by a TPM with DAA key
pair (sk, pk) on an endorsement key epk, with ValidKey(epk, pk) = 0, we name this property key binding
in our model. The reason why we focus on the key binding requirement is that none of the previously
proposed communication channels achieve this property. Chen et al. [CLW12] included this property in
the unforgeability, however the protocol failed to achieve this property since the TPM uses TPM2-Sign
to create signature on its endorsement key epk under his signing short-term key sk, without proper check
that the TPM owns epk. In fact Validkey(epk, pk) check cannot be implemented by the current TPM as
we mentioned before, to solve this problem we propose the use TPM2-Certify in our protocol instead of
TPM2-Sign, this ensure that the TPM can perform a proper internal check to make sure that it owns epk
before creating any signature.
We adopt the definitions of the following lists from [CLW12] that will be accessed by some oracles:
• ValidKey: contains the list of pairs (epk, pk) with the meaning that the key pk is a valid key for the
TPM with public key epk. We write ValidKey(epk, pk) = 1 to indicate that the pair (epk, pk) belongs to
ValidKey, and ValidKey(epk, pk) = 0 otherwise. This global set is shared by all the TPM, CHb, Bond
and TRAN oracles.
• ValidTPM: denotes the list of pairs (epk,cpk), each pair indicates that the CA with public key cpk
knows the TPM with public key epk, in real world this means that epk is validated by the TPM’s man-
ufacturer. We write ValidTPM(epk,cpk) = 1 to indicate that the pair (epk,cpk) belongs to ValidTPM,
and ValidTPM(epk,cpk) = 0 otherwise. This global set is shared by all the CA, Bond and CHb oracles.
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Oracles needed in the security games
Following the model in[CLW12], we define the following oracles that are similar to those defined in
[CLW12] but with different behaviours that fit with our security proof. We also add a new oracle bond
that is needed in the key binding security game.
• TPM(epkl, pk): the adversary can use this oracle to interact with TPM tl
• CA(cpk j,epkl, pk): The adversary can use this oracle to interact with CA c j.
• CorrCA( j): This oracle allow the adversary to access the signing key of CA c j
• CorrTPM(l): This oracle allows the adversary to access the secret decryption key of the TPM t j.
• TRAN(epkl,cpk j): This oracle returns a public transcript between TPM and CA in a transaction.
• The Bond oracle access the sets of endorsement and DAA keys epk and pk respectively, and return a
pair (epkl, pk) where epkl← epk and pk← pk such that ValidKey(epkl, pk) = 0.
• CHb(epkl0 ,epkl1 ,cpk j): This oracle defines a a third party anonymity. The adversary sends a tuple
(epkl0 ,epkl1 ,cpk j) to the oracle and get back (pk,cer) executed by the TPM tlb and CA c j.
A TPM oracle is parametrized by an endorsement key (epk,esk). The oracle expects to recieve as input a
pair of key (epkl, pk). The TPM uses TPM-2 Certify command to check that pk is one of the short-term
keys which that TPM owns, and signs its long-term public key epk under the short-term signing key
sk creating a self certificate scer. Later the oracle expects to recieve the credential blob CB, together
with the encrypted seed sˆ under epkl. The TPM runs TPM-2 activate credential command to return the
credential key K ; otherwise the oracle aborts the execution.
The CA oracle is parametrized by the verification and signing keys (cpk,csk). The oracle expects to
recieve (pk,epk, scer) as an input. If the self certificate is not a valid signature on epk under sk, the
oracle aborts. Otherwise, the oracle uses make-credential command to check that epkl is a certified key,
i.e. validated by the TPM’s manufacturer, then creates the credential C, as a signature on pk, a credential
key K and a seed s, symmetric encryption key, ke, HMAC key kh using a key derivation function, finally
outputs the credential blob CB, sˆ and the encrypted credential Cˆ.
The CHb oracle is activiated by a tuple (epkl0 ,epkl1 ,cpk j), where epkl0 and epkl1 are two different TPM
public keys and cpk j is a CA public key. The oracle aborts if:
• ValidTPM(cpk j,epkl0 )⊕ValidTPM(cpk j,epkl1 ) = 1 .
• If any of esk0, esk1 or csk j is corrupt.
Otherwise, the oracle generates a new key pair (sk, pk) and randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0,1}. Then
assigns the generated pk to TPM tlb and updates the ValidKey. The oracle now runs TPM(epklb , pk)
and CA(cpk j). The CHb oracle computes the credential on pk according to the results of CA and
TPM(epklb , pk) and ouputs (pk,C)
The TRAN oracle takes (epkl,cpk j) as an input. TRAN oracle then runs CA and TPM oracles to abtain
a public transcript τ in a transaction between TPM tl and CA c j. Finally, the CA corruption oracle
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CorrCA and the TPM corruption oracle CorrTPM have access to the CAs and TPMs secret signing key
respectively.
The Bond oracle have access to CorrTPM oracle to get a corrupted endorsement key (epkl,eskl),
get a TPM public key from the public key list pk ← pk, and returns a pair (epkl, pk) such that
ValidKey(epkl, pk) = 0
The behaviour of the above oracles is summarized in Figure 7.8.
We now present the required security properties needed in our security model.
Third-party anonymity: Given a pair (pk,C), we say that the protocol is third-party anonymous if no third
party can determine which TPM is issued a credential C on its DAA public key pk, except the engaged
TPM and CA. We assume that the adversary can collude with any malicious CAs or TPMs except the
two challenged TPMs and the corresponding CA that creates credential for one of the challenged TPMs.
Therefore, the adversary can access the ValidTPM and ValidKey lists. We also require that the DAA
public keys to be disjoint, i.e. there doesn’t exist two TPMs that both share the same pk. The adversary
queries TPM, CA, CorrTPM, and CorrCA oracles, then outputs a tuple (epkl0 ,epkl1 ,cpk j), where epkl0
and epkl1 are two different TPM public keys and cpk j is a CA public key. The adversary then queries
a CHb, TPM, CA and CorrCA oracles. We don’t allow the adversary to query the challenge DAA key
pk to TPM or CA oracles or access ValidKey after CHb oracle query. At the end of the experiment, the
adversary outputs a bit b.
Definition 4. [CLW12] Third party anonymity:
AdvanonA (η) = |Pr[Expanon−0A (η) = 1]−Pr[Expanon−1A (η) = 1]|
we say that the protocol is third-party anonymous if Advanon
A
(η) is a negligible function of η for all
polynomial time adversaries A.
Unforgeability: We say that a protocol is unforgeable if no adversary can forge a credential on a TPM’s
DAA public key. Our experiment of unforgeability proceeds as follows: Keys are generated for the TPMs
and issuers, and the adversary is given all the public keys. Let epk and cpk denote the sets of TPMs
and issuer public keys respectively. An authority Auth specify ValidKey ⊂ epki × {0,1}∗ and ValidTPM
⊂ cpk×epk lists. As in the third anonymity experiment, we also require that the DAA keys to be disjoint,
i.e. there doesn’t exist two different TPMs that both share the same pk. The adversary is also given
access to some CorrTPM and CorrCA oracles. At the end of the execution, the adversary outputs a tuple
(epkl∗ ,cpk j∗ , pk∗,C∗), where epkl∗ ∈ epk, cpk j∗ ∈ cpk and pk∗,C∗ ∈ {0,1}∗. The experiment outcome can
be analysed as follows:
• The experiment returns 0 if CB ,H|len16(Kˆ)|Kˆ|QN .
• If C∗ is not a valid signature on pk∗, the experiment returns 0.
• If csk j∗ has been corrupted, the experiment returns 0.
• If Issuer j∗ with verificaton key cpk∗ has never certified pk∗, or the tuple (epkl,cpk j∗ , pk∗,C∗) (for some
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TPM(epkl, pk)
• scer = T PM2− certi f y(sk;epkl)
• send scer
• recieve CB, sˆ,Cˆ
• s = adec(sˆ,eskl)
• ke = KDF(s,QN)
• kh = KDF(s,NULL)
• H′=hmac(kh, len16(Kˆ)|Kˆ|QN)
• K = sdec(Kˆ,ke)
• send K
CA(cpk j,epkl, pk)
recieve scer
if ValidTPM(cpk j,epkl)=0. then abort
If VER(pk;epkl, scer) = 0, then abort
• C = S IG(csk j, pkli )
• K← KG(λ)
• QN = nameAlgID16|Hname(pk)
• s← {0,1}t
• ke = KDF(s,QN)
• kh = KDF(s,NULL)
• Kˆ = senc(K,ke)
• H=hmac(kh, len16(Kˆ)|Kˆ|QN)
• CB =H|len16(Kˆ)|Kˆ|QN
• sˆ = aenc(s,epkl)
• Cˆ = senc(C,K)
• send CB, sˆ,Cˆ
Bond(epkl, pk)
• ValidTPM(cpk j,epkl)=0, then abort
• eskl← CorrTPM
• pk← pk
• If (epkl, pk) ∈ ValidKey, abort
• else return (epkl, pk)
TRAN (epkl,cpk j)
• (pk, sk)← KG(λ)
• (CB, sˆ,Cˆ)←CA(cpk j,epklb , pk)
• (scer,K)← T PM(epkl, pk)
• τ← (scer,CB, sˆ,Cˆ)
• return τ
CHb(epkl0 ,epkl1 ,cpk j)
• ValidTPM(cpk j,epkl0 )⊕ValidTPM(cpk j,epkl1 )=1,
then abort
• If csk j is corrupt, then abort
• If esk0 or esk1 is corrupt, abort
• (pk, sk)← KG(λ)
• CB′, sˆ′,Cˆ′←CA(cpk j,epklb , pk)
• (scer,K′)← T PM(epklb , pk)
• C← sdec(K′,Cˆ)
• return (pk,C)
T PM∗(epkl, pk)
• scer = T PM2− certi f y(sk;epkl)
• send scer
• recieve CB, sˆ,Cˆ
• s = adec(sˆ,eskl)
• ke = KDF(s,QN)
• kh = KDF(s,NULL)
• H′=hmac(kh, len16(Kˆ)|Kˆ|QN)
• K = sdec(Kˆ,ke)
Figure 7.8: TPM, CA, TRAN, Bond, CHb and T PM∗(epkl, pk) oracles
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TPM with endorsement key epkl) exists in RegList but ValidKey(epkl, pk∗) = 0, the experiment returns
1.
Definition 5. [CLW12] Unforgeability: We define
Advun f orge
A
(η) = Pr[Expun f orge
A
= 1]
we say that the protocol is unforgeable if Advun f orge
A
(η) is a negligible function of η for all polynomial
time adversaries A.
Deniability We say that a protocol is deniable if a TPM can deny that it was engaged in a transaction with
some CA even if this transaction actually took place. Following the definition from [CLW12], we define
two kinds of deniability: strong deniability and weak deniability, we will show that our protocol catches
the two security requirements.
Definition 6. Strong/Weak Deniability: we say that a scheme is strong/weak deniable if for each adver-
sary A that outputs a real transcript τ0 from an interaction in real transaction, there exists a simulator S
that can produce τ1 which is indistinguishable from τ0.
As in the unforgeability game, in the deniability game the keys are generated for the TPMs and CAs,
and the adversary is given all the public keys. Let epk and cpk denote the sets of TPMs and CA public
keys respectively. An authority Auth specify ValidKey ⊂ epki × {0,1}∗ and ValidTPM ⊂ cpk× epk lists.
A and S are given access to (epk,cpk,csk, ValidTPM). This shows that the adversary can collude with
all CAs. We also assume in this experiment that the TPMs and hosts are honest, thus the adversary can’t
have access to the ValidKey list. In the strong deniability game, the adversay access some T PM∗ oracle
in Figure 7.8 (same as TPM oracle but the oracle doesn’t output K as we assume the hosts are honest)
and outputs τ0. There is no need for A to access the CA oracle as it already knows csk.
In the weak deniability game, A has access to TRAN oracle described in Figure 7.8, A then outputs a
transcript τ0. The simulator that can access all the secret signing keys of CAs runs A as a black box and
outputs τ1. A distinguisher D is given τb ∈ {τ0, τ1} and finally outputs a decision bit b.
Definition 7. [CLW12] Deniability:
AdvdeniA (η) = |Pr[Expdeni−0A (η) = 1]−Pr[Expdeni−1A (η) = 1]|
we say that the protocol is strongly/weakly deniable if Advdeni
A
(η) is a negligible function of η for all
polynomial time distinguishers D.
Key Binding: We say that a protocol has a key binding if there exist an authentication that binds the
TPM’s long-term endorsement key and the TPM’s DAA key pk. In a DAA protocol, this property ensures
that the issuer must be able to authenticate a TPM with a given endorsement key associated with a DAA
key. We assume that the adversary can access the ValidTPM and ValidKey lists. We also require that
the DAA public keys to be disjoint, i.e. there doesn’t exist two TPMs that both share the same pk. The
adversary queries TPM, CA and Bond oracles. The adversary runs the oracles and wins the experiment
if it can output a valid self certificate scer that is issued by the TPM oracle with a DAA key pair (sk, pk)
on an endorsement key epkl, with ValidKey(epkl, pk) = 0.
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Definition 8. Key Binding: We define
AdvBondA (η) = Pr[Exp
Bond
A = 1]
we say that the protocol has an authentication key binding property if AdvBond
A
(η) is a negligible function
of η for all polynomial time adversaries A.
7.6 The Proposed Solution
TPM(tl) Host(hl) Issuer (CA – c j)
epkl,eskl epkl,cpk j,pk
∗
li csk j,epkl
[pkli,skli] =t.load(pk
∗
li)
pk∗li←−−−
join epkl ,pkli−−−−−−−−−−→
if check keys(epkl,pkli)
fails: reject
n j← {0,1}λ
bsn← choose basename
[s2,y2] =
n j ,bsn←−−−−−
map to point(bsn)
P1 ,s2 ,y2←−−−−−−
[cv,E,K,L] =t.commit(P1,s2,y2)
cv,E,K,L−−−−−−→ h = H(P1 ‖ pkli ‖ E ‖ K ‖ L ‖ n j)
h←−−
[Att,nt ,s]=t.certify(skli;cv, h)
Att,nt ,s−−−−−→ cert = (Att,nt ,s,h,K) cert−−→
if
check cert(pkli,epkl,cert)
fails: abort
C=gen DAA credential(pkli,
csk j)
key← {0,1}λ
[cb, sˆ, Cˆ] =make credential(
epkl,pkli,C,key)
cb, sˆ←−−− cb, sˆ,Cˆ←−−−−−
t.activate credential(cb, sˆ)
key−−−→ C = sdec(Cˆ, key)
verify C
h′ = H(C ‖ n j) h
′
−→ verify h′
join complete
Figure 7.9: Authentication channel using TPM commands
In this section we propose a new authentication channel based on using TPM2 commands, see Figure 7.9.
To save space in the figure the TPM2 commands are all written as t.command. We may use ‖ sign to
represent concatinations. The actual TPM2 commands are described in Section 7.6.1. Our design relies
on [CLW12], but with the following simplifications:
• the TPM2 Load command (t.load) ensures that the TPM actually created the key blob, (pkli)∗ and so
there is no need to define the abstract set ”Known” as in [CLW12].
• the TPM2 Certify command (t.certify) is used to self certify epkl instead of using the TPM2 Sign
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algorithm.
• the make credential procedure is used by the Issuer to create the credential blob cb, an encrypted
authentication seed sˆ, and an encrypted credential Ĉ. The Issuer carries out the calculations needed,
either standalone, or by using its own TPM and the TPM2 MakeCredential command.
• the TPM2 ActivateCredential command (t.activate credential) is run by the TPM to unwrap the cre-
dential blob and return the key key.
Thus our authentication channel requires the TPM only to load the keys (pkli,skli), run TPM2 Certify
and TPM2 ActiviateCredential. While the Issuer does most of the other calculations. These changes
save a lot of checks, decryption, encryption and signatures that were done outside the scope of TPM
commands in the previous authentication channels and also achieves a better security level as we will
discuss in Section 7.5.
7.6.1 The Relevant TPM Commands
In the DAA Join protocol, the Host communicates with an Issuer to obtain a credential to use with the
DAA key. Calls to the TPM are used to obtain the necessary keys and information that the Issuer requires.
One important call to the TPM (TPM2 ActivateCredential) is used to convince the Issuer that the DAA
key, Q, that is has received has been generated by the TPM whose endorsement key, E, it has already
received and checked. The activate credential procedure is described next.
Before describing the TPM2 ActivateCredential, TPM2 Sign and TPM2 Certify procedures we will
give some general information that we will need to rely on later. These notes are based on the TPM 2.0
specifications version [Tru14].
When a key is created the user is given a public data structure which contains information about the
key and the public key itself. For a primary key (one at the top of the hierarchy) no private key data is
provided. For other (child) keys the user is also given a private data structure, this is encrypted using a
key held by its parent and is just stored and used when a key needs to be loaded.
The public data structure is, as it says, public and can be used to give others information about the key
and the key’s public key itself. The precise details of the structure depend on the type of key being used,
and are given in the TPM 2.0 specifications. Here we just give details of the public data structure that are
needed for what follows:
1. type – the type of the key. We will be only considering RSA and ECC keys here.
2. nameAlg – the identifier for the hash algorithm used to calculate the name of the key (see the note
below).
3. objectAttributes – the attributes of the key. These determine how the key can be used. The important
attributes for the discussion here are:
(a) fixedTPM – the object is fixed to this TPM.
(b) fixedParent – the parent of the object may not change.
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(c) restricted – the key can only be used on structures that have a known format.
(d) decrypt – the private key may be used to decrypt.
(e) sign/encrypt – for a symmetric cipher object, the private key can be used to encrypt. For other
objects the private key may be used to sign.
4. parameters – these depend on the type of key. In particular, for signing keys, the parameters include
the signing scheme to be used. Note that, if this is TPM ALG NULL, the signing scheme is specified
in the signing command.
5. unique – the unique data for the object, for an asymmetric key this would be the public key
Two names for the key are used in what follows:
• The key’s name – this is derived from the key’s public data
name = nameAlgID16 ‖ Hname(Qpd)
nameAlgID16 is the 16-bit identifier for the hash algorithm, Hname (0x000b for SHA256). Using the
key’s name in what follows makes sure that the key’s properties cannot be altered to fool a user into
thinking that the key is restricted and that it’s signature can be relied upon when it is not.
• The key’s qualified name – this is a hash of the key’s name concatenated with the qualified name of its
parent (and so on up the hierarchy). This ties the key to the hierarchy where it was created.
The Activate Credential procedure
At the start of the procedure to issue a credential, the Issuer receives:
1. E – a certified copy of the public endorsement key.
2. The public data of the DAA key (Qpd). For TPM 2.0 the DAA key is an ECC key.
The Issuer generates a credential, C (to use with the DAA key) together with a random credential key, K.
The credential key, K, is used to encrypt the credential and the activate credential process used to make
sure that K can only be used by the host if:
1. E comes from a TPM used by the Host.
2. The DAA key was generated by the same TPM.
To do this the Issuer:
1. Validates E by checking that the certificate for the key has been validated by the TPM’s manufacturer.
The Issuer should also check that E has the correct properties to ’unwrap’ the credential blob that will
be generated.
2. Confirms that the DAA key has the necessary properties for the credential being issued. The DAA key
should be an restricted ECC signing key that is fixed to the TPM and fixed to the parent.
3. Calculates the name of the DAA key, as described above.
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4. Generates a random seed value, s.
s← {0,1}t
5. Derives a symmetric encryption key, ke, and an HMAC key, kh using a key derivation function (KDF).
These keys are used to protect the key key. The seed and the name of the DAA key are both parameters
of the KDF. Using the name is important as it ties in the attestation key. An additional parameter is used
in the KDF to separate the different keys, for ke it is “STORAGE”, while for kh it is “INTEGRITY”
(both are null terminated strings and the null is included in the calculations). For our purposes we
write:
ke = KDF(s,”S TORAGE”,Qn)
kh = KDF(s,”INT EGRITY”,NULL)
6. Encrypts K using the key, ke, giving K̂. This will use AES 128 in CFB mode with an IV of zero.
K̂ = senc(K,ke)
7. Generates an HMAC, H, for K̂ using the key kh. The HMAC also incorporates the key name, Qn:
H = hmac(kh, len16(K̂) ‖ K̂ ‖ Qn)
8. The encrypted key and the HMAC together form a ‘credential blob’, cb=H ‖ len16(K̂) ‖ K̂.
9. Encrypts the seed s using E, giving sˆ – in the TPM standard this is called the secret. The encryption
uses RSA-OAEP encryption with SHA256 as the hash function and MGF1 padding.
ŝ = aenc(label, s,E)
10. Encrypts C using K, giving Ĉ.
Ĉ = senc(C,K)
11. Sends the encrypted credential, Ĉ, the credential blob, cb=H ‖ len16(K̂) ‖ K̂, and the secret, sˆ, to the
Host.
In the protocol diagram below this process will be abbreviated as:
[cb, sˆ ] = make credential(E,Qpd,K) and
Ĉ = senc(C,K)
The Host uses the TPM command to unwrap the credential blob and return the key,K. To do this the Host
loads the endorsement and DAA keys into the TPM and then uses TPM2 ActivateCredential to obtain
the key, to do this the command:
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1. Decrypts the secret seed, s, using the private endorsement key.
s = adec(label, ŝ,e)
2. Uses the seed together with DAA key’s name (which the TPM already knows) to generate the encryp-
tion and HMAC keys that were used to create the credential blob.
ke = KDF(s,”S TORAGE”,Qn)
kh = KDF(s,”INT EGRITY”,NULL)
3. Uses these keys to check the integrity of the blob and decrypt the key, K. To do this:
(a) The credential blob is split into its component parts, H and len16(K̂) ‖ K̂
(b) The HMAC is calculated
H′ = hmac(kh, len16(K̂) ‖ K̂ ‖ Qn)
and checked against the value from the credential blob.
(c) The credential key, K, is calculated
K = sdec(K̂,ke)
4. The credential key is then returned to the Host.
The Host can then decrypt and use the credential, C.
C = senc(Ĉ,K)
In the join protocol this procedure is used twice. In the first case there is no credential to be encrypted, but
the Issuer wants to check that the Host has access to the TPM and can therefore unwrap the credential blob
that it creates. In the second case the credential is the A, B, C and D values that form the DAA credential
together with the signature that the Host uses to validate the credential that it has received from the Issuer.
7.6.2 Using a DAA key without a credential
Even without a credential the DAA key can be used, but the anonymity will be lost. Using a DAA key is
a two stage process, we first use TPM2 Commit to get the TPM ready and then we can use TPM2 Sign
or TPM2 Certify, to sign a message or certify a key.
TPM2 Commit This command is used to prepare the TPM for the DAA key to be used. There are a
number of different options for the inputs to this command. Here were are setting the inputs to be empty
and the command then does the following:
1. Generate a new counter value, cv and an associated random number, rcv ∈ Zn, where n is the order of
the elliptic curve being used.
2. Calculate a point E = [rcv]P1, where P1 is the generator for the curve.
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3. Return the counter value, cv and the point E to the caller.
Calculate the commitment value The commitment value, p is calculated as
p = H(P1 ‖ Q ‖ E ‖ str)
Where str is a user defined string.
TPM2 Sign To use TPM2 Sign the string, str, used to calculate the commitment value is the message
itself. For a restricted key (which we are considering) the commitment value, p, must be hashed again by
the TPM using TPM2 Hash. This hash operation checks the data being hashed to see that it does not begin
with the TPM GENERATED VALUE (0xFF544347). Provided this is the case the hash function returns
a ticket confirming this and the hash value, ptpm. The ticket and the hash value, can then be passed to
TPM2 Sign together with the cv value returned from the TPM2 Commit command. TPM2 Sign carries
out the following operations:
1. Check the ticket.
2. Using the cv value it can to retrieve the nonce, rcv (also generated as part of the TPM2 Commit com-
mand).
3. Calculate:
h1 = ptpm = H(p)
nS ← {0,1}t
h2 = H(nS ‖ h1) (mod n)
s = rcv + h2 · f (mod n)
The signature is the pair of values (nS , s).
TPM2 Certify The TPM provides a call which certifies that a given key is loaded into the TPM, this
call is TPM2 Certify. This call generates a data structure attesting that the key is a TPM key that can be
loaded into the TPM. This data structure is then signed using one of the TPM’s signing keys. Confidence
in this certification depends on the properties of the signing key that is used, so a signing key that is not
restricted and not fixed to the TPM cannot be relied upon, while one that is restricted and fixed to the
TPM provides much more confidence. In our case we are using a DAA key which by definition is a
restricted signing key that is fixed to the TPM.
To certify a key, QK , we first load it into the TPM. We then call TPM2 Certify passing in the commitment
data, p, and the counter that was previously generated.
TPM2 Certify carries out the following operations:
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1. Generate the attestation data for the key, this data is described in Part 1 of the TPM 2.0 specifications
(pg. 194) [Tru14]. For TPM2 Certify, this data structure has the following fields:
(a) magic – a 32 bit number that is used to tag structures that are generated by a TPM (referred to as
the TPM GENERATED VALUE, 0xFF544347)
(b) type – the type of the attestation structure - in this case it is
TPM ST ATTEST CERTIFY (0x8017).
(c) qualifiedSigner – the qualified name of the signing key. When using a DAA key this field is set to
be an empty buffer.
(d) extraData – external information provided by the caller. This field is set to the commitment data,
p.
(e) clockInfo – clock data.
(f) firmwareVersion – a 64 bit number identifying the firmware version.
(g) name – the name of the key being certified.
(h) qualifiedName – the qualified name of the key being certified. When using a DAA key to certify a
key this field is set to be an empty buffer.
Note:
The clockInfo and firmwareVersion fields are not important for the protocol that we are discussing
here.
In what follows we refer to this attestation data as Att.
2. The TPM then uses the DAA key to sign this attestation data structure. To do this it uses the com-
mitment data p and the counter value cv returned from the TPM2 Commit command. Using the cv
value it can to retrieve the nonce, rcv (also generated as part of the TPM2 Commit command) and then
calculates:
h1 = H(p ‖ H(Att))
nC ← {0,1}t
h2 = H(nC ‖ h1) (mod n)
s = rcv + h2 · f (mod n)
The certification consists of the attestation data Att, the value of s and the nonce nC . This can be used
together with the values generated when preparing the DAA key to verify the certificate.
While the important fields used here can be obtained using other TPM calls we can only use a restricted
TPM key to sign data that is generated internally, or that has been hashed by the TPM and provided with
a ’ticket’ guaranteeing that the hashed data did not begin with the ’magic’ string (using TPM2 Hash).
7.7 Security Proof
Theorem 10. Our protocol is a third-party anonymous if the encryption scheme used is CCA secure.
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Cearly, our protocol doesn’t satisfy full anonymity as the CA and the TPM engaged in a transcription can
identify the credential on the corresponding public key. However, no third party can tell to which TPM
an issued credential belongs since:
1. We assume that the DAA keys are selected from the same distribution.
2. The CA always creates a credential as follows: C = S IG(csk j, pk), without any interference of the
TPM’s identity or the long term endorsement key.
Proof. Assume that A is an adversary against third-party anonymity of our protocol in the above exper-
iment. We will show that Advanon
A
(η) is a negligible function of η. The CHb oracle assigns a public key
pk to TPM tlb after randomly selecting a bit b. CHb oracle then activates CA and the assigned TPM tlb
oracles, and finally outputs (Cˆ, sˆ,CB). The CA oracle always runs make-credential command to return
(Cˆ, sˆ,CB), where C is a signature on the TPM’s DAA public key, CB depends on pk and some randomnly
generated key K, and sˆ is the encypted random seed s under epklb . Clearly no third party can guss epklb
other than the TPM tlb and CA as long as no one can share the seed s with CA and tlb (encryption scheme
is CCA secure). We argue that no third party can guss s as long as tlb and CA are not corrupt. This
is true by our assumption that the adversary can collude with any malicious CAs ot TPMs except the
two challenged TPMs and the corresponding CA that creates credential for one of the challenged TPMs.
Therefore the adversary always outputs the decision bit b by guessing and
AdvanonA (η) = |Pr[Expanon−0A (η) = 1]−Pr[Expanon−1A (η) = 1]|
is a negligible function in η. 
Theorem 11. Our protocol is unforgeable if the signature scheme used in SIG is EU-CMA secure.
Proof. The adversary A that works for the Expun f orge
A
wins the unforgeability game if A can produce a
valid credential C∗ on some public pk∗ that has not been involved in an execution with the issuer, i.e
the adversary can output a valid tuple (cpk j∗ , pk∗,C∗) that doesn’t belong to the existing Registration
List (RegList). We assume that all the CA and TPM keys are obtained by running the key generation
algorithms (csk j,cpk j)← KG ∀ 1 ≤ j , j0 ≤ p(η) for some j0 selected uniformly from 1,2,3, · · · p(η) and
(eski,epki)← AKG ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ p(η) respectively. The public key for CA j0 is set to be the public key pk
that corresponds to some TPM, pk is an input from an adversary B that works for the Expeucma
B
. We
assume that an adversary B has access to CorrTPMs, CorrCAs except for c j0 . For any CA j with j , j0,
the adversary B runs the CA oracles defined in Figure 7.8. For CA j0 , the B provides the signature using
some signing oracle (the TPM with key pair (sk, pk) in our case). An adversary A produces a forgery
(cpk∗, pk∗,C∗), B aborts if cpk∗ , pk, otherwise B outputs his forgery (pk∗,C∗) with a probability 1p(η) .
Also if the tuple (pk, pk∗,C∗) doesn’t appear in RegList, hence (pk∗,C∗) is a successful forgery. Thus the
advantage of A to output a successful forgery is
Advun f orge
A
(η) ≤ 1
p(η)
AdveucmaB (η)

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T PM∗
S
(epkl, pk)
(pk, sk)← KG(η)
scer = T PM−2S ign(sk;epkl)
send scer
Figure 7.10: The simulated T PM∗
S
oracle
S(epk,cpk,csk, ValidTPM)
run A and answer A’s queries according to figure 7.10
τS←AT PM∗S(epk,cpk,csk,ValidT PM)
τ1← τS
output τ1
Figure 7.11: The simulator game for deniability
Theorem 12. Our protocol satisfies strong deniability.
Proof. We let the simulator S runs A and simulates the T PM∗
S
oracle. When A queries T PM∗ oracle,
the simulator answers A by generating a new DAA key pair (pk, sk), and creates a signature, using
TPM-2Sign algorithm instead of using the TPM-2Certify command, to create a signature on epk under
sk. Finally S outputs scer. From A point of view, the outputs of the simulated T PM∗
S
and the original
oracle T PM∗ are indistinguishable since we assume that A doesn’t have access to ValidKey. Once A
outputs a transcript τS , the simulator S uses it as its output τ1. Since we have perfect simulation, τ1 is
indistinguishable from A output τ0 in interaction with a real T PM∗ oracle. Therefore, AdvdeniA (η) is a
negligible function of η for all polynomial time distinguishers D. 
Theorem 13. Our protocol satisfies the key binding property if the signature scheme used in TPM2-
Certify is EU-CMA secure .
Proof. The adversary queries TPM, CA, CorrTPM and Bond oracles. The adversary then runs the bond,
TPM and CA (with verification keys (csk j,cpk j)← KG) oracles, and wins the experiment if it can out-
put a valid self certificate that is issued by the TPM oracle with DAA key pair (pk, sk) on a corrupted
TPM’s endorsement key epkl, with ValidKey(epkl, pk) = 0. We let the TPM oracle to runTPM-2Certify
command instead of TPM-2Sign command to create a signature on epkl under its siging key sk. Running
TPM-2Certify command ensures that the TPM checks that it is signing its own endorsement key before
creating scer, this check is a part of TPM-2 Certify discussed in section7.6.1. Therefore, the TPM or-
acle with signing key sk will abort when requested to sign an endorsement key epkl that is not its own
endorsement key, and hence the TPM oracle cannot output a valid self certificate on the corrupt endorse-
ment key epkl. Thus A cannot get such tuple (epkl, pk, scer,cpk j) by querying the TPM oracle. The only
way to win the game is to letA produce a valid self certificate that is accepted by the CA oracle, henceA
has to forge a signature on epkl under sk corresponding to pk and ValidKey(epkl, pk) = 0, this contradicts
our assumption that signature scheme used in TPM2-Certify is EU-CMA secure. Therefore AdvBond
A
(η)
is a negligible function of η for all polynomial time adversaries A. 
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Operations Proposed Channel
TPM2 CreatePrimary (2048-bit RSA key [Int06]) 18900
TPM2 Create (256-bit ECDAA key [CPS10a]) 215
TPM2 Load 38.2
TPM2 Commit 91
TPM2 Certify 59.5
TPM2 ActivateCredential 220
Compute a pairing 171
Calculate an AK credential 47.2
Table 7.1: Timings in Experiment (Each number is in milliseconds)
7.8 Implementation
The proposed authentication protocol for the DAA signature has been tested using an Infineon TPM 2.0
module (Infineon SLB9760) installed on a Raspberry Pi 3 (ARMv7) running Raspbian Linux 4.14.30.
The code was written in C++ and makes use of the IBM TSS (TPM Software Stack), OpenSSL (version
1.1.0f) and the Apache-Milagro Crypto library (version 3 of this library is used for the pairing functions
required in the ECDAA scheme [CPS10a]). We make use of the GNU g++ compiler and linker, version
6.3.0 to compile and link the code.
As the purpose of this experiment is to test the protocol in the TPM environment the focus was on
making the code clear and robust, we have not yet carried out any optimisation. In our tests we have no
network latency and so the time taken to run the protocol is dominated by the TPM calls and computing
the pairings. The timings from our experiment are shown in Table 7.1. There is some variability in
the values and so the results given in the table are the median values. The Host and CA operations are
implemented on the Raspberry Pi and most of them are very fast compared to the operations on the TPM.
We give two of the slower examples in the table: calculating the pairings and creating the credential of
an attestation key.
7.9 Comparison Between our Proposed Authentication Channel and
the Existing Channels
A brief comparison to the existing schemes is given in Table 7.2. We consider the four security properties
as listed in Section 7.2 plus the implementation in real TPM in Section 7.8. The details of the other
schemes are discussed in Section 7.3. This table demonstrates that our protocol is the first and only
solution achieving all the required properties.
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schemes 3rd-party unforge- deni key implemented
anonymity ability ability binding in a TPM
TPM 1.2 [Tru04] X X X − X
TPM 2.0 [Tru14] X X X − X
DAA Join protocols
[BCC04] -[BL10, Che09, CPS10a] X X X − X
[CMS09] X X − − −
A/S channel-based
DAA Join protocols
[CDL16, CCD+17, CDL17, KCB+19] X X X X −
ePCAS [CLW12, CW10] X X X − X
Our eACAS X X X X X
Table 7.2: A comparison to the existing solutions
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
The growing IoT infrastructure requires scaleable and reliable networks. While solutions based on the
CE paradigm solve part of the problem, by having Edge devices servicing small networks of IoT de-
vices, current solutions ensuring the trustworthiness of the network based on TPMs might not be secure
in the long-term. DAA protocols enable IoT systems to prove their genuineness and trustworthy state to
an Edge node in an anonymous way. However, currently standardised DAA schemes are susceptible to
post-quantum attacks. While [BK17] has recently proposed a lattice-based DAA protocol with conjec-
tured post-quantum security, it is computationally cumbersome, since both the TPM and the Host need
to individually generate large proofs-of-knowledge about their secret-key shares. In contrast, a novel
commitment scheme is herein proposed allowing for the construction of commitments to values shared
between the TPM and the Host. Building on this technique, we are then able to propose a lattice-based
DAA scheme wherein the TPM and the Host interact to produce a single proof-of-knowledge about their
shared secret-key. The proposed protocol is proved to be secure in the UC security model. Experimen-
tal results show that the resulting scheme reduces the storage requirements of the TPM twofold and the
signature size five times. Moreover, the signing and verification operations are accelerated 1.1 and 2.0
times, respectively. We further optimise the proposed scheme, to make it even more suitable to hard-
ware implementations and IoT applications, resulting with a compact quantum-safe lattice-based Direct
Anonymous Attestation protocol that can be suitable for inclusion in a future quantum-resistant TPM.
The security of our proposed scheme is proved in the Universal Composability (UC) model under the
assumed hardness of the Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE problems. The signature size of our proposed DAA
scheme is around 2MB, which is (at least) two orders of magnitude smaller compared to existing post-
quantum DAA schemes.
Working closely with DAA schemes, we noticed that the current DAA schemes ignore the authentication
channel between the TPM and the issuer, some provide weak authentication channels that are vulnerable
to many attacks and others propose secure authentication channel that cannot be implemented in the
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current TPM chip. Thus we fill such gap and propose a novel secure authentication channel that relies
on the current TPM2.0 commands. Our proposed channel doesn’t need any modification to the current
TPM2.0 commands and has good performance with the best aimed security.
As EPID can be seen as a DAA scheme with different linkability requirements, Enhanced Privacy
ID (EPID) is a more general scheme than Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) and thus does not split
signers into Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) and hosts, but also targets the creation of anonymous
signatures. Such similarities between EPID and DAA protocols has led our research to propose a post
quantum EPID scheme from lattices with a new Universal Composability (UC) model. While EPID plays
a determinant role in the security of Software Guard Extensions (SGX), the scheme currently deployed
by Intel will become insecure in the event that a large-scale quantum-computer is produced. In this
thesis, a novel EPID scheme is proposed, supported on lattice-based security assumptions, and achiev-
ing presumed quantum resistance. A security model for EPID is presented for the first time in the UC
framework, and the proposed scheme is proven secure under this model. When compared with a closely
related Lattice-based DAA (LDAA) scheme from related art, the proposed Lattice-based EPID (LEPID)
achieves a reduction in the private-key size of 1.5 times, and of the signature and verification times of 1.4
and 1.1 times, respectively, when no users have been revoked. It is furthermore shown, experimentally,
that the overhead introduced by the more effective revocation method of LEPID is minimal for small
to medium-sized communities. Finally, it is expected that the proposed LEPID may benefit from theo-
retical developments and hardware accelerators that result from the increased interest that lattice-based
cryptography has gathered in the last few years.
8.2 Future Work
This section outline some future research directions in the area of lattice-based direct anonymous attes-
tation, lattice-based EPID, and more general lattice-based anonymous signatures such as group and ring
signatures. Our future work includes and may not be restricted to the following main objectives:
• Implementation of our proposed compact LDAA scheme presented in Chapter 5. As we discussed
before, the signature produced by our compact LDAA scheme in [CEKLL19] is more than two order
of magnitudes shorter than the schemes in [KCB+19] and [BK17]. This result is very promising, thus
our proposed compact LDAA scheme will be implemented in the full range of TPM environments, i.e.,
hardware, software and virtualization environments. The scheme may be further optimised based on
performance evaluation.
• Investigation whether the final solution of this research will be an LDAA scheme suitable for inclu-
sion in the future quantum-resistant TPM, this work is in collaboration with the European H2020
FutureTPM project.
• Studying the security definitions for the quantum-resistant DAA under the quantum random oracle
model.
• Constructing a more efficient LEPID scheme built on the top of our proposed compact LDAA scheme,
that may benefit not only from future research developments in post-quantum cryptography but also
from instructions that may extend Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) in the future.
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• Finding more applications on DAA and EPID protocols in the real world.
• Further improvements to existing lattice-based anonymous signature schemes such as group and ring
signatures. Basically, we discussed in Subsection2.2.4 some existing lattice-based group and ring
signatures. However, these schemes require massive keys and signature sizes. Thus another identified
future work is to improve some existing lattice-based signature schemes and provide efficient zero-
knowledge proofs, to ensure practicality and efficiency of such existing schemes. Current thoughts
include the following:
1. Develop smarter zero knowledge proofs for lattice problems.
2. Implement the proofs, and ensure practicalilty and efficiency of such proofs.
The final research may lead to more efficient anonymous signatures that may be useful for inclusion in
post-quantum applications.
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